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INTRODUCTION

AWAVE of dissatisfaction with the existing indeterminate sentencing policies and practices swept across the nation in the early
1970's. Critics from a wide spectrum of political interests criticized
the use of the indeterminate sentence and the theory of rehabilitation
on which it rested.' The critics focused on the extensive disparity in
sentences and called for reforms to limit and structure discretionary
decisionmaking. 2 In response, various jurisdictions rejected indeterminate sentencing in favor of more systematically structured sentencing decisionmaking. State legislatures passed presumptive flat-time
sentencing 3 and mandatory minimum sentencing laws, 4 and abol1. For a discussion of the policies underlying indeterminate sentencing, see notes
13-14 and accompanying text infra.
2. For a general overview of sentencing reforms, see generally notes 18-21 and
accompanying text infra. See also Dowd, The Pit and the Pendulum- Correcttonal Law
Reform from the Sixties into the Eighties, 29 ViLL. L. REV. 1 (1983).
3. California became the first state to adopt across-the-board presumptive

sentences for offenders committed to prison by passing the Uniform Determinate
Sentencing Law in 1976. 1976 Cal. Stat., ch. 1139, § 273, at 5140 (codified as
amended at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1983)). For a general discussion
of the California statute, see Messinger & Johnson, Callfornia s Determinate Sentence Statute: History andIssues, in NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIM. JUST., U.S.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss1/2

2

Martin: Interests and Politics in Sentencing Reform: The Development of S
1983-84]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

ished parole release. 5 Parole boards responded by establishing guidelines to structure parole, 6 and the judiciary adopted voluntary
sentencing guidelines. 7
Two states, Minnesota and Pennsylvania, have responded by instituting similar alternative approaches to sentencing reform. In
1978, each state legislature created a hybrid body called a sentencing
guidelines commission which was authorized to produce sentencing
DETERMINATE SENTENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION?
13-18
(1978).
Other states that have since adopted analogous legislation are as follows: Alaska
(for second and subsequent offenders), Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, New
Jersey, and North Carolina. See generally von Hircsh & Hanrahan, Determzate Penalty
Systems in America: An Overview, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 289 (1981). Typically, presumptive sentencing schemes do not attempt to regulate the judicial decision whether
or not to imprison, but instead govern the duration of a prison sentence if the judge
has chosen to impose one. Id. at 299.
4. Between 1977 and 1980 mandatory minimum sentencing laws were adopted
in 27 states and were under consideration in 14 others. These laws typically directed
that repeat offenders who commit violent crimes or crimes involving a firearm be
sentenced to a prison term of not less than a specified period of years. U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES-1979 (1980).
5. "Parole release" refers to "the conditional release, for a specified period, of an
offender who has already served a portion of his sentence in a correctional institution.
While on parole, the released prisoner remains in the custody of the paroling authority and may be returned to the penal institution for violations of parole regulations or
for commission of a new offense." D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON & J. WILKS, THE
DEI'T OF JUST.,

EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT:

A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVAL-

UATION STUDIES 9 (1975).

Parole release has been abolished in Alaska, California,
Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, New Mexico, and North Carolina. Von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 3, at 299 n.28.
6. Parole guidelines to establish explicit standards for release decisions were first
developed by the (then) United States Board of Parole. In 1976, these guidelines
were mandated for use through the entire federal system and have served as a model
for many of the 17 states that, as of 1979, were reported to have parole guidelines.
UNIFORM PAROLE REPORTS, PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1979 at 11 n.1. See
generally von Hirsch & Hanrahan, supra note 3, at 309-12. See also Project, Parole Release Decisionmakingand the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810 (1975) (analyzing innovations in the federal parole system, including hearing reforms and detailed parole
guidelines).
7. Following the successful implementation of the U.S. Parole Commission's
guidelines, the developers sought to test the feasibility of guidelines for sentencing.
See generally L. WILKINS, J. KRESS, D. GOTFREDSON, J. CAUI'IN & A. GELMAN,
SENTENCING GUII)EIINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAl, DISCRETION (1978) [hereinafter
cited as STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION]. Massachusetts, Denver, and Philadelphia adopted voluntary sentencing guidelines using a methodology sometimes
termed "the Albany approach," since it was developed at the Criminal Justice Research Center in Albany, New York. The Massachusetts sentencing guidelines are
described and analyzed in R. SPARKS, B. STECHER, J. ALBANESE & P. SHELLY,
STUMBLING TOWARD JUSTICE:

SOME OVERLOOKED RESEARCH AND POLICY QUES-

TIONS ABOUT STATEWIDE SENTENCING GUIDEIANES 203-413 (Working Draft, 1982)

(report to the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter cited as
SPARKS & STECHER]. The Philadelphia and Denver guidelines are described and
examined in W. RICH, L. SUTTON, T. CLEAR & M. SAKS, SENTENCING BY MATHEMATICS (1982).
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guidelines that would structure judicial decisions. Minnesota's guidelines went into effect in May 1980.8 In Pennsylvania the legislature
rejected the proposed guidelines in April 1981 and returned them to
the Commission for revision. 9 The revised guidelines were resubmitted to the legislature in January 1982 and went into effect in July
1982.10 The purpose of this article is to explore the social, organizational, and political factors and interests that shaped the seemingly
similar sentencing reform laws, and yet contributed to divergent initial legislative reactions and unique final products in these two states.
Several limitations should be noted. First, the findings are preliminary, as there have been no long-term studies on the implementation or impact of the guidelines." Second, generalization of the
experience of the two states in the study to other states is clearly conjectural given the diversity of social histories, sentencing structures,
and political cultures among other states. Nonetheless, examination
of the Pennsylvania and Minnesota experiences is useful. It provides
a record which makes possible a preliminary interpretation of the
forces that shape an institutional change and an indication of the
complexities involved in designing sentencing guidelines. These
problems extend beyond the development of statistical models
describing past practice to the political tradeoffs and value choices
required in the policy-making process.
This article initially reviews the nature of the problems associated with sentencing reform, noting the importance of the political
culture and the traditions of a jurisdiction in shaping its policy options and perspectives on change, and describes the structure of the
criminal court and corrections systems in Minnesota and Pennsylvania. The article next examines in some detail the politics of sentencing reform in Minnesota. It includes a review of the legislative
process resulting in a statute creating the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines Commission, the Commission's mandate, the key elements
in formulating the guidelines, the content of the guidelines, the role of
interest groups in shaping them, and the legislature's reaction to the
guidelines. The third section contains an analogous review of the
politics of sentencing reform in Pennsylvania. The final section analyzes the factors that shaped the divergent processes by which legislatively mandated sentencing guidelines came into being in the two
8. See notes 177-79 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 324-32 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 363-72 and accompanying text infra.
11. For an analysis of the impact of the Minnesota guidelines during the first
year in which they were in effect, see Knapp, Impact of/he Mnnesota Guidehnes on Sentencing Practices, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 237 (1982).
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states, compares the structure and content of the resulting guidelines,
and considers the likely impact of the guidelines in each state. It
suggests that changing a sentencing system is an inherently political
process that requires reformers to address two types of questions.
First, there are normative questions regarding the goals of sanctions,
the appropriate object of such sanctions, and the amount of punishment necessary to achieve the sentencer's goal. Second, they must
address questions related to the functional goals of the criminal justice system such as how to structure discretion and, at the same time,
gain the cooperation of the key organizations and individuals with
interests in the system and who frequently resist change. As will be
indicated, the sentencing guidelines commission in Minnesota was
more successful than that in Pennsylvania in achieving a balance between principles and practice and in designing a compromise among
competing ideologies and interests that is likely to bring a substantial
2
measure of determinacy to sentencing in that state.'
II.

THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT OF SENTENCING
REFORM

A.

The Nature of the Problem

Under indeterminate sentencing schemes, legislatures establish
very broad policies through the creation of statements of purpose, the
establishment of maximum sentences, often without minimums, and
the authorization of general sentencing procedures. Vast discretion is
then left in the hands of sentencing judges and parole boards to de12. The research methodology adopted for this study involved an extensive review of the following: sentencing reform bills submitted to the Minnesota and Pennsylvania legislatures and the statutes creating the commissions in each state; minutes
of all meetings of both commissions up to submission to each legislature for final
consideration; staff concept papers and other materials prepared for presentation at
commission meetings; the public documents related to the guidelines; and written
testimony presented at public hearings of the Pennsylvania Commission. The author
also conducted numerous unstructured interviews with participants in the legislative
and administrative development process as well as with representatives of various
concerned interest groups. Thus, the author's conclusions attributing motives to particular individuals or groups are often based on her interpretation of this composite
of information. The author, of course, accepts full responsibility for her conclusions.
Interviews were conducted in Minneapolis and Saint Paul, Minnesota on March
6-7 and May 11-13, 1981. For a list of the individuals interviewed in Minnesota, see
note 52 infra. Interviews were conducted in Pennsylvania between March and May
1981, and again in March 1982. For a list of the individuals interviewed in Pennsylvania, see note 165 bhfra. The interviews were unstructured and ranged from half
an hour to several hours in length, averaging 1.5 hours.
Because the author's conclusions were often drawn from a composite of sources
such as unpublished materials, interviews, and her own observations, standard forms
of substantiation are difficult, particularly with respect to attributing motives to various groups.
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cide on the type and amount of punishment appropriate in individual
cases. Indeterminate schemes are based on the premise that society
will be protected by keeping offenders incarcerated until they have
become rehabilitated. Accordingly, the severity of the punishment
depends more on the characteristics of the individual offender than
on the nature of the crime, and disparity in sentencing individuals
convicted of the same crime is an accepted part of the system of indi13
vidualized treatment for offenders.
For many years indeterminate sentencing satisfied a wide spectrum of interests. Liberals were pleased with the rejection of the notion of retribution as well as the possibility of speedy release of
offenders amenable to rehabilitation; judges enjoyed wide authority
but were relieved of the responsibility for release decisions; prison administrators had flexibility in controlling hostile inmates; and politicians could appear "tough on crime" by raising statutory penalties
without affecting prison populations or the actual time served.14
However, in the early 1970's, support for the prevailing indeterminate sentencing system began to crumble. Civil libertarian and
prisoners' rights groups initiated the attack, charging that the system
was based on inadequate assumptions about the predictability of
human behavior, gave unchecked discretion to judges and paroling
authorities, contributed to prisoner unrest, and resulted in excessively
long and arbitrary sentences.' 5 A widely publicized article reported
that existing rehabilitation programs were ineffective. 16 The perception of continually rising crime rates led others to demand surer and
stiffer sanctions against criminals as a means of preventing crime.17
13. For a general discussion of the indeterminate scheme, see SENTENCING REFORM: EXPERIMENTS IN REDUCING DISPARITY 17 (M. Forst ed. 1982) [hereinafter
SENTENCING REFORM]. See also D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE 56-

72 (1980).
14. See Messinger & Johnson, supra note 3, at 16-17.
15. See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973)
(criticizing broad judicial discretion in sentencing and discussing possible remedies);
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971) (focusing
on the fallacies behind the individual treatment model).
16. D. LnTON, R. MARTINSON &J. WILKS, supra note 5. This survey is a compilation of research studies conducted to evaluate the different methods of treating
criminal and juvenile offenders. Instituted at the behest of the Governor of New
York's Special Committee on Criminal Offenders and supported by state funds, its
purpose was to determine the relative effectiveness of different categories of treatment
and the factors contributing to the success or failure of each method. Id at 3-21.
Robert Martinson, one of the authors of the study, summarized the study's findings
in a separate article: "With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts
that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism." Martinson, What Works?- Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, THE PUBLIC

Spring 1974, at 22, 25.
17. See generally J. WILSON,

THINKING ABOUT CRIME- (1975).
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Thus, criticism came from both those concerned with individual
rights whose objective was "fair, equitable punishment of offenses"' 8
and those concerned with social protection whose objective was swift,
simple crime prevention. 19 The unifying concern shared by most of
the opponents of indeterminate sentencing was the belief that sentencing reform based upon more explicit standards that would struc20
ture the discretion of officials and reduce disparity was necessary.
Along with the call for reform, debate developed in many jurisdictions over three overlapping sets of questions. First, how should
the competing goals of deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
retribution be ordered or balanced? Second, how severe a sanction
should be imposed to achieve the particular goal? Finally, what criteria should be used for applying different types of sanctions and who
should have the authority to establish sentencing standards and make
individual sentencing decisions?
In addition to normative considerations, any effort to alter sentencing structure will also be affected by the existing institutional arpopularity of the death penalty was symptomatic of such demand. Id. at 181-204.
See also F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981).
18. Travis, The Politi'is of Sentencing Reform, in SENTENCING REFORM, supra note
13, at 71. In general, reformers embracing a just desserts or retributive approach
advocated a sentencing system based on the principles of commensurability and predictability of punishment. Penalties under such a scheme are apportioned on the
basis of the blameworthiness of criminal conduct by scaling punishments to the seriousness of the offense. Predictability is sought through the adoption of standards
specifying the amount of punishment ordinarily to be given for certain types of criminal conduct. A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS
(1976) (report of the Committee for the Study of Incarceration calling for major
sentencing reform and proposing commensurate punishment as the sole legitimate
goal of the system). See also TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAl. SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976) (outlining a method of

promulgating a commensurate desserts sentencing structure).
19. For a discussion of the use of sentencing as a means of crime prevention and
social protection, see B. WOOTEN, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 91-118 (1963).

See also H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) (comparing a
"crime control" model with a "due process" approach).
20. See, e.g., R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND

DESERT 10 (1979) ("in the late 1960's and 1970's there was a growing perception that
the criminal justice system was becoming incredibly overworked . . . . Rehabilitation seemed not to work; deterrence, and if not deterrence, incapacitation seemed like
the answer.").
Of special concern was the problem of unchecked judicial power over sentencing. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 15; Ozanne, JudicialReview. A Casefor Sentenciig Guidelies and just Desserts, in SENTENCING REFORM, supra note 11, at 177
(examining early responses of the legal community to this problem, including the
American Bar Association's publication in 1968 of detailed standards for appellate
review of sentencing decisions). But cf. Coffee, The Repressed Issues of Sentencing." Accountability, Preditabi'ty,and Equaiy in the Era ofthe Sentencing Commission, 66 GEO. L.J.
975 (1978) (critically analyzing guideline sentencing systems as remedies for overbroad judicial discretion).
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rangements for distributing discretion, the extent and origin of
sentence disparities in the state, and the political influence of interest
groups with a stake in the debate. Thus, to be effective, reformers
must also consider functional goals such as the needs and interests of
the individuals and organizations that comprise the criminal justice
system. 2 1 When a proposed change appears to reduce authority, diminish flexibility, increase workloads, or result in other costs, it is
likely to be opposed, and, if implemented, undermined by those operating the system. The task of designing a sentencing reform that introduces a meaningful rather than a symbolic change thus depends
on the way the reformers define "the sentencing problem," the clarity
and degree of consensus regarding normative goals, and the degree to
which they take into account the functional goals of individuals operating the institutions and devise ways to neutralize opposition or coopt potential opponents into participating in a change.
B.

CriminalJustice Systems in Minnesota and Pennsylvania

1. Minnesota
a.

The Political Culture

Professor David Elazar, a scholar of American federalism, has
described Minnesota as having a moralistic political culture in which
citizens tend to view government as a means to achieve a good community through positive political action. 2 2 Characterized by its small
21. See generaly D. ROTHMAN, supra note 7 (attributing the success of the Progressive reform movement in the early 1900's to the harmony of goals among various
groups such as concerned citizens, psychologists, judges, district attorneys, wardens,
and superintendents).

22. D.

ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM:

A VIEW

FROM THE STATES

(1966).

Elazar defines a political culture as "the particular orientation to political action in
which each political system is embedded." Id. at 84. He identifies three ideal, typical
conceptions-the individualistic, moralistic, and traditional political cultures. Elazar
characterizes Minnesota as moralistic and Pennsylvania as individualistic. For a discussion of Elazar's description of the political culture in Pennsylvania, see note 35
and accompanying text infra.
Many of the characteristics defined by Elazar as representing a moralistic political culture are found in Minnesota. See generally Leavitt & Nord,Mhnesota's Changing

Pobteal Culture, in

PERSPECTIVES ON MINNESOTA GOVERNMENT AND POIXTIcs

31

(M. Gieske & E. Brandt eds. 1977). For example, there is substantial citizen participation in civic and political activity, a relatively weak party system, strong civil service laws, and great pride in the absence of political corruption. Id., passim. From
1913 until 1973 candidates for the state legislature ran in non-partisan elections, protest or reform movements were a recurrent part of the political landscape, and a
three-party system prevented more than brief domination of both the legislature and
state house by any party. Organized interest groups played a significant role in shaping political issues. Internal cohesiveness and issue oriented politics rest in large part
on Minnesota's ethnic homogeneity. Id. Most Minnesotans are descendants of
Scandinavians and Germans. In 1970 less than two percent of Minnesota's four mil-
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population, ethnic and cultural homogenity and a tradition of citizen
participation in government, including the involvement of interest
groups in policymaking, this political culture facilitated the development of a consensus on a new state sentencing policy.
b.

The Law

Prior to the 1978 implementation of Minnesota's sentencing
guidelines, Minnesota had an indeterminate sentencing law in which
the judge was responsible for the decision whether to incarcerate and,
if incarceration were imposed, for the establishment of a maximum
sentence. Under Minnesota's categorization of public offenses, only
offenders convicted of a felony may be committed to the custody of
the Commissioner of Corrections and subjected to possible confinement in state prisons.2 3 Prior to its abolition in 1981,24 the paroling
authority determined all state prisoners' release dates, which could be
any time after imprisonment and were usually substantially sooner
25
than the maximum terms.
After sentencing, judges may stay imposition or execution of the
sentence and, in most cases, grant probation as a condition of the
stayed sentence. 26 The judge may also impose a variety of conditions
lion inhabitants were black (34,868), Indian (23,128), or Chicano (23,198). Haniff,
Social Groups in Mtnesota Po/lics, in PERSPECTIVES ON MINNESOTA GOVERNMENT
AND POLITICS 87, 99 (M. Gieske & E. Brandt eds. 1977).
23. Minnesota law categorizes "crimes" as felonies, gross misdemeanors, misdemeanors, and petty misdemeanors. A felony is a crime for which a penalty of more
than one year may be imposed. There are no subcategories of felonies; the only
distinctions among them are the maximum penalties that may be imposed. A gross
misdemeanor may carry a penalty of more than 90 days and up to a year in county
jail. A misdemeanor is a crime for which a sentence of not more than 90 days or a
fine of not more than $500 or both may be imposed. A petty misdemeanor is a petty
offense prohibited by statute which does not constitute a crime and for which a fine
of not more than $100 may be imposed. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02 (West Supp.
1983).
A sentence of more than one year, i.e., for a felony, calls for the Commissioner of
Corrections to determine the place of confinement in a prison or other facility. A
sentence for a year or less, i.e., for a gross misdemeanor or misdemeanor, must be
served in a county jail, workhouse, work farm or other authorized facility. Id

§ 609.105.

24. 1981 MINN. LAWS ch. 3600, § 4 subd. 2.
25. For a general discussion of Minnesota paroling practices, see Research Project, infra note 53, at 355-72.
26. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.135 (West Supp. 1983). The judge may prescribe
the terms of the probation, including restitution, when practicable. Id Judicial discretion to stay a sentence for first degree murder and for other crimes in which a
firearm or dangerous weapon is involved is limited by a mandatory minimum sentencing law. Id (citing id. § 609.11). These crimes include aggravated assault, assault, burglary, kidnapping, manslaughter, murder in the second and third degrees,
rape, robbery, sodomy, or escape while under charge or conviction of a felony. Id
§ 609.11. When the guidelines were written, the mandatory minimum prison sen-
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on the stayed sentence, including a term of up to one year in the
county jail, extended probation, or assignment to a treatment
27
program.
The Community Correction Act,28 passed in 1973, commits Minnesota to a policy of keeping offenders in the local communities and
out of jail through state subsidies for the operation of local programs
that provide alternatives to incarceration. Participating counties that
send an offender to state prison for an offense punishable by five years
or less have to pay the costs of that offender's imprisonment out of
29
their subsidy monies.
c.

Courts and Counsel

The district court is the court of general criminal jurisdiction in
Minnesota. There are ten judicial districts and appeals are taken directly to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Judges are elected to sixyear terms in non-partisan elections. 30 Judicial candidates are not
screened or endorsed by political parties. In general, judges are not a
politically powerful or active group.
Although there is an extensive system of public defenders,
neither they nor the private criminal bar are well organized or politically powerful. In contrast, county attorneys are a well-organized
and active political force. County prosecutors are elected for fouryear terms in non-partisan elections. The county prosecutors' association has a full-time paid lobbyist as well as an active educational
program.
d.

Corrections and Parole
The Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections

tence was applicable only to recidivists. Since then it has been extended to first offenses involving firearms. 1981 MINN. LAWS ch. 227, §§ 1-7 (codified as amended at

d.).
27. A stay of imposition means the defendant is convicted but not sentenced.
He or she is given probation, and on its completion the felony conviction is reduced
to a misdemeanor on the criminal record. If the offender violates probation, the
court may impose a sentence. If the judge stays execution, the defendant is convicted
and sentenced but the sentence is not carried out. A stay of execution results in a
felony conviction on the offender's record. The offender is put on probation and a
violation permits the judge to order the sentence to be carried out. Id. §§ 609.13-

609.14.
28. Id. §§ 401.01-401.16.
29. Id. § 401.13.
About 80% of the convicted felons in Minnesota are kept under local supervision
rather than being committed to prison. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, A Preliminary Analysis of Sentencing and Releasing Data 8 (1979) (unpublished report on file with the Villanova Law Rrvtew).
30. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 388.01 (West Supp. 1983).
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is appointed by the governor, and, since 1959, has held cabinet level
status.3 ' On January 1, 1974, in an effort to professionalize parole
decisionmaking, a full-time five-member Minnesota Correctional Authority (later renamed the Minnesota Corrections Board or MCB) replaced the two part-time parole authorities previously responsible for
adult and juvenile parole. 32 Until the abolition of the MCB in 1981,
members were appointed by the governor and its chairperson was appointed by the Commissioner of Corrections, creating an overlap in
the interests of parole and correctional bureaucracies. Parole decisionmaking guidelines, modeled after the U.S. Parole Commission
33
guidelines, were put into effect on May 1, 1976 by the MCB.
Minnesota has been and remains a low incarceration state. In
1983 its rate of fifty-three persons incarcerated per 100,000 population was considerably lower than the national average of 177.34
2.

Pennsylvania

a.

The Political Culture

Pennsylvania's political culture is characterized by a large and
heterogeneous population, a tradition of strong local government,
and a lack of shared goals and values. Pennsylvania has been characterized by Professor Elazar as having an individualistic political culture where politics is generally regarded as the business of
3 5
professionals.
31. See id § 241.045(1).
In the early 1970's, reform-oriented commissioners sought to develop a political
constituency for corrections in Minnesota. They introduced reforms such as reorganization of the parole authority and community-based corrections. Interviews with
Dale Parent, Ken Schoen, and Richard Mulcrone, bhfra note 52.
32. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.045(2)(a) (West Supp. 1983).
33. MINNESOTA
LINES (July 1979).

CORRECTIONS

BOARD,

PAROLE

DECISION-MAKING

GUIDE-

34. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., PRISONERS AT MIDYEAR 1983, at 2, Table 2.

35. See D. ELAZAR, supra note 22, at 112. In an individualistic political culture,
government is seen as a means of efficiently responding to the demands of different
competing individuals and groups. Id Parties operate like business organizations,
maintaining a system of favors and mutual obligations, demanding strong loyalty
and cohesiveness, controlling the nomination process and entry into politics, and distributing the tangible reward of power to members. Id Because political parties are
composed of competing groups of conflicting interests, often lacking a unifying or
common philosophy, elections are rarely issue-oriented. Id The view of politics as
the job of professional politicians translates into limited citizen participation in political life and elected officials acting as brokers for private interests. Id. See also R.M.
Stevens, Occupation "Legislator": An Exploration of Political Culture in the Pennsylvania General Assembly (1971) (unpublished manuscript, Center for the Study of
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The Law

Pennsylvania has an indeterminate sentencing system in which
the role of the judge in determining the actual time to be served in
prison overshadows the role of the parole authority. Under the 1974
Crimes Code, criminal offenses are graded into eight major categories
with a maximum sentence for each. 36 Judges have wide discretion to
impose on a convicted offender a fine, partial confinement, total confinement, or no penalty at all. 3 1 In imposing a sentence of incarceration, the judge selects a minimum and maximum sentence. The
minimum imposed may not be greater than half of the maximum,
which is limited by the statutory maximum for the class of crime. 38
The court also considers where to send the offender. Those serving
39
more than a five-year maximum must go to a state institution.
Those serving a maximum of two to five years (usually with a minimum of one to two and one-half years) may be sent to either a local
or state facility. 40 Those serving less than a two-year maximum must
go to a local jail, where they remain under the supervision of the sentencing court which may grant parole at any time. 4' Upon completion of the minimum sentence, a state prisoner may be considered for,
parole. 42 There is no provision for "good time."
c.

The Courts and Counsel

The Court of Common Pleas is the court of general criminal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. Except in capital cases, appeals in criminal cases go to the Superior Court, and subsequently, to the
Federalism, Temple University) (empirical study confirming Elazar's views of Pennsylvania's political culture).
Heterogeneity contributes to the predominance of many competing interests in
an individualistic political culture. Pennsylvania is characterized by great ethnic diversity, varied regional economic interests and activities, and a tradition of strong
local government. There are 5,518 individual governmental units established by the
state or county governments that are loosely held together by common norms and
goals. See 105 THE PENNSYLVANIA MANUAl 481 (G. Ackley ed. 1981).
36. These categories are first and second degree murder; first, second, and third
degree felonies; first, second, and third degree misdemeanors; and summary offenses.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 106 (Purdon 1983).
37. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721 (Purdon 1982) (except when a mandatory
sentence is prescribed by law, the judge has discretion to choose from the alternatives
of probation, determination of guilt without further penalty, partial confinement,
total confinement, or a fine).

38. Id. § 9756.
39. Id. § 9762.
40. Id.
41. PA. STAT.

ANN.

tit. 61, § 331.26 (Purdon 1964).

42. Id § 331.21.
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court, at the latter's discretion. 43 Judges of
each court are elected initially for ten-year terms in partisan elections
and subsequently face retention elections. 4 4 Judges tend to come
from political rather than legal careers and often maintain close party
45
ties.
As in Minnesota, both public and private defense bars are relatively politically weak and disorganized, while county prosecutors,
many of whom are elected officials, are well organized and politically
visible.
d.

Corrections and Parole

The Bureau of Corrections is headed by a commissioner who,
until 1980, was named by the Governor's appointed Attorney General. The Attorney General is now an elective office 46 and the Department of Justice, of which the Bureau of Corrections is a part, is
the responsibility of the Governor's appointed General Counsel. The
47
General Counsel now appoints the Commissioner.
The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole has the exclusive power to determine the parole discharge of inmates sentenced to
state institutions after their minimum sentence has been served. Its
practice has been to parole offenders upon service of the court-imposed minimum sentence unless the offender's prison adjustment and
conduct have been unsatisfactory. In 1975-78, about eighty percent
of the offenders considered for parole were released at the expiration
48
of their minimum sentence.
The Pennsylvania state prison system was not crowded through
much of the 1970's. 49 However, local jails were both crowded and
43. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 722, 724, 742 (Purdon 1981).
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3131-3135 (Purdon 1981).
45. Though crossfiling is permitted and occurs, allowing the judicial candidate
to receive the nomination of both parties in contrast to Minnesota's system ofjudicial
selection, judges are chosen by political party leaders directly and run with party
endorsement. For a thorough discussion and criticism of the partisan political election of judges, see Kauffman,Judicial Selection in Pennsylvania: A Proposal, 27 VILL. L.
REV. 1163 (1982).
46. PA. CONST. art. 4, § 4.1.
47. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 302 (Purdon 1962). The authority of the Bureau of Corrections and the influence of the Commissioner are limited by their placement in the executive organization and by a Bureau tradition of low visibility.
48. See PENN. BD. OF PROBATION AND PAROLE, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT 28, Table 7.

44. See 42 PA.

49. On November 30, 1979 there were 8,275 inmates in the Pennsylvania prison
system, which had a total usable capacity of 8,380. PENNSYLVANIA COMMISSION ON
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,

AN ANALYSIS

STATE CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES

OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR CURRENT

NOW AND

IN THE FUTURE

(submitted to the

Governor Jan. 11, 1980).
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physically deteriorating. 50 Pennsylvania's incarceration rate of 93 per
100,000 civilian population in 1983, while higher than that in Minne5
sota, was still below the national average. '
III.

THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM IN MINNESOTA

A.
1.

52

The Legislation

The Legislative Battle

In Minnesota, the effort to reform sentencing originated in the
Senate in 1975 and was led by Senator William McCutcheon. McCutcheon's goal was to introduce determinacy through legislativelyfixed sentences and to abolish the parole board. 53 McCutcheon is difficult to classify politically. As a member of the majority Democratic
Farmer Labor Party and a fiscal conservative, he opposed policies
that would increase inmate populations (including across-the-board
hikes in sentence severity). However, as deputy police chief of St.
Paul, he was seen as a friend of law enforcement and "tough" on
crime and therefore respected by conservatives.
50. Since 1975 county jails have been overcrowded. In 1975 and 1976 their
populations hovered at about 113 percent of capacity. House Judiciary Committee
Staff Report on the Use and Impact of Mandatory Sentencing in Pennsylvania (Sept.
1976).
51. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 34, at 2, Table 2. The national
average ratio as of June 30, 1983 was 177 prisoners per 100,000 citizens. d
52. For details of the legislative battle in Minnesota, see Clark, An Historical
Overview of Sentencing Reform Legislation: 1975-1978 (May 15, 1979)
(unpublished study prepared for the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission;
on file with the Vi/anova Law Review).
Interviews were conducted with the following individuals in Minnesota: Justice
Douglas Amdahl, member of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
(MSGC), in St. Paul (May 12, 1981); Howard Costello, legislative liaison for the
Department of Corrections, in St. Paul (May 13, 1981); William Falvey, Public
Defender and member of the MSGC, in St. Paul (May 13, 1981); Frank Fly, Senate
staff member, in St. Paul (May 12, 1981); Cort Holton, former legislative aide to
Representative Donald Moe, in St. Paul (May 11, 1981); Arnold Kempe, former
Representative, in St. Paul (May 12, 1981); Kay Knapp, MSGC Research Director,
in St. Paul (March 7 & May 14, 1981) (by phone on April 10, June 8 & Oct. 19,
1981); William McCutcheon, former senator, in St. Paul (May 12, 1981); Senator
Donald Moe, former representative, in St. Paul (May 14, 1981); Richard Mulcrone,
former Parole Board Chairman, in St. Paul (May 14, 1981); Dale Parent, MSGC
Staff Director, in St. Paul (March 7, May 11 & 13, 1981); Steven Rathke, County
Attorney and member of the MSGC, in St. Paul (March 7 & May 14, 1981);
Kenneth Schoen, former MSGC member and Commissioner of Corrections, in New
York City (April 20, 1981); Jan Smaby, MSGC Chairperson and Hennepin County
representative of MACCAC, in Minneapolis (March 6, 1981); Representative Robert
Vanasek, Chairman of the House Criminal Justice Committee, in St. Paul (May 12,
1981).
53. Interview with Sen. William McCutcheon, supra note 52. See also Research
Project: Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 292, 301 (1982).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss1/2

14

Martin: Interests and Politics in Sentencing Reform: The Development of S

1983-84]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Senator McCutcheon submitted a flat-time sentencing bill to the
legislature in 1975 which would have put all offenses in the Criminal
Code into one of three classes of felonies, punishable by fixed five-,
ten-, and fifteen-year terms of incarceration. It would also have eliminated the parole board but would not have affected judicial discretion over the disposition decision 54 (i.e., whether to incarcerate and
where to send prisoners). The bill would have resulted in vast increases in prison population and corrections system costs. 55 The bill,
as it was introduced by McCutcheon, never received serious consideration. 56 It did, however, lead to the establishment of the Senate Select Subcommittee on Determinate Sentencing 57 which held public
hearings and revised the bill. 58 Because the Subcommittee's hearings
received substantial news coverage, sentencing became a high-visibility issue and created a "get tough on crime" image for McCutcheon's
bill in the legislature, press, and public which persisted despite considerable modification of the bill between the 1975 and 1976 legislative sessions.
The bill that was reported out of the Judiciary Committee in
January 197659 was a flat-time sentencing bill that set sentences at
forty percent of the statutory maximum for each offense and permitted day-for-day time off for good behavior. This forty percent minus
good time figure was chosen because it both resembled the average
time currently served by offenders and, according to an impact state54. S.F. 634 (Minn. 1975). The bill was submitted by Senators McCutcheon,
Brown, and Olhoft.
In Minnesota, only about 20% of convicted felons are sentenced to a term in
state prison. Others may serve jail terms as a condition of probation. For a discussion of sentencing in Minnesota prior to the imposition of guidelines, see notes 22-29
and accompanying text supra. See also Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Concept Paper on Guideline Development (Oct. 27, 1978) (unpublished staff paper available from the Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, St. Paul, Minn.) [hereinafter
cited as Concept Paper].
55. Clark, supra note 52, at 8.
56. Interviews with Dale Parent and Frank Fly, supra note 52. See also Research
Project, supra note 53, at 302. The original bill did serve the important function of
providing a vehicle for discussion of the need for sentencing reform. The bill was
completely rewritten before it was passed. Id
57. Research Project, supra note 53, at 302. The Subcommittee was chaired by
Senator McCutcheon and was made up of members of the standing committee who
would later consider the bill in the Senate. Id
58. Clark, supra note 52, at 8. The subcommittee held 14 meetings and heard
testimony from witnesses representing corrections groups, the judiciary, the parole
board, attorneys, and private citizens. Id at 8. The subcommittee also sponsored a
survey done by the Correctional Service of Minnesota, a private consulting group, on
determinate sentencing. Id. at 12.
59. S.F. 634 (Minn. 1975).
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ment prepared by the Department of Corrections, 60 would not increase prison populations. Judges would be allowed to increase or
decrease the sentence by fifteen percent to take aggravating or mitigating circumstances into account, but would be required to state the
reasons for the deviation in writing. The bill also provided for abolition of the Parole Board on January 1, 1979 and for appellate review
6
of sentences including appeals by the state. '
The McCutcheon bill was passed by a vote of 54 to 11 in the
Senate and was sent to the House in March 1976.62 It satisfied fiscal
conservatives who were concerned with the cost of custody, 63 the law
enforcement community which desired greater certainty of punishment, 64 and liberals who were concerned with the lack of clear stan65
dards and the resulting disparity in sentencing.
In the House, the bill was initially referred to the Committee on
Crime Prevention and Corrections which was chaired by Donald
Moe. 66 The Committee, under Moe's leadership, refused to give the
bill a hearing, claiming that so momentous a change should be given
further study. 67 Moe's opposition rested on his fear that once the legislature began setting prison terms, it might easily and capriciously
increase sentence lengths. He also objected to shifting discretionary
authority from the parole board to judges and prosecutors. 68
Additional opposition to the bill came from R.T. Mulcrone,
chairman of the MCB, who worked closely with Moe to prevent the
bill from coming to the House floor. When Moe's committee voted to
send the bill to an interim subcommittee for study, a coalition of
Republicans and Democrats brought the McCutcheon bill to the
House floor by attaching it as a Senate amendment to a bill already
60. Interview with Frank Fly, supra note 52. See also Research Project, supra note
53, at 302.
6i. S.F. 634 (Minn. 1975).
62. Clark, supra note 52, at 15-16. Several "toughening" amendments were added by the Judiciary Committee in February, 1976. The bill was passed by the
Senate on March 11, 1976 with support from both Democrats and Republicans. Id.
at 15.
63. Id at 16.
64. Id. at 15. Because Senator McCutcheon had a reputation for being tough
on crime, law enforcement support was strong even though sentence lengths were not
increased. Interviews with Steven Rathke and Frank Fly, supra note 52.
65. Clark, supra note 52, at 16.
66. Research Product, supra note 53, at 303.
67. Id Moe objected to totally modifying the criminal code in only a few weeks
because revisions had traditionally taken years. He further asserted that many House
members did not understand the bill. Id (citing interview with Sen. Moe, former
State Rep. (Feb. 1982)).
68. Interview with Sen. Moe, supra note 52.
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passed by the House. 69 After heated debate, the House voted to defer
the effective date to permit technical revisions, 70 then passed the
bill. 71 The Senate passed the amended measure the following day
72
and sent it to Governor Anderson.
During much of the debate, Governor Anderson had assumed a
low profile. When the bill reached his desk, however, the Governor
vetoed it, citing "serious inadequacies" arising from a technical defect
in drafting. 73 Some observers surmised, however, that Moe and Mulcrone, who had close personal ties with Governor Anderson's chief
advisor, convinced the governor to veto the legislation and found that
74
the technical defect made such an act politically feasible.
When the new legislature convened in 1977, McCutcheon again
introduced his determinate sentencing bill.7 5 It was passed by the
Senate on May 10 and was then sent to the House.7" However, momentum had shifted during the intervening year. Representative Arnold Kempe, a conservative and former supporter of the McCutcheon
bill, now advocated establishing a judicial guidelines commission
77
which would establish advisory sentence lengths and ranges.
Kempe drafted a bill to establish a sentencing guidelines commission
of five judges which would design guidelines to be approved by the
supreme court.78 The guidelines would establish a presumptive sen69. Interviews with Sen. Moe, Richard Mulcrone, and Dale Parent, supra note
52. See also Research Project, supra note 53, at 303. S.F. 634 was attached to H.F.
1865, an uncontroversial bill written by Representative Arnold Kempe. Id
70. Interviews with Sen. Moe, Richard Mulcrone, and Dale Parent, supra note
52. See also Research Project, supra note 53, at 304. The bill was referred to a conference committee which amended it to reflect objections raised on the floor. Id.
Among those amendments was the omission of an extended term for murder, serious
offenses, and crimes with a weapon. Id. The Governor objected to this omission. See
notes 73 & 74 and accompanying text infra.
71. Research Project, supra note 53, at 304. The final version was passed by a
vote of 94 to 36. Id.
72. Id. at 304.
73. In the confusion surrounding the end of the legislative session, language
specifying the length of extended sentences for certain violent and chronic offenders
was inadvertently omitted. See Veto Message, 4 JOURNAL OF HOUSE 6640 (1976).
74. See Save/koul C/ams Wend, 'Untruthfu/" about Veto Reasons, St. Paul Pioneer,
April 15, 1976, at 26. See also Clark, supra note 52, at 25.
75. S.F. 65 (Minn. 1977) (codified in scattered sections of MINN. CODE ANN. ch.
241, 244 & 609). The bill that McCutcheon introduced was essentially identical to
the amended house bill from the previous session. Research Project, supra note 53, at
304.
76. Research Project, supra note 53, at 304.
77. Clark, supra note 52, at 31.
78. Kempe's proposal combined suggestions and ideas from several sources regarding a sentencing guidelines commission and sentencing guidelines. In 1977
Kempe learned that the Albany Criminal Justice Research Center had developed a
method of creating sentencing guidelines known as the "'Albany approach." Id The
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tence for all felonies, with the provision that a judge could depart
from the guidelines sentence by setting forth in writing his reasons for
doing so. Sentences would be subject to appeal by either the defense
or the state. Representative Moe was willing to accept Kempe's approach to determinate sentencing if the final bill were shaped so as to
allow the parole board to determine sentence length.7 9
With the McCutcheon bill bottled up in a House committee,
and the Kempe bill unable to get a hearing in the Senate, Moe broke
the impasse by arranging for the Speaker to pair the two non-companion bills so that they could move forward as a single piece of legislation. 80 The House passed the Kempe version, and when the Senate
refused to concur, a conference committee composed of five House
members and five Senate members was established on January 19,
8
1978. 1
The Senate conferees, led by McCutcheon, supported abolition
of the parole board and advocated legislatively-set flat-time sentences
that left the dispositional decision in the hands of the judge.8 2 The
House conferees, however, were divided. Moe, fearful that legislative
term-setting would ultimately result in increased sentence severity,
advocated a dual concept with dispositional guidelines established by
a sentencing commission and durational guidelines established by the
MCB or its reincarnation. 83 Kempe supported a single guidelines
commission made up of judges that would design presumptive guidelines for both sentence disposition and duration.8 4 Thus, the conference committee had to deal with three principal issues: 1) whether
the legislature or a commission would set sentencing policy;
2) whether there would be a single or dual sentencing authority; and
3) whether the commission would be composed only of judges or be a
Albany approach involved a technical construction of guidelines modeled on the
state's past sentencing practice, with the important modification that inappropriate
factors, such as race, were eliminated from the final guidelines. The general effect of
the Albany approach is to maintain the status quo. Knapp, Impact of the Minnesota
Sentencing Guideines on Sentencing Practices, 5 HAMLINE L. REv. 237, 238 (1982).
79. Research Project, supra note 53, at 306. Moe and McCutcheon both attempted to persuade Kempe to agree to "a bifurcated system in which judges would
make the decision whether an offender would be incarcerated or put on probation,
and the parole board would decide sentence length, using written guidelines." Id.
Kempe, however, would not agree to this compromise. Id.

80. Id. at 304-06.
81. Clark, supra note 52, at 33.
82. The Senate position would have shifted discretion from the correctional bureaucracy to the court.
83. Interview with Sen. Moe, supra note 52.
84. The Kempe proposal would have had the effect of making the Parole Board
and its release authority superfluous. For a general discussion of the bill proposed by
Rep. Kempe, see note 78 and accompanying text supra.
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mixed group.8 5
McCutcheon yielded to the House position in favor of sentencing
guidelines, but insisted that the commission be of mixed composition,
that the guidelines not go into effect until the legislature had the opportunity to review them, and that the guideline sentence be a presumptive sentence. The issue of a single or dual decisionmaking
authority was resolved in favor of a single body. 86 Thus, the bill
which came out of conference provided for a single, legislatively authorized guidelines commission that was to determine both sentence
dispositions and durations. The bill was approved 129-1 in the
House, 45-0 in the Senate, and was signed by the Governor on April
5, 1978.87
2.

The Proviszons of the Law

The law enacted after the four-year struggle created the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission (MSGC). The nine-member
commission consisted of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or his
designee, two district court judges appointed by the Chief Justice, the
Commissioner of Corrections or his designee, the Chairperson of the
Corrections Board or his designee, and the following persons appointed by the Governor: one prosecutor from those nominated by
the Board of Governors of the County Attorneys Council, one public
defender from those nominated by the State Public Defender, and
two citizens. The Governor was to select one of the nine members as
chairperson.*88
85. The positions of the leaders of the Minnesota legislative struggle with respect to the key issues are indicated in the following table.
Legislator

Discretion
over Duration

Role of
Parole

Structure of
Commission

McCutcheon

Legislature

Abolish

(No strong
opinion)

No
Increase

Police and
Prosecutors

Kempe

Judiciary

Abolish

Dual

(No
strong
opinion)

(Judiciary)

Severity

Client
Constituency

Moe

Administrative
Retain
Single
No
Corrections
Body
Increase
Bureaucracy
86. It has been suggested that Moe had actually planned to maneuver a
"switch" by substituting his dual authority bill for Kempe's in conference. The plan
apparently went awry when one of the three-House conferees necessary to support
the change mistakenly voted the "wrong way" and was unwilling to reverse himself.
87. 1978 Minn. Laws 723. For a detailed description of the legislative history of
the Minnesota sentencing guidelines law, see generally, Research Project, supra note
53, at 301-06.
88. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1983). The amended ver-
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The sentencing guidelines were to be submitted to the legislature
by January 1, 1980, and would become effective on May 1, 1980 unless the legislature took contrary action. 89 The guidelines were to be
advisory to trial court judges. They were to include consideration of
both the circumstances under which the imprisonment of an offender
is "proper" and a recommendation of a presumptive fixed sentence
for offenders for whom imprisonment is proper based on combinations of "reasonable" offense and offender characteristics. In determining the presumptive sentence, the MSGC was to "take into
substantial consideration current sentencing and releasing practices
and correctional resources including but not limited to the capacities
of local and state correctional facilities." 9 The MSGC was permitted
to establish a range of up to fifteen percent within which the presumptive sentence could vary, 9 1 with the requirement that the court
92
make a written finding of fact as to the reasons for any departure.
Both the state and the defendant are given an unlimited right to
appeal stayed or imposed sentences. The supreme court may review
the sentence to determine whether it is inconsistent with statutory requirements, "unreasonable, inappropriate, excessive, unjustifiably
disparate or not warranted by the finding of fact issued by the
court."'93 Good time may be earned at the rate of one day for every
two days of good behavior in the institution. 94 The MCB retained
95
full power over inmates imprisoned for crimes prior to May 1, 1980.
Those imprisoned after that date were to have release dates determined by the judge at the sentencing hearing. However, the MCB
would continue to establish conditions of supervised release, revoke
release upon violation of those conditions, and grant extraordinary
96
discharges.
sion provides for a 10 or 11 member commission, adding one peace officer and one
probation officer, both to be appointed by the governor. Id § 244.09 subd. 2.
The exclusion of legislators and the delegation of responsibility to citizens and
representatives of various interest groups are consistent with Minnesota's moralistic
political culture. For a discussion of Minnesota's political culture, see note 22 and
accompanying text supra.
89. MINN. STAT. § 244.09 subd. 12 (West Supp. 1983).
90. Id § 244.09 subd. 5.
91. Id
92. Id § 244.10 subd. 2.
93. Id § 244.11. ("the Supreme Court may dismiss or affirm the appeal, vacate
or set aside the sentence imposed or stayed and direct entry of an appropriate sentence or order further proceedings to be had as the Supreme Court may direct").
94. Id § 244.04 subd. 1.
95. Id § 244.08 subd. 1. The MCB was abolished in 1981, and its responsibilities were transferred to the Department of Corrections. 1981 Minn. Laws ch. 3600,

§ 4, subd. 2.
96. MINN.

STAT.

§ 244.05 (1980). The Commission was also authorized both to
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3.

The Role of Interest Groups in Shaping the Sentencing Law

a.

Law Enforcement

The law enforcement community strongly supported the McCutcheon bill. Police and prosecutors shared McCutcheon's dissatisfaction with the parole board's authority to release an offender at any
time. 97 Although many of his supporters were concerned principally
with the MCB's leniency, McCutcheon's goal was greater certainty of
punishment rather than increased severity. His initial flat-time bill
presented an image of toughness-whether intended or not-which
lingered through its many revisions. Yet McCutcheon seemed to
have been almost as determined as the Commissioner of Corrections
to avoid increasing prison populations, and convinced the law enforcement community to trade greater severity for increased certainty
98
of punishment.
The county attorneys, recognizing that they would gain discretion at the expense of the parole board, strongly supported McCutcheon's bill. They were not pleased with the guidelines approach, but
when it became apparent that the House version would prevail, they
lobbied hard for and gained representation on the Commission, the
inclusion of the right of the state to appeal a sentence, and a reduction in the rate at which good time could be earned. 99
b.

Judges

Judges were only marginally involved in the legislative battle.
Neither a politically powerful nor an active group, their strong tradition of judicial restraint and lack of agreement with respect to the
parole board inhibited overt participation, although it was evident to
legislators that most judges did not like either bill. Even when
Kempe suggested an entirely judicial commission, the reaction of the
serve as a clearing house and information center on sentencing, and to conduct research and evaluation on the sentencing guidelines, the use of imprisonment and
alternatives, plea bargaining, and other matters relating to the improvement of the
criminal justice system. It was required to make periodic recommendations to the
legislature regarding changes in the criminal code and criminal procedures. The
Commission was permitted to promulgate guidelines relating to non-imprisonment
sections. After implementing the guidelines, the Commission was required to review
the powers and duties of the MCB and recommend to the legislature its future role.
Id § 244.09.
97. Interviews with Sen. William McCutcheon; Steven Rathke, Prosecutor and
Commission member; Dale Parent, Staff Director; Kenneth Schoen, Commissioner of
Corrections; and Howard Costello, Legislative Liaison for the Department of Corrections, supra note 52.
98. Id
99. Id
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judiciary was cool.' 0 0
c.

Corrections

Kenneth Schoen, the Commissioner of Corrections, maintained a
low profile during 1975-76, the first phase of the legislative struggle.
While he opposed the McCutcheon bill, Schoen realized that open
opposition was not an advisable position for the corrections department. Since the McCutcheon bill was designed to hold prison populations at current levels, Schoen felt he could tolerate the changes in
sentencing practices and the abolition of the paroling authority. 101 In
the second phase, between 1977 and 1978, the corrections department
actively supported the guidelines approach. Since the MSGC would
set sentence lengths, Schoen's key concern again was stable prison
populations. Schoen submitted to the House conferees a provision
drafted by the corrections-department staff calling for the MSGC to
take correctional resources and facilities into consideration in designing the guidelines. Its inclusion in the bill was supported by both
Moe and McCutcheon, and was ignored by virtually everyone else,
although it later played a key role in the development of the sentencing guidelines.10 2 Its significance was reinforced by Schoen's success
in lobbying for MSGC membership for both the Commissioner of
Corrections 0 3 and the chairman of the MCB.
The chairman of the parole board, R.T. Mulcrone, played a key
role in the legislative struggle. Parole had no constituency because
both liberals and conservatives saw it as the symbol of inequities in
the system and the primary target of change. Yet Mulcrone, a former
lobbyist, skillfully aroused the concern of both liberals and conservatives with the severity of the flat-time bill, and worked closely with
10 4
Moe to devise a dual-guidelines approach.
100. Interviews with Kay Knapp, Research Director, and Dale Parent, Staff Director, supra note 52.
101. Interview with Kenneth Schoen, Commissioner of Corrections, supra note
52.
102. For a discussion of the importance of the language requiring the MSGC to
take correctional resources and facilities into consideration in drafting the guidelines,
see notes 113-17 and accompanying text infra.
103. The inclusion of the Commissioner of Corrections on the Commission
proved to be an important decision for unplanned reasons. As an appointee of the
Governor, he provided an important link to the Republican Governor who took office in 1978.
104. Input from other lobbying groups was limited. For example, penal reform
groups played virtually no role in the legislative battle in Minnesota. For a discussion of the role of these groups in the passage of California's determinate sentencing
law, see Messinger & Johnson, supra note 3, at 27-29. Prisoner advocacy groups supported the McCutcheon bill in 1976, but were virtually invisible thereafter. The
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Additinal Observations

The composition of the MSGC is consistent with Minnesota's
political culture. 0 5 The final bill excluded legislators, delegating responsibility for detailed decisionmaking to citizens and representatives of affected interest groups. This approach represented a
compromise between fiscal conservatives and correctional liberals
over the allocation of decisionmaking authority within the criminal
justice system. Once Moe and Mulcrone agreed that there would be
sentences of fixed duration, the central issue became who would determine sentence lengths: the legislature, the judiciary, or an administrative body. The issue of sentence severity was secondary because
key actors agreed not to increase prison populations. This agreement
greatly facilitated subsequent acceptance of the MSGC's interpretation of its legislative mandate.
B.
1.

Formulatingthe Guidelines

The Key Elements in Shaping the Guidehnes

The elements that were central to the interpretation of the legislative mandate and the development of politically acceptable sentencing guidelines in Minnesota were the character of individual
Commission members and staff and the emergent sense of group purpose, the literal interpretation of the law as an absolute constraint on
prison population, the use of research in policy development, and the
view that guideline formulation was a political process in which interest groups should participate and make compromises according to the
ground rules established by the MSGC.
a.

Membership, Leadership, and Staff

An important factor in the Commission's development of acceptable guidelines was the dedication, political sensitivity, and intelligence of its members, chair, and staff. The two statutory members,
Chairman of the Parole Board, R.T. Mulcrone and Commissioner of
Corrections, Kenneth Schoen, both left their positions and the MSGC
by the end of 1978. They were replaced after a hiatus of several
months by Les Green and Jack Young, respectively. The three judicial members appointed by the Chief Justice included George Scott,
associate justice of the Supreme Court, Douglas Amdahl, chief judge
governor's office also remained aloof, both before and after the 1976 veto. Interviews
with Dale Parent and Sen. McCutcheon, supra note 52.
105. For a discussion of Minnesota's political culture, see note 22 and accompanying text supra.
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of the Fourth District Court (Hennepin County), 10 6 and Russell Olson, of the Third District (Rochester).
The Governor, after consultation with Moe, Mulcrone, Schoen,
and McCutcheon, selected Steve Rathke, a prosecutor and political
activist who, as chair of the County Prosecutors' Association's legislative committee, had lobbied hard for the McCutcheon bill; Bill Falvey, the public defender of Ramsey County (St. Paul); as citizen
representatives, Barbara Andrus, a woman involved in community
service activities; and Jan Smaby, the Community Corrections Act
administrator for Hennepin County. Smaby was appointed chairperson and brought to the task both abundant energy and political experience both as a lobbyist for the Hennepin County Community
Corrections Board and through family ties. 10 7 Her selection was
strongly supported by both Moe and Schoen. 1° 8
The MSGC first met in June 1978 and had eighteen months in
which to construct the guidelines. In the fall it hired Dale Parent as
staff director and Kay Knapp as research director. Parent had
worked for the corrections department for four years, including two
years as research director of the parole board's guidelines project;
Knapp was also formerly with the Department of Corrections.
In October, Knapp and Parent presented a concept paper which
had emerged from considerable debate between them over the nature
of the MSGC's task.' 0 9 Initially the MSGC members and Parent,
based on his parole guidelines experience, expected to develop largely
descriptive guidelines. Knapp, convinced that guidelines that simply
systematized existing practice were neither possible to create nor what
the legislature desired, pressed for a shift to a more policy-oriented
approach. The concept paper set out a workplan outlining stages of
guideline development, policy issues, and likely problems. It also articulated concerns about descriptive guidelines that purport to replicate past practice, and made clear that the MSGC needed to "more
actively engage in developing sentencing policy than has previously
been required" by those jurisdictions following the Albany approach
to guidelines development." 10
Harmonious internal dynamics facilitated the MSGC's work.
106. Hennepin County includes Minneapolis. Amdahl has since become Chief
Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court.
107. Smaby's mother had been a state legislator, and her husband was at the
time an assistant majority leader in the state House of Representatives.
108. Interviews with Sen. Moe, former state representative, and Kenneth
Schoen, former MSGC member, supra note 52.
109. Concept Paper, supa note 54.
110. Id at 4.
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Members acted as representatives of their particular constituencies'
interests but were able to see beyond particular issues and positions to
the larger goal. Meetings were held monthly and even weekly in the
final stages, yet absenteeism was extremely low.i' Gradually, the
MSGC developed a strong collegial spirit and integrated outlook that
facilitated resolution of differences through negotiation and compromise. The staff took an active role by focusing the Commission's attention on various issues, although they did not participate in the
actual decisionmaking. Their numerous background papers and
presentation of research findings provided the members with ample
information and with clear, concise statements of the theoretical arguments and policy choices that the MSGC faced.' 12
b. The Interpretation of "consideration of.
resources"

.

.correctional

The legislative directive that the MSGC "take into substantial
consideration. . . correctional resources, including but not limited to
the capacities of local and state correctional facilities"'' 3 gradually
came to be interpreted as a directive that the guidelines should not
lead to prison populations that exceeded the capacities of state correctional institutions.' 14 Although there was never a vote on the interpretation of the phrase as an absolute limit, Smaby, Parent, and
Knapp early agreed to view it as an absolute constraint on the
MSGC's decisionmaking and gradually "sold" this perspective as
both principled and practical to both MSGC members and the inter5
est groups that participated in MSGC meetings."
111. The low absenteeism was facilitated, but not explained, by the fact that
seven of the nine members lived in the Twin Cities area where Thursday evening
dinner meetings were held.
112. For a discussion of the research studies used by the MSGC, see notes 118-26
and accompanying text infra.
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 subd. 5 (West 1980).
114. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE
2 (Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT]. The report
stated, "In drafting the sentencing guidelines, the Commission has interpreted this
directive to mean that the guidelines should produce prison populations which do
not exceed the current capacity of state correctional institutions." Id
115. Kay Knapp, the Sentencing Commission's Research Director, explained
the Commission's rationales for viewing existing prison capacity as an absolute limit
on the Commission: 1) since the legislature, not the Commission, appropriates funds,
if the Commission were to increase prison population and force the construction of
new facilities, it would overstep the legislative mandate; 2) it takes as long as five
years to build a prison; if the legislature wanted more inmates imprisoned, it should
have appropriated funds and built the facilities before increasing inmate populations;
3) it is immoral to create a sentencing system that consciously leads to overcrowding
and endangers the safety of staff and inmates; and 4) if overcrowding were to occur, it
is likely that there would be lawsuits and federal court intervention in the state prison
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The interpretation by the MSGC of "consideration of.

.

. cor-

rectional resources" as an absolute limit was central to its work for
two reasons. First, it facilitated the development of a useful research
methodology; the methodology, in turn, reinforced the population
limitation and the need to consider it. For the MSGC's guidelines to
maintain prison population at or below the current level, it was necessary to project accurately the impact of different sentencing policy
options on prison populations; the accuracy of such projections in
turn depended on predictable sentencing outcomes. Predictability required that guideline sentences had to be presumptive and the range
of variation limited.
Second, the interpretation of the legislative mandate as an absolute limit on prison population imposed discipline on the MSGC.

The Commission's task then became the allocation of the limited
space among the larger universe of potential occupants. 16 Furthermore, the population cap constrained the interest groups lobbying
before the MSGC, particularly those seeking to increase sentencing
severity. It forced principled, responsible decisions within the bounds
of discourse established by the MSGC and put interest groups in the
position of having to argue which types of offenders most merited
1

imprisonment.

c.

17

Research and its Role in Guideline Development
After defining its task as one of allocating existing prison space in

accordance with past practices and members' values, the MSGC
needed accurate data on existing sentencing and paroling practices,
system. K. Knapp, Estimating the Impact of Sentencing Policies on Prison Populations (presented at the American Society of Criminology 32nd annual meeting in San
Francisco, California, Nov. 5-8, 1980 and on file with the Vllanova Law Review). See
also von Hirsch, Constructzg Guidehnesfor Sentencing. The CriticalChoicesfor the Minesota
Sentencitg Guidehes Commission, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 164, 176-80 (1982).
116. The state prison capacity was 2,072 inmates. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT,
supra note 114, at 13.
117. Smaby observed that the prison cap "was our strongest weapon to deal
with the tremendous competing interests we had to face in terms of trying to influence who we were going to lock up." Interview with Jan Smaby, MSGC Chairperson, supra note 52.
Several Commission members were initially uncomfortable with what they considered a pragmatic approach to setting policy, but gradually came to embrace the
prison cap. When the prosecutor and conservative Commissioner of Corrections publicly supported the population constraint, it forced others to argue according to the
rules established by the Commissioner. In the end, all groups realized they could not
force the Commission to lock up all offenders and that they would have to agree to
trade-offs and compromises in order to achieve some reform. Gradually a consensus
developed that it was not so important to put more burglars in prison if it meant
locking up fewer rapists. Id
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the current and future prison populations, and the likely impact of
alternative sentencing policies. From the outset, the MSGC had
agreed to undertake research to facilitate informed decisionmaking.
The staffs October concept paper recommended three research components: a dispositional study to determine existing sentencing policy
and practice with regard to the decision of whether to incarcerate, a
durational study to determine the existing practice concerning sentence length, and a simulation or population projection model to predict the impact of various sets of guidelines on state and local
correctional facilities.'18 The MSGC authorized the preparation of a
detailed research design, and in January 1979, the dispositional and
the durational studies were initiated.' 19
The results of the dispositional study indicated that the most significant factor in the judges' decisions regarding imprisonment was
the offender's criminal history. The second most important factor
was the severity of the current offense. The most important individual criminal history items were the number of prior felony convictions, followed by whether the offender was on probation or parole at
the time of the current offense, and finally, the extent and severity of
the juvenile record of young adult felons.' 20 With regard to the durational component of sentences, the seriousness of the current offense
was found to be the primary factor and criminal history the second
most important variable associated with the MCB decisions on length
118. Concept Paper, supra note 54, at 5. The Concept Paper suggested that the
guideline development should involve the following four sequential stages:
Stage 1: Determine existing sentencing policy and practice (in/out decisions) with a descriptive research study of sentencing dispositions. Determine existing practice concerning sentence length
from a second study of releasing practices.
Stage 2: Commission review of existing sentencing policy and practice.
Stage 3: Development of Commission sentencing policy.
Stage 4: Development of guidelines based on Commission policy using
simulation to predict the impact of various sets of guidelines on
state and local correctional resources.
Id.
119. In the dispositional study, data were collected on approximately 50% of the
persons convicted of felonies in fiscal year 1978, including a 42% random sample of
males and the entire population of females convicted of felonies. All counties in the
state were sampled, with oversampling in those counties with a large Indian population. The dispositional sample consisted of 2,39.9 cases. The durational study included data on all 847 persons released-either by parole or sentence terminationfrom state correctional institutions in fiscal year 1978. Data collected for both studies
included approximately 150 items regarding current offense, prior criminal history,
juvenile history (for adults age 23 or less at the time of the current offense), social
history, criminal justice processing data, and sentencing data. The durational study
added variables covering duration of confinement. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT,
supra note 114, at 4.
120. Id at 5.
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of prison terms. 121
The data further indicated the following: there was little systematic bias by race or gender in sentencing;1 22 no social status factor
other than employment was associated with sentencing; 123 and only
modest regional differences in imprisonment patterns existed. A
slightly lower proportion of person offenders were committed in metropolitan areas than non-metropolitan areas, but the large differences
in urban and rural sentencing severity that had been expected failed
to materialize due to the wide variation among the rural counties
with respect to commitment rates. 24 The absence of large urbanrural variations in sentencing dispositions, as well as the existence of
the Parole Board's statewide policies with respect to duration, greatly
diminished potential regional opposition to the adoption of statewide
guidelines regarding the imprisonment of felons.
The data from these studies were then used to develop a unique
impact analysis. 25 Rather than simply modeling the guidelines on
past sentencing behavior, the Commission developed a population
projection model that used case data from the dispositional and dura121. Id
122. Id Blacks were being committed at a higher rate than whites for serious
person offenses; whites were being committed at a slightly higher rate for property
offenses. Id
123. Id Social status items included educational attainment, employment status, community stability, marital status, and drug or alcohol use. Id. These items
were not associated with sentencing decisions, with the exception of employment at
the time of sentencing. It is conceivable that a systematic racial or economic bias
could develop if social status items were included in sentencing decisions. Id
124. In 1978 in Minnesota, the overall imprisonment rate for convicted felons
was 20.4%. In the third, sixth, and seventh judicial districts (all of which were rural)
rates of imprisonment were 25.7%, 13.4%, and 13.2%, respectively; in Hennepin and
Ramsey Counties they were 23.9% and 22.7%. Summary Table of MSGC History
Index Score (available from the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission).
125. The research findings were presented to the Commission at two two-day
retreats in August 1979. Commission members received notebooks containing a series of color-coded tables indicating percentages of incarcerated offenders of different
types and their average sentences. The general attitude of the Commission toward
the research, as demonstrated by their actions, was one of trust in the methodology,
acceptance of the findings, and a focus on their implications.
Kay Knapp, the MSGC Research Director, explained the Commission's use of
data:
Viewing guideline development as the articulation of public policy rather
than as the discovery of past practice led to the adoption of impact analysis,
rather than statistical description of past practices, as the primary methodological focus. Impact analysis provided the Commission with information
as to the consequences that various sentencing policies would have on other
aspects of the criminal justice system, with particular emphasis on the consequences for the size and nature of the prison population.
Knapp, Impact of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines on Sentencing Practices, 5 HAMLINE L.
REV. 237, 239 (1982).
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tional studies to simulate the population effects of various sentencing
policy options and Commission decisions over a five-year period. The
model assigned probabilities of imprisonment to cases in each offense
and offender category, permitting the projection of prison populations broken down by offender background and offense type. 126 The
MSGC could then consider the implications of various guideline configurations for the overall prison population, the rate of accumulation
of prison populations for each year during a five-year period, and the
social characteristics of that population over time.
d.

The Strategy of Public Involvement in the Development
Process

The fourth essential element in the development of the Minnesota sentencing guidelines was the Commission's definition of its task
in political rather than technical terms. 127 Recognizing that the development of public policy is a political process, the MSGC sought to
develop a constituency for the guidelines by encouraging interest
group participation. All Commission meetings were open. In addition, the MSGC held a series of six regional public meetings, 28 and
staff and members made numerous presentations to interested groups
126. K. Knapp, supra note 115. The Sentencing Guidelines Commission was
awarded a $12,700 grant from the National Institute of Corrections to develop a
projection model to test the effect of sentencing policies on prison populations over a
five-year period. Id at 3.
Future prison population can be determined primarily by three factors: 1) the
current prison population; 2) new committments increasing the prison population
between the present and future dates; and 3) the duration of imprisonment for current and future offenders. Id. Probabilities of type and length of sentencing are adjustable parameters in the model. Id Other probabilities included in the model are
the probability of parole or work release revocation and probation revocation. Id at
5. The model also provides for a maximum of 100 categories of offenders and 10
severity levels of criminal offenses. Id. The system was designed so that a computer
terminal could be brought to Commission meetings to provide information on the
impact of policy options as they were considered prior to decisionmaking.
127. Kay Knapp, the MSGC Research Director, explained that "[r]ather than
viewing guideline development as a technical problem with a mathematical solution,
sentencing guidelines development was viewed as a normative problem (ie., how
should punishment be allocated given limited resources) with a political solution (ze.,
development of public policy)." Knapp, supra note 125, at 239.
128. The regional public hearings were held between March and July 1979.
Minutes of MSGC Meeting, at 5 (Feb. 15, 1979). To publicize the three meetings
held outside the Twin Cities, about 130 individual letters were sent prior to each
meeting to local public defenders, county attorneys, county court judges, county sheriffs, chiefs of police, county commissioners, district court administrators, regional corrections department personnel, and special interest groups such as Indian, black, and
women's organizations. The local press was notified. Minutes of MSGC Meeting, at
1-2 (May 17, 1979). While attendance was spotty, no group could complain that it
had not been availed an opportunity to make its concerns heard. Interviews with
Dale Parent, Jan Smaby, and Kay Knapp, supra note 52.
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and arranged for liaison with organizations and agencies that they
29
regarded as important.1
At MSGC meetings, the members listened to advocates of various positions and then acted in a fashion similar to a panel of judges.
Opponents of guidelines, deprived of the procedural objection that
the guidelines were developed in a vacuum, generally chose to bargain. They accepted as "fact" that sentencing guidelines were the
vehicle to bring determinacy to sentencing and adhered to the parameters imposed by the constraint of prison population capacities.
They did so both because of the logic of that policy and because the
Commission helped them to perceive how their group could gain
more through participation and support than through opposition. By
the time the guidelines were developed, all groups had been afforded
some input, had gained some concessions, and the guidelines had become their product, too.
2.

Constructing the Guidehes

Construction of the guidelines proceeded in several overlapping
steps. Initially, the Commission gathered information through reading, discussion, and collection of data on existing sentencing practices
in the state. It next adopted a grid format for the guidelines. One
dimension represented offense severity; the other, the offender's criminal history. The core of the work then revolved around establishing
several essential policies: selecting the specific items that would constitute offense severity and offender criminal history scores, and establishing policies to determine dispositions and set sentence lengths for
those to be incarcerated. Once those issues were settled, the MSGC
turned to deviations from the guidelines and other related policy
questions.
129. The Commission asked several police and sheriffs' associations and the Attorney General's office to appoint liaison persons to attend Commission meetings.
The Minnesota Association of Community Corrections Act Counties appointed one
of its board members to monitor Commission meetings. In addition, Parent informally briefed the Chief Judge's quarterly administrative meetings in 1979 and sat in
on a Department of Corrections Task Force meeting on Sentencing Guidelines.
Rathke gave the board of the County Attorneys Association regular briefings on the
guidelines. Minutes of MSGC Meeting, (May 17, 1979); interviews with Jan Smaby,
Dale Parent, and Steven Rathke, supra note 52.
Parent and Smaby also cultivated relations with the press. In May 1979, they
began meeting with the editorial boards of all the major Twin Cities papers as well as
several papers in the rest of the state. They also began developing contacts with
reporters, regularly giving them news stories. The efforts translated into generally
accurate and favorable coverage of the guidelines and publicity at critical moments
that countered criticism and misrepresentation of the guidelines. Interview with Kay
Knapp, supra note 52.
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Offense Severity Ranking

Guideline construction in Minnesota began with the ranking of
offense severity. 30 All felonies were categorized into six generic
groups. 13 1 Each member first ranked the crimes within each category
in order of decreasing severity. After within-category rankings were
agreed upon, an overall ranking was established and felonies were
separated into ten categories according to seriousness.132
b.

Criminal History Index

The next step was to determine the criminal history index which
would compose the second dimension of the grid. The MSGC agreed
to include prior felonies and offender's custody status as the basic
variables in the index because research had indicated that these were
important factors in existing sentencing decisions.' 3 3 However, when
additional research indicated that the only social status factor associated with sentencing was employment at the time of arrest, a factor
which is highly correlated with race and income level, the Commission unanimously agreed to exclude all social status factors from the
134
criminal history index.
130. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 6. The Commission
worked for four months constructing the severity rankings. Id. The initial effort to
rank 60 felony offenses resulted in wide variation among individual members' rankings and dissension within the Commission. Rathke's subcommittee restructured the
ranking activity by dividing felonies into generic groups for initial intragroup ranking. This greatly facilitated the decisionmaking.
131. Id The six groups were crimes against persons, crimes against property,
criminal sexual conduct, arson, drug offenses, and miscellaneous offenses. A total of
104 felonies were divided among the six categories.
132. Generally, the Commission did not attempt to subcategorize the seriousness of criminal conduct within statutory offense categories. Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines & Commentary § II.A (rev. ed. 1981), reprinted in MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244
app. (West Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Minn. Guidel'nes & Commentay]. The
Guidelines do rate the seriousness of theft and forgery-related offenses according to
the value of the property involved. Id § V. One commentator has suggested that the
Commission was reluctant to create its own subcategories of criminal offenses because
of the judicial difficulties that would be encountered when facts that were not proved
at trial were introduced at the sentencing hearing, von Hirsch, supra note 115, at
194-95.
133. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 7. The term "custody status" refers to whether the offender was on probation or parole when the offense was
committed. Id The guidelines provide for an extra point to be added to the criminal
history score if the crime is committed while the offender is on probation or parole.
Mthn. Guidehnes & Commentary, supra note 132, § II.B.2.
134. Minn. Guidehnes & Commentary, supra note 132, § II.D. . Status factors

which specifically may not be used as aggravating or mitigating circumstances include race, sex, employment, educational attainment, marital status, or living arrangements. Id.
Indian-rights groups had expressed considerable concern about the inclusion of
these factors. Public defenders, who often rely on personal background as a source of
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Two other aspects of the criminal history index were matters of
more extended debate. Several options were considered for handling
prior misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors. The Commission could
exclude them from consideration altogether, include only those similar to the current offense, use a weighted system, or include all prior
convictions. Data analyses indicated that misdemeanor and gross
misdemeanor convictions had not been strongly associated with sentencing decisions in the past, 135 but most Commission members were
reluctant to completely ignore prior misdemeanor convictions in sentencing felons. In October, the MSGC unanimously accepted a com136
promise motion to adopt a weighted system.
Consideration of juvenile records caused the most heated and
prolonged controversy within the Commission and the most intensive
input from interest groups. 137 At the suggestion of a committee of
juvenile judges, the MSGC held two public hearings on the question
before making a decision. 138 Commission members eventually chose
to include juvenile history in the criminal history index because they
"felt that under limited and tightly controlled conditions to assure
equity and reliability, certain juvenile history information was highly
relevant to sentencing young adult offenders." 139 The initial compromise adopted by the Commission gave one point for two adjudications based on offenses that (1) would have been felonies if committed
by an adult, and (2) that occurred after the offender's sixteenth birthday but before his twenty-first birthday with a maximum of two
mitigating factors, were silent. Interview with Dale Parent, MSGC Staff Director,
supra note 52.
135. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 7.
136. Id Under the scoring system promulgated by the Commission, each prior
felony conviction counts one point on the criminal history score, each gross misdemeanor counts one-half point, and each misdemeanor counts one-quarter point. Id
One of the difficulties with this system is that relatively trivial felony convictions
count as much as major felony convictions. Minn. Guidelines & Commentaiy, supra note
132, § II.B.
137. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 7-8. See also Falvey, Defense
Perspectives on the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 257, 262 (1982).
The defense bar was particularly concerned that the use of juvenile convictions
would violate the statutory confidentiality of juvenile court records. Id at 262-63.
The bar believed that the use of such records would create sentencing disparity due
to the varied procedures used by the different Minnesota juvenile courts. Id.
138. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 8. "Juvenile court judges,
district court judges, prosecutors, defenders, law school professors, representatives of
law enforcement organizations, and corrections officials addressed the Commission
on the pros and cons of using juvenile records." Id.
139. Id at 23. The Commission reasoned that young offenders with serious,
extensive juvenile records should not be treated as first-time offenders. The Commission placed strict limits on the types of records considered and on the period of time
during which the consideration of this information would be relevant. Id at 8.
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criminal history points based on juvenile offenses.1 40
c.

Drawing the Disposition Line and Establishing Sentence
Durations

The next step in constructing the guidelines was to draw the disposition line based on considerations of current sentencing practices,
philosophical models of punishment, expressions of legislative intent,
and impact on prison populations.' 4 I For several months, the staff
and Commission floundered with abundant data indicating current
42
practices, but no clear guide for determining placement of the line. 1
Turning to consideration of the implications of different philosophical models of punishment, the staff drew dispositional lines representing just desserts, modified just desserts, incapacitation, and modified
incapacitation approaches. 43 The just-desserts approach emphasizes
making punishment proportional to the seriousness of the current offense, and eliminates criminal history in determining whether and for
how long to imprison.' 44 The modified version allows for limited consideration of the offender's prior criminal record, though the current
offense remains the dominant factor in sentencing. 14 5 The incapacitation approach aims to identify and restrain offenders who are likely
to pose a threat to society through future criminal behavior. The offender's criminal history is the primary factor used to predict recidivism, although current offense seriousness also is considered in
sentencing. 146 The modified incapacitation approach gives more at140. Mnn. Guidehies & Commentay, supra note 132, § II.B.4.
141. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 8. With regard to legisla-

tive intent, the Commission primarily considered mandatory sentencing laws and the
Community Corrections Act. The Commission attempted to draw the dispositional
line so that most offenses that fell within the mandatory sentences would receive a
presumptive imprisonment sentence. The Community Corrections Act establishes a
presumption against imprisonment for offenses with a statutory maximum of five
years or less (generally property crimes). The Commission attempted to draw the
disposition line to follow this intent generally, although the guidelines do recommend
imprisonment for individuals convicted of property crimes with longer criminal histories. Id. at 9.
142. Id The staff observed that, in general, rates of imprisonment were low for
low severity and low criminal history cases and increased at higher levels of criminal
history and higher levels of severity, but these trends did not suggest clear dispositional breakpoints. Id.
143. Id.
144. For a discussion of the just desserts approach, see G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 460-66 (1978); R. SINGER, JUST DESSERTS: SENTENCING BASED
ON EQUALITY AND DESSERT 67-74 (1979).

145. For a discussion of the modified just desserts approach, see von Hirsch,
Dessert and Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REv. 591 (1981).

146. For a discussion of the incapacitation approach, see D. GOTTFREDSON, L.
& P. HOFFMAN, GUIDELINES FOR PAROLE AND SENTENCING 41-67 (1978).

WILKINS
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tention to the gravity of the current offense than does a strict incapacitation approach.147 Data analyses indicated that Minnesota judicial
decisions in the past resembled an incapacitation model more than a
8

just desserts model.14

After labeling the philosophical bases of these four alternative
disposition lines, the MSGC tested each to determine its impact on
current prison populations. The Commission quickly adopted a modified just desserts disposition line; it rejected the incapacitation approach on philosophical grounds and the pure just desserts approach
because it would have caused prison overcrowding. 149 The line
adopted appeared to be feasible to implement in terms of existing
correctional facility capacity, although actual population effects depended on other decisions. Subsequent decisions were made to conform with the tentative disposition line, to which the MSGC became
increasingly attached.
Once the disposition issue had been addressed, the MSGC confronted the need to establish sentence durations. Durational considerations were strongly influenced by three factors: current practice of
the MCB; philosophies of punishment; and system impact. 50 Ultimately, the MSGC adopted a sentencing scale which appeared to be
consistent with a modified just deserts philosophy and which gave
judges discretion to make limited durational variations without de147. For a review of the theories considered by the MSGC, see von Hirsch, supra
note 115, at 181-91.
148. Id at 4-5. The Commission found that defendants who had felony records
tended to be imprisoned despite the lack of seriousness of the current offense, whereas
first offenders tended to receive probation even if the offense were serious. Id.
149. Id at 9, 13-14. For a discussion of the enabling statute's requirement that
the Commission take correctional resources into consideration, see notes 113-17 and
accompanying text supra.
150. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 10-11. The report is unclear as to how much weight the Commission gave to each of the three factors in
establishing the durational component. Andrew von Hirsch has suggested that the
most important factor was the Commission's desire not to disturb the dispositional
line. von Hirsch, supra note 115, at 192. The Commission's desire to preserve the
dispositional line resulted in a reduction in sentence duration when the preferred
durational configuration was tested and found to result in average annual prison
populations at capacity with no margin for fluctuations. This pressure on prison
resources forced the Commission to choose among permitting periodic overcrowding,
changing the dispositional line, or reducing durations. The Commission reluctantly
agreed that a five percent population margin was necessary and cut durations by 10%
to achieve a policy within the constraints of correctional resources. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 14. One other factor the Commission considered
was the impact of "good time" on sentence durations. Under Minnesota law, good
time may be earned by the prisoner at the rate of one day for every two days of good
behavior. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.04 (West Supp. 1983). The Commission increased the length of presumptive fixed sentences to account for "good time" reductions. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 11.
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parting from the guidelines.
d.

5 1

Departures from the Guidelines Sentence

The MSGC decided to permit departure from the presumptive
sentences in cases presenting aggravating or mitigating circumstances. 152 Although it specifically prohibited considering social status factors as a basis for deviation, it allowed these factors to be used
in determining nonstate incarceration and local treatment.15 3 Thus,
the Commission distinguished the limited universe of offenders for
whom the guidelines' restrictions apply (convicted felons sent to state
prisons) from the larger area of setting conditions of non-imprisonment sentences in which discretion remains.
In considering a proposed non-exclusive list of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances for departure, several MSGC members
adopted uncharacteristic advocacy roles. The prosecutor proposed
adoption of many aggravating factors; 54 the defender countered with
motions to adopt numerous mitigating factors. 155 After the MSGC
voted to approve many vaguely worded reasons for departure, the
Commissioner of Corrections chided the Commission for "making a
farce of the departure issue" by opening more than half the cases to
deviations. 156 Apparently swayed by this argument, the Commission
rescinded previously adopted motions on departures and subsequently adopted a more limited but non-exclusive list of mitigating
15 7
and aggravating factors.
151. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 12.

152. Mnn. Guidelines & Commentag, supra note 132, § II.D.2. The enabling statute permitted durational deviations within the guidelines of up to plus or minus 15%.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 subd. 5(2) (West Supp. 1983). The ranges actually provided by the guidelines are plus or minus five to eight percent of the fixed presumptive sentences. MINN. GUIDELINES REPORT, supra note 114, at 12. The Commission
refrained from adopting the full permissible range because "broad ranges would increase the disparate treatment of similar cases and, in a sense, would allow disparity
to continue in practice while defining it away in theory." Id.
153. Min. Guidelines &Commentary, supra note 132, § II.D. 1. More specifically,
the guidelines prohibit, as a basis of deviation, consideration of race, sex, employment
factors, social factors such as educational attainment, and the exercise of constitutional rights by the defendant during the adjudication process. Id.
154. Minutes of Meetings, Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission, Nov.
1-3, 1979, at 10-11.
155. Id at 11-13.
156. Id at 13.
157. Minn. Guidehnes & Commentary, supra note 132, § II.D.2. Mitigating factors
which may be used as reasons for departure include the following:
(1) The victim was an aggressor in the incident.
(2) The offender played a minor or passive role in the crime or participated under circumstances of coercion or duress.
(3) The offender, because of physical or mental impairment, lacked sub-
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The legal standard adopted for departures was that of "substantial and compelling circumstances."'' 58 Despite the efforts to limit the
number of departures, the Commission did not set a limit on the extent of the departure from the presumptive sentence, leaving specific
standards for departure to be developed through appellate review of
159
sentences by the state supreme court.
stantial capacity for judgment when the offense was committed. The
voluntary use of intoxicants (drugs or alcohol) does not fall within the
purview of this factor.
(4) Other substantial grounds exist which tend to excuse or mitigate the
offender's culpability, although not amounting to a defense.
Id § II.D.2.a.
Aggravating factors include the following:
(1) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to age, infirmity, or reduced physical or mental capacity, which was known or should have
been known to the offender.
(2) The victim was treated with particular cruelty for which the individual offender should be held responsible.
(3) The current conviction is for an offense in which the victim was injured and there is a prior felony conviction for an offense in which the
victim was injured.
(4) The offense was a major economic offense, identified as an illegal act
or series of illegal acts committed by other than physical means and by
concealment or guile to obtain money or property, to avoid payment
or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or professional advantage. The presence of two or more of the circumstances listed below are aggravating factors with respect to the offense:
(a) the offense involved multiple victims or multiple incidents per
victim;
(b) the offense involved an attempted or actual monetary loss substantially greater than the usual offense or substantially greater
than the minimum loss specified in the statutes;
(c) the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning or
occurred over a lengthy period of time;
(d) the defendant used his or her position or status to facilitate the
commission of the offense, including positions of trust, confidence, or fiduciary relationships; or
(e) the defendant has been involved in other conduct similar to the
current offense as evidenced by the findings of civil or administrative law proceedings or the imposition of professional sanctions.
Id § II.D.2.b.
158. Id § II.D. Judges must provide written reasons for a departure from the
guidelines. Id A judge who departs from both the presumptive disposition and the
presumptive duration must provide reasons for each departure. Id.§ II.D.02.
159. The extent to which judges may depart from the guidelines depends on the
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the "substantial and compelling" standard. See von Hirsch, supra note 115, at 212. The Minnesota Supreme Court has
ruled on the departure issue on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., State v. Luna, 320
N.W.2d 87 (Minn. 1982) (defendant's use of knife and particularly offensive threats
during sexual assault justified increase in presumptive sentence from 43 to 60
months); State v. Fairbanks, 308 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1981) (13-month addition to
presumptive sentence for conviction of burglary of dwelling with assault, justified in
light of defendant's threats to his victim of castration and murder, and his assault on
victim). Generally, the outer limit for departures is a doubling of the presumptive
sentence. See State v. Martinez, 319 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1982); State v. Evans, 311
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Additional Policy Considerations

In designing the guidelines, the MSGC recognized that the effect
of punishment standards critically depends on the actions of system
officials, particularly prosecutors, and that the guidelines would increase these officials' discretion due to their control of the charging
and plea negotiation process.' 60 After hearing a variety of arguments,
the Commission decided not to attempt to structure plea negotiation
or limit prosecutorial power until the guidelines had been implemented and prosecutorial reactions had been studied. The Commission also weighed and rejected real offense sentencing and explicit
61
sentence discounts for guilty pleas.'
The legislative mandate permitted, but did not obligate, the
Commission to develop guidelines governing conditions of probation
for convicted felons not sentenced to state prisons (non-imprisonment
guidelines). 16 2 Initially, the grid included non-imprisonment guidelines, but later the Commission agreed not to adopt non-imprisonment guidelines or establish recommended sanctions for convicted
offenders for whom state prison terms are not proper. This self-imposed limitation was an important factor in avoiding opposition to
the guidelines. It permitted the judge to set the conditions of probation which may include up to one year in a local jail. For the eighty
percent of all convicted felons whose sentences are stayed (as well as
all misdemeanants) there is no state sentencing policy governing judicial determination of the conditions of punishment. This decision by
the MSGC averted angering both the bench and bar over the determination of jail time, which often is affected by local traditions and
63
conditions in county jails. 1
f.

Final Adjustments
Statewide conferences of judges, prosecutors, and public defend-

N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 1981); State v. McClay, 310 N.W.2d 683 (Minn. 1981). But cf
State v. Stumm, 312 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. 1981) (absolute vulnerability of 2-year-old
victim and cruelty of defendant and his indifference to child's medical needs justified
more than a doubling of presumptive guideline sentence).
160. See generally Rathke, Plea Negotiating Under the Sentencing Guidelnes, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 271, 271-72 (1982).
161. Minutes of MSGC Meeting (Dec. 21, 1978); interviews with William Falvey, Steven Rathke, Dale Parent, and Judge Amdahl, supra note 52.
For a discussion of the implications of these policies, see Coffee & Tonry, Hard
Choices: Crriical Trade-ofs in the Implementation ofSentencing Reform Through Guidelnes, in
REFORM AND PUNISHMENT (M. Tonry & F.E. Zimring eds. 1983).
162. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 subd. 5 (West Supp. 1983).
163. The Minnesota House of Representatives has recently adopted a resolution
directing the Commission to develop a grid for non-prison sanctions. Resolution of
March 17, 1982, Comm. on Crim. Justice, Minn. House of Reps.
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ers were held in late November 1979 to present the draft guidelines

that were to be submitted to the legislature January 1, 1980. Public
defenders, who had been passive to that point, suddenly became vocal
critics of the guidelines. The December meeting at which the Com-

mission made final modifications of the guidelines was "the night of
the defense." 1 6 4 Under pressure from public defenders to eliminate
prior misdemeanors, gross misdemeanors, and juvenile adjudications
from the criminal history score, the MSGC members representing the
county attorneys and public defenders agreed to a compromise: a
limit of one point on the criminal history score for all prior misdemeanors and gross misdemeanors 65 and one point for a juvenile record. 166 Other modifications included the adoption of a provision
permitting the lapse of a prior record after a period of time if no
subsequent convictions occur 167 and, in response to vigorous lobbying
by women's groups, an increase in the severity level of several crimi16
nal sexual conduct offenses.'
3.

Endorsements and Interest Group Positions

The response to the guidelines, while not wildly enthusiastic, was
generally quite positive. Rathke's effort to persuade the County Attorneys Association to adopt a resolution in favor of the guidelines
resulted in a bland statement that the association would not be the
one to "cast the first stone" at the guidelines. 69 Thus, a politically
powerful potential opponent was neutralized. Prosecutors had become convinced that they had more to gain from the sentencing
guidelines than from continuation of the status quo. Indeed, the
prosecutors had won several important concessions, including consideration of the juvenile record in the adult offender's history score and
the elimination of consideration of social status factors in sentencing.
What they had lost in severity of sentences was more than offset by
increased certainty of imprisonment for violent offenders, greater leverage in the charge and plea negotiation process which had been left
unregulated by the guidelines, and the elimination of parole board
authority over the length of prison terms. These changes enhanced
164. Telephone interview with Kay Knapp, MSGC Research Director, supra
note 52.
165. Minn. Guidelines & Commentary, supra note 132, at Comment II.B.302.
166. Id. at Comment II.B.405.
167. Id. at Comment II.B. 106.
168. This change was not adopted until modifications in the criminal history
index reduced the projected prison population sufficiently to accommodate the proposed increases in offense severity.
169. Interview with Stephen Rathke, County Attorney and member of the
MSGC, supra note 52.
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the influence of the prosecutors in decisions about who should go to
prison and for how long.
The public defenders, a less politically potent group than the
prosecutors, actively entered the negotiation process only in its final
stage. Their initial vocal opposition to the guidelines was blunted
when they recognized that prison populations would shift but that
overall severity level and numbers would not increase, and when they
won a limitation on the criminal history score with respect to misdemeanors and juvenile adjudications. 170
Judges took no position on a county, district, or statewide level.
They were divided in their views of the guidelines, without leadership
on the sentencing issue, and probably inhibited by their tradition of
political restraint. Further, the decision of the Commission not to impose non-imprisonment guidelines avoided likely vociferous criticism
by judges. While occasional statements that the guidelines would
turn judges into robots surfaced, the guidelines shifted rather than
diminished judicial discretion. Prior to the guidelines, judicial decisions with respect to dispositions were unfettered, but judges in reality
had virtually no influence over prison terms. 17 1 With the guidelines,
although their dispositional discretion was limited, their discretion
with respect to sentence duration was increased.
Police and sheriffs, who might have been expected to oppose the
guidelines as too lenient, did not take a position. 172 The Minnesota
Association of Community Corrections Act Counties (MACCAC)
gave the guidelines a weak endorsement. MACCAC was initially
concerned about financial arrangements and increased costs to counties if jail use increased. The MSGC won their support with a financial incentive, providing that counties would not be charged under
the Community Corrections Act for any offender sentenced according
to the guidelines. 7 3 The reactions of other corrections personnel to
170. Interviews with William Falvey, public defender and member of the
MSGC; Kay Knapp, MSGC Research Director; and Jan Smaby, MSGC Chairperson, supra note 52.
171. For a discussion of sentencing in Minnesota before the guidelines were implemented, see notes 23-29 and accompanying text supra.
172. McCutcheon, who had become an advocate of the guidelines as a former
Police Chief, apparently convinced the Police Chiefs' Association to support the
guidelines rather than adopt a resolution opposing them, as they had been considering. Interviews with Dale Parent, MSGC Staff Director, and William McCutcheon,
former senator, supra note 52.
173. Under the Community Corrections Act, counties were expected to keep
felons' sentences to less than five years in local facilities. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 401.01-401.16 (West Supp. 1983). To encourage local treatment, counties received a subsidy from the state for local programming from which was subtracted the
per diem expenses of "chargeable" felons sent to state institutions (z'e., those offenders
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the guidelines were mixed. Some officials were threatened by the rejection of rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment and as a mechanism of social control of offenders. Probation officers were upset by
the new burden imposed on them to provide accurate criminal history information in the face of often incomplete records. Top corrections department leaders, however, recognized the leverage provided
by the adoption of "good time" and also welcomed the assurance of a
1 74
limited and predictable prison population.
Groups representing Indians, blacks, and women went along
with the guidelines. While mistrustful of the impact of the guidelines,
Indian and black civil rights groups sought and gained the explicit
elimination of consideration of status factors which they believed
worked against them. Indian advocates also successfully argued for
the elimination of petty offenses and won a limitation on prior misdemeanor offenses in criminal history scoring. Feminist groups had succeeded in increasing the severity of criminal sexual conduct
offenses.

175

The Republican Governor, Albert Quie, also supported the
guidelines. He had taken no position on the guidelines while the
MSGC was constructing them. As several members were appointees
of his Democratic predecessor, the only entree to the Governor's office
was through the Commissioner of Corrections, Jack Young, a Quie
appointee. When the guidelines were submitted to the legislature,
Smaby, Parent, Knapp, and Young briefed the Governor in an open
meeting that was attended by a news reporter who reported the Governor's only statement on the guidelines: he supported them. 7 6 This
support helped avoid a partisan battle in the legislature.
4.

The 1980 Legislat've Session Strategy

The MSGC presented the guidelines in a report to the legislature
on January 1, 1980.177 The enabling statute provided that the guideserving less than five years and thus chargeable to the county). Smaby, the Hennepin County representative of MACCAC, realizing that under the guidelines some
chargeables would be sentenced to state prison, recommended legislation that counties not be charged for any offender sentenced according to the guidelines. This proposal won Community Corrections Act counties' support. Interview with Jan
Smaby, MSGC Chairperson, supra note 52.
174. Interviews with Kay Knapp, Dale Parent, Howard Costello, and Kenneth
Schoen, supra note 52.
175. id
176. Schultze, Little Effect on Prison Bolls Seen, Rochester Post Bull., Jan. 17, 1980,
at 17 (reporting that Governor Quie supported the guidelines). See also Salisbury,
Uniform Crimnal Penalties Taking Shape, St. Paul Pioneer Press, Dec. 23, 1979.
177. See MINN. GUIDFLINES RFI'ORT,supra note 114.
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lines would go into effect on May 1 if there were no legislative action
178
to the contrary prior to that date.
At the start of the 1980 legislative session, Chairperson Smaby
briefed key legislators. 7 9 She argued that the guidelines could not
retain their integrity if amended, that they adhered to the legislative
mandate, and that they faced no organized opposition. Leaders in
both chambers adopted the strategy of keeping the guidelines in committee until they went into effect to avoid debate or efforts to alter
them on the floor of either chamber.180
The legislature was willing to let the guidelines go into effect because it did not want to reopen the sentencing issue that had earlier
led to such a bitter and protracted debate. Further, the MSGC had
resolved key issues, at least temporarily, in a responsible manner that
was acceptable to all concerned groups. The goal of sentencing was
shifted from an emphasis on rehabilitation to a primarily retributive
approach. Discretionary authority to determine the disposition and
duration of prison terms of felons was shifted and structured by the
guidelines, and the existing level of sentencing severity was maintained, although average terms of imprisonment for certain types of
offenses were altered.
IV.

THE POLITICS OF SENTENCING REFORM IN PENNSYLVANIA1

A.
1.

8

1

The Legislalion

The Legislative Battle
In Pennsylvania, criticism of the existing indeterminate system of

178. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 subd. 12 (West 1983). The guidelines are reprinted at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 (app.) (West 1983).
179. Interview with Jan Smaby, MSGC Chairperson, supra note 52.
180. Interviews with Jan Smaby and Rep. Vanasek, supra note 52. A bill was
introduced to defer implementation of the guidelines rather than reject them, but it
never got out of the House Criminal Justice and Corrections Committee. In the
Senate, when a similar bill was blocked in committee and brought to the floor by a
parliamentary maneuver, it was defeated in a party line vote. This is ironic (and
perhaps an apochryphal sign of danger) in view of the tradition of nonpartisan treatment of criminal justice policy issues in the Minnesota legislature and the efforts of
the commission to gain bipartisan support.
181. For a general discussion of the author's research methodology, see note 12
and accompanying text supra.
Interviews were conducted with the following individuals in Pennsylvania:
Patrick Beaty, Staff Aide to Sen. Michael O'Pake, in Harrisburg (May 4, 1981); Rep.
Norman Berson, member of the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (PCS), in
Philadelphia (March 14, 1981) and in Harrisburg (April 1, 1981); Judge Richard
Conaboy, original Chairperson of the PCS, in Scranton (March 13, 1981); Rendell
Davis, Executive Director of Pennsylvania Prison Society, in Philadelphia (April 28,
1981); Saundra D'Illio, Research Director of the Philadelphia Sentencing Guidelines
Project, in Philadelphia (April 28, 1981); Donald Dowd, Criminal Law Professor at
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sentencing criminals focused on disparity and on the apparent leniency of sentences. The legislative struggle was between House leaders
and their allies, who sought broad criminal justice reform, and Senate
leaders and their supporters, whose focus was on increasing the severity of sentences for repeat violent offenders. The House leaders' goals
were to reduce disparity in sentences, abuses of judicial discretion,
and inconsistency in the administration of justice and to create a coherent system through judicial participation in sentencing reform
without increasing overall severity.1 82 The concerns of Senate leader
Michael O'Pake and his allies, on the other hand, focused on inconsis1 83
tency and leniency in the sentencing of violent offenders.
In 1976, the Senate took the lead in sentencing reform by
amending a relatively minor bill, S.B. 995,184 adding a provision that
mandated minimum prison sentences for offenders convicted of a
number of violent felonies.' 85 The subsequent vote by the House not
Villanova Law School, in Villanova (May 5, 1981); Sen. George Gekas, member of
the PCS, in Harrisburg (March 4, 1981); Frederick Giles, Counsel to the Chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, in Harrisburg (May 4, 1981); Rep. Lois Hagarty, in
Bala Cynwyd (April 28, 1981 and March 17, 1982); Frank Hazel, District Attorney of
Delaware County, in Media (April 28, 1981); Sen. James Kelley, member of the PCS,
in Harrisburg (March 4, 1981); John Kramer, PCS Executive Director, in State
College (Jan. 27-28, 1981) and in Harrisburg (Feb. 19, Dec. 9, 1981 and March 19,
1982); Nick Lippincott, Counsel to the House Judiciary Committee, in Harrisburg
(May 4, 1981); Robin Lubitz, PCS Associate Director, in Philadelphia (March 11,
1981) and in Harrisburg (April 1, 1981); Ronald Marks, Commissioner of
Corrections, in Camp Hill (May 4, 1981); Lynn Marks, Executive Director of
Women Organized Against Rape, in Philadelphia (May 5, 1981); Sam McClea,
Executive Director of the House Judiciary Committee, in Harrisburg (March 4,
1981), in Philadelphia (March 11, 1981) and by telephone (March 2, 1981); John
McCormack, PCS Research Associate, by telephone (April 10, 1981); Rep. Terrance
McVerry, member of the PCS, in Pittsburgh (Feb. 28, 1981) in Harrisburg (May 4,
1981 and March 29, 1982); Michael Minney, member of the PCS, in Lancaster (May
5, 1981); Judge John O'Brien, member of the PCS, in Pittsburgh (Feb. 28, 1981);
Alfred Pelaez, member of the PCS, in Pittsburgh (Feb. 28, 1981); Edward Rendell,
District Attorney of Philadelphia County, in Philadelphia (April 29, 1981); Judge
Anthony Scirica, member of the PCS and later PCS Chairperson, in Norristown
(March 12, 1981 and March 16, 1982); Joseph Smyth, District Attorney of
Montgomery County in Norristown (April 29, 1981).
182. For example, Rep. Scirica, the chief sponsor of the bill establishing a guidelines commission, believed that the adoption of appellate review of sentencing was an
even more important means than the Guidelines Commission of reining in judicial
discretion. Interview with Judge Anthony Scirica, supra note 181.
183. Interview with Patrick Beaty, Staff Aide to Sen. O'Pake,supra note 181. See
also Synopses of Public Hearing Testimony, 1980, infra note 304 (testimony of Sen.
O'Pake advocating more severe sentencing, particularly for violent crimes).
184. S.B. 995, 159th Sess. (Pa. 1975) (amended June 30, 1976). S.B. 995 originally merely added the theft of leased property to Title 18 (Crimes and Offenses) of
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes. Id
185. id. The amendment to S.B. 995 specified mandatory sentences for those
convicted of rape, arson, and robbery. S.B. 995 was not the only mandatory sentencing bill seriously considered that year. See H.B. 1509, 159th Sess. (Pa. 1975). The
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to concur forced the bill to a joint conference committee. 186 The bill
was reported out of the conference committee and passed in the Senate, 18 7 but was tabled in the House on the last vote of the 1976
session. 188
The principal opposition to S.B. 995 came from Norman Berson,
Democratic Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, and Anthony
Scirica, Republican member of that committee. Both opposed
mandatory minimum sentencing legislation in general as too rigid,
and opposed S.B. 995 specifically as too severe and costly.' 8 9 Their
initial strategy was to undertake a study of the fiscal impact of S.B.
995 and several similar bills. The joint research study conducted during the summer of 1976 by the legislative staff on the use and impact
of mandatory sentencing in Pennsylvania indicated the enormous
costs of its adoption and implementation. 90 In addition to using
these cost figures to their advantage, opponents of the bill invoked a
rarely used parlimentary procedure, resulting in the defeat of S.B. 995
Senate had earlier amended H.B. 1509 to include a provision which required
mandatory sentences for repeat offenders and offenders who commit crimes while in
the possession of firearms. See Pa. House Leg. J., June 30, 1976, at 5924-26. The
House rejected that amendment on the same day that it added its own mandatory
sentencing amendments to S.B. 995. Id.
186. Pa. Senate Leg. J., Sept. 27, 1976, at 1970.
187. Id.,Nov. 16, 1976, at 2088-89. The bill that was reported out of the conference committee toned down the mandatory sentencing amendments. See id , Nov. 15,
1976, at 2056.
188. Pa. House Leg. J., Nov. 17, 1976, at 6441-44. The House tabled the bill by
a 92-84 vote. Id at 6442-43.
189. Pa. House Leg. J:, June 30, 1976, at 6012 (remarks by Rep. Scirica in opposition to S.B. 995).
This criticism was shared by the Sentencing Task Force of the Pennsylvania
Council on the Criminal Justice system, which concluded that
mandatory sentencing does not achieve the deterrent effects that many
claim, that the imposition of such sanctions disregards constitutional principles and beliefs regarding individualized justice and that the implementation of mandatory sentences would be exorbitantly expensive and, from a
correctional management point of view, unrealistic.
Memo from Judge Richard P. Conaboy, President of the Pennsylvania Joint Council
on the Criminal Justice System, to Participants and Invitees to the Pennsylvania
Sentencing Conference of 1977 (Feb. 23, 1978) (on file with the Vilanova Law Review).
190. Memorandum from Frederick D. Giles, Kenneth R. Neeley, Sam McClea,
and Mike Berney (Feb. 3, 1977) (on file with the Vi'lanova Law Review) (discussing the
legislative staff's projection of the fiscal impact of S.B. 995). In 1975, 4,915 of the
10,061 persons sentenced for crimes which would be subject to mandatory sentences
under S.B. 995 (48.9%) were given probation or another non-incarcerative sentence.
Id. Assuming that one-quarter of those not incarcerated had one or more prior felony convictions-and under S.B. 995 would be incarcerated-a conservative estimate of the cost arising from an increased number of inmates, longer individual
prison sentences, a rise in operational and construction costs for the correctional system, and the costs of more jury trials was set at $28.8 million. Id. If half this number
of felons were affected, the cost to the state would be $92.7 million. Id.
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in the House.' 9'
As in Minnesota, opponents of the nearly-adopted mandatory
minimum sentencing bill sought an alternative, and proposed sentencing guidelines in the next session.' 92 The prime mover in developing the sentencing guidelines legislation was Representative
Scirica. The idea of implementing sentencing guidelines received additional exposure with the adoption by the Philadelphia judiciary of
voluntary "descriptive" guidelines in an effort to "reform" its sentencing practices. 93 Further support for the guidelines concept came from
94
the Pennsylvania Joint Council on the Criminal Justice System.
Its Sentencing Task Force, which included Scirica and Judge Richard
Conaboy, the Joint Council's president, organized a sentencing conference attended by more than 100 state leaders in February 1977 to
discuss sentencing issues and to develop recommendations for the legislature. The well-orchestrated consensus that emerged from the conference resulted in Joint Council support for the creation of a
statewide sentencing guidelines commission.' 95 The Joint Council
also agreed on the desirability of some form of appellate review of
191. In the Pennsylvania House, votes are tabulated electronically. While a
House rule provides that members cannot vote unless they are seated, it is common
practice for members to press the buttons to record votes for other members. This
practice is rarely challenged.
The majority leader, who opposed S.B. 995, invoked the rule, thereby limiting
the vote to those actually present. Pa. House Leg. J., Nov. 17, 1976, at 6442. This
tactic enraged Democratic Representative Zeller, who shouted abuse at the majority
leader. Id Representative Zeller's tactics may have been counterproductive since
some of the House members who had previously indicated their support for the bill at
a party caucus subsequently changed their votes during the actual count.
192. See H.B. 953, 161st Sess. (Pa. 1977). H.B. 953 resulted from the combination of two prior bills, H.B. 796, 161st Sess. (Pa. 1977) and H.B. 197, 161st Sess. (Pa.
1977). It provided for appellate review of sentences and for the creation of a sentencing commission.
193. The Philadelphia voluntary guidelines are described in R. Lubitz, S. DiIllio and T. Clear, Philadelphia's Sentencing Guidelines: The Impact of Judicially
Initiated Reform on the Court of Common Pleas (unpublished manuscript available
from the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing).
194. The Joint Council is a 24-member body composed of trial judges, lawyers,
legislators, state agency heads, and administrators of professional organizations actively involved in Pennsylvania's criminal justice system. It was established in May
1972 by the Governor to serve as an ongoing forum in which concerns of the justice
system could be discussed from the interdisciplinary and interdepartmental perspectives of its members. Funds for most of its activities come from the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration's monies and are distributed by the state planning agency.
195. Pa.JoitI Council on the CrimnalJustice System, Sentencing Task Force Position
Statement on House Bill 953,presented at Pa.HouseJudci'ai Committee Hearings on Sentencing

Reform, at 4-5 (Sept. 20 and 21, 1977) (on file with the Villanova Law Review).
Following the sentencing conference, the Task Force focused its attention on
House Bill 953 which was seen as embodying many of the views expressed by conference members. Id
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sentencing, on the goal of emphasizing greater certainty of punishment over increased severity, and on the need to decrease sentence
96
disparity among various regions of the state.
The House Judiciary Committee held public hearings on several
sentencing reform bills during the summer of 1977.197 However, none
of the proposed bills were passed by the House that year. In the 1978
session, Scirica's 1977 guidelines bill' 98 was passed by the House, 199
but died in the Senate Appropriations Committee. 20 0 In the fall of
1978, Representatives Berson and Scirica broke the impasse by attaching their sentencing guidelines commission provision as an
20 1
amendment to a minor bill that had been passed by the Senate.
The amended bill was passed by the House, 20 2 but the Senate voted
not to concur in the House amendment. 20 3 The bill was then referred
to a six-member House-Senate conference committee to negotiate a
final compromise.2 0 4 The price of compromise was the inclusion of an
interim mandatory sentencing provision. 20 5 The Conference Com196. Id at 1-4.
197. The reform bills were primarily mandatory sentencing bills. See, e.g., H.B.
193, 161st Sess. (Pa. 1977) (providing presumptive minimum sentences for offenders
convicted of violent crimes and repeat offenders who committed crimes with the use
of a weapon); H.B. 168, 161st Sess. (Pa. 1977) (providing, inter a/,a, additional
mandatory penalties for possessing a firearm during the commission of a crime); and
H.B. 1467, 161st Sess. (Pa. 1977) (providing mandatory penalties for victimizing the
elderly). An important exception was House Bill 953, the guidelines bill, which was
introduced by Representatives Berson and Scirica. H.B. 953, 161st Sess. (Pa. 1977).
198. H.B. 953, 161st Sess. (Pa. 1977).
199. Pa. House Leg. J., May 23, 1978, at 1484. The bill passed by a 185-6 vote.
200. Pa. Senate Leg. J., June 13, 1978, at 610.
201. S.B. 195, 162nd Sess. (Pa. 1978). Senate Bill 195 originally amended Title
18 of the Pennsylvania Code (Crimes and Offenses) relating to the alteration of identification marks on personal property.
202. The vote in the House in favor of the bill was 190-0. Pa. House Leg. J.,
Sept. 21, 1978, at 3132.
203. Pa. Senate Leg. J., Sept. 27, 1978, at 1020.
204. Pa. Senate Leg. J., Sept. 28, 1978, at 1044. The Senate appointed Senators
O'Pake, Fumo, and Jubelier to the Conference Committee. Id The House appointed Representatives Scirica, Rhodes, and Berson. Pa. House Leg. J., Sept. 28,
1978, at 3581.
205. The conferees agreed to the inclusion of interim guidelines, avoiding the
term "mandatory sentence." See 1978 Pa. Laws 319 § 5 (expired with adoption of
sentencing guidelines), reprithedat 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 9721, at 333. Under
the Interim Sentencing Guidelines, when sentencing offenders who had committed
certain violent crimes and had previously been convicted of any of the listed crimes,
the court must have "consider[ed] as a guideline in imposing sentence that such person be sentenced to a minimum term of not less than four years imprisonment." Id
§ 5(a). A judge imposing a sentence of less than four years in such cases was required
to provide a statement of reasons for deviation. Id § 5(b). Additionally, it provided
for the right of either the defendant or the Commonwealth to appeal the sentence,
and gave standards for review on appeal. Id § 5(c)-(t). The Interim Sentencing
Guidelines were, by terms of the law, to expire upon the effective date of the sentenc-

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984

45

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29: p. 21

mittee Report was adopted by both the House and Senate, 20 6 and the
bill establishing the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (PCS)
20 7
was signed into law on November 26, 1978 by the Governor.
The sentencing guidelines commission legislation was thus enacted as a compromise between the House and Senate factions. The
Senate leaders had preferred mandatory minimum sentences as a
preferable way to force lenient judges to change, to reduce violent
crime, and to appear to their constituents as "tough on crime." In
agreeing to the guidelines approach they expected the latter to impose sentences that were both more uniform and more severe. The
House leaders supported guidelines as a politically useful alternative
that offered the opportunity for broad sentencing reform while avoiding the costs of mandatory minimums.
2.

'The Provzsions of the Legislation Estabh'shbng the Sentencing Guidelnes
Comm'ssz'on

The struggle over determining the composition of the guidelines
commission was marked by the legislators' bias against allowing too
great a role for judges, whom they viewed as having created the sentencing problem. At the same time, they felt a significant role on the
commission for legislators was warranted to ensure that the resulting
guidelines would be "sold" to fellow legislators.2 0 8 Thus, although at
one point the bill had proposed a commission composed of eight legislators and seven judges, 209 the final compromise reduced the number
of judges and legislators to four each, and added three gubernatorial
appointees. 210 To satisfy other groups that had sought inclusion on
ing guidelines adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. Id. § 5(j).
Those guidelines were adopted on May 14, 1982 and went into effect July 22, 1982.
See 204 Pa. Admin. Code § 303 (Shepard's 1983).
206. The House adopted the Report by a vote of 185-5. Pa. House Leg. J., Nov.
15, 1978, at 3734. The Senate adopted the Report with a vote of 47-0. Pa. Senate
Leg. J., Nov. 15, 1978, at 1128.
207. See 1978 Pa. Laws 319 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 & 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1981)).
208. See, e.g., Pa. House J., Nov. 22, 1977, at 3298 (Rep. Milliron, suggesting
that a majority of commission members should be from the legislature, so that legislators would have more say than the judiciary).
209. See id. (amendment introduced by Rep. Milliron).
210. See 1978 Pa. Laws 319 (codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2152(a)

(Purdon 1981)). The eleven commission members included four legislators, two from
the House appointed by the Speaker, and two from the Senate appointed by the
president pro tempore (one from each party in both chambers); four judges of a court
of record appointed by the Chief Justice; and a district attorney, defense attorney,
and law professor or criminologist appointed by the Governor. Id § 2152(a)(1)-(4).
The chairperson was to be elected by the Commission. Id. § 2152(c). This composition reflects the tendency in Pennsylvania's political culture to regard politics as a
task for professionals. For a discussion of Pennsylvania political culture, see note 35
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the Commission, the legislation called for public hearings prior to the
submission of the guidelines to the legislature, and specified that cer2 11
tain groups were to be invited to testify.
The mandate of the PCS was to promulgate sentencing guide-

lines "within the limits established by law which shall be considered
by the sentencing court in determining the appropriate sentence for

felonies and misdemeanors committed by a defendant. '21 2 The
promulgated guidelines were to specify the range of sentences applicable to crimes of a certain degree of seriousness, the range of
sentences of increased severity for defendants previously convicted of

felonies or crimes involving a deadly weapon, and deviations from the
range of sentences applicable due to the presence of aggravating or
2 13
mitigating circumstances.
The mandate included no direction to the PCS to consider ex-

isting capacities of correctional facilities. Such a provision was considered, but was rejected when it appeared its inclusion would lead
Senator O'Pake and the Philadelphia District Attorney Edward
Rendell to oppose the entire bill. Despite the omission of this explicit
direction, Representative Scirica expected that he would be able to

guide the adoption of guidelines that would not greatly affect prison
and accompanying text supra. Half the initial members were appointed for one-year
terms; the others and subsequent appointees were to serve for two years. 1978 Pa.
Laws 319. It is difficult to understand why the drafters of the legislation initially
established the Commission for four years but set the terms of office of half the members to expire while the Commission was in the middle of designing the guidelines,
and the terms of the rest to expire shortly after the guidelines were to be implemented. The provision was repealed and replaced in 1980 by a provision that requires members to serve "two years and until a successor has been selected and
qualified." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
211. See 1978 Pa. Laws 319 (codified at 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2155(a)(1)
(Purdon 1981)). For the debate over the composition of the Commission, see Pa.
House J., 162nd Sess., May 23, 1978, at 1475. Rep. Williams expressed concern that
the Guidelines Commission would be composed entirely of white professional males,
and community input would be lacking. Id. Rep. Scirica pointed out that any interested parties could comment on the proposed guidelines at the public hearings required by the guidelines law. Id.
The groups specified by law to be invited to testify at the public hearings included the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association; Chiefs of Police Associations;
Fraternal Order of Police; Public Defenders Organization; law school faculty members; State Board of Probation and Parole; Bureau of Correction; Pennsylvania Bar
Association; Pennsylvania Wardens Association; Pennsylvania Association of Probation, Parole and Corrections; Pennsylvania Conference of State Trial Judges; and
any other interested persons or organizations. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2155(a)(1)
(Purdon 1981).
It appears that the Bureau of Corrections was excluded from the Commission
because of its low visability, and because of the sense that the Board of Probation and
Parole would also have to be included.
212. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2154 (Purdon 1981).
213. Id. § 2154(l)-(3).
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2 14

population.
The guidelines commission legislation required that public hearings be held on the draft guidelines between thirty and sixty days
after their initial publication in the Pennsylvania Bulletn, 2 15 and publication of the guidelines in final form in the Pennsylvania Bulletin simultaneous with their adoption. 2 16 The guidelines were then to go into
effect 180 days after the final publication unless they were rejected in
their entirety by a concurrent resolution of the General Assembly
2 17
within ninety days of publication.
The statute also includes a number of provisions not directly related to the establishment of the guidelines commission, but which
generally affect sentencing in Pennsylvania. For example, in sentencing outside the guidelines, the legislation requires a judge to provide a
written statement of the reasons for the deviation. 2'1 The legislation
further provides for appeal of the sentencing decision by both the defense and prosecution, 21 9 and allows the appellate court to vacate a
sentence if the application of the guidelines is "clearly unreasonable"
or if a departure is "unreasonable. ' 22 0 In reviewing the record, the
appellate court is required to look at the nature of the offense, the
circumstances under which it was committed, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the presentence investigation, and the findings on which the sentence was based, as well as the guidelines. 22 I In
sum, Pennsylvania's legislation suggests guidelines that would be
broader in scope, covering both felony and misdemeanor sentences,
but which were to be advisory rather than presumptive as in Minnesota. These guidelines were to be superimposed on the existing sentencing procedures and affected judges' discretion in determining the
214. Interview with Judge Anthony Scirica, supra note 181.
215. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2155(a)(1) (Purdon 1981).

216. Id § 2155(a)(3).
217. Id § 2155(c).
218. Id.§ 9721(b). The enactment of this provision appears to have been influenced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Riggins,
474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140 (1977). In Riggins, a 21 year old married father with three
sons was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 1.9 ounces of marijuana. Id. at
119-20. 377 A.2d at 142-43. Without explaining why he did so, the trial judge imposed the maximum allowable sentence (a period of " 'not less than two nor more
than five years.' "). Id.at 121-22, 377 A.2d at 143. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court overturned the sentence, holding that "[wihen a trial court imposes judgement
of sentence, its reasons for the imposition of the sentence should appear on the record." Id at 122, 377 A.2d at 143.
219. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9781(a) (Purdon 1982).
220. Id § 9781(c).
221. Id § 9781(d).
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minimum sentence without affecting the parole board's decisionmaking authority.
3.

The Role of Interest Groups in Shaping the Sentencig Law

Because judges in Pennsylvania make both the dispositional and
durational decisions by setting the minimum sentence to be served,
and because the legislature did not consider eliminating the parole
board, the key legislative issues addressed by interest groups were the
means by which judicial discretion should be restricted and the extent
of those restrictions. Many of the interested parties saw sentencing
guidelines as a more appropriate restriction than mandatory minimum sentencing.
The Trial Judges Association endorsed Scirica's sentencing
bill.2 22 Although much of the judiciary was not enthusiastic about
sentencing reform, it appears that judges tended to view sentencing
guidelines as preferable to mandatory sentences because the guidelines would allow greater room for the exercise of judicial discretion.
Further, the PCS included members of the judiciary, and the imposition of any change would be deferred for at least eighteen months.
Like the judges, the district attorneys preferred sentencing guidelines over mandatory minimum sentencing. One reason for the preference appears to be a concern with retaining flexible plea and charge
223
bargaining as a means of avoiding the overcrowding of local jails.
The inclusion of the right to state-initiated appeals and appellate review of sentences was also widely supported by the district attorneys. 2 2 4 The Philadelphia District Attorney, Edward Rendell,
initially preferred mandatory minimum sentences, believing them
necessary to force judges to increase sentence length. 225 Rendell did
support the guidelines approach, however, once a provision for interim guidelines was added.
The defense bar also supported sentencing guidelines because
they were seen as providing greater flexibility and leniency than
mandatory minimums. 2 2 6 Defense interests, however, were not par222. The Trial Judges Association pressed for a legislative provision for a range
rather than a single sentence and for advisory rather than presumptive guidelines.
After these provisions were incorporated in the bill, it was endorsed by the Trial
Judges Association at its annual meeting.
223. Interviews with Rep. Norman Berson and district attorneys Frank Hazel,
Edward Rendell, and Joseph Smyth, supra note 181.
224. Interview with Philadelphia District Attorney Edward Rendell, supra note
181.
225. Id
226. Interviews with Sam McClea and Judge Anthony Scirica, supra note 181.
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ticularly powerful in shaping the legislation.
The Bureau of Corrections, a potentially important interest
group, was not very active in developing the guidelines legislation.
The Commissioner of Corrections, Ronald Marks, believed, however,
that the mandatory sentencing bill would vastly overcrowd the prisons, and accordingly stated his preference for the guidelines
2 27
alternative.
As in Minnesota, the sentencing guidelines bill was passed by an
unusual coalition of conservative and liberal supporters that had different goals. It represented both a "compromise" and an obscuring of
a number of issues, permitting its acceptance by wide majorities in
both the House and Senate and endorsement by various interest
groups outside the legislature. Conservatives, aware of the enormous
costs of mandatory minimum sentences, were satisfied with the passage of a bill that they could hold out as being tough on crime, but

that also avoided the political consequences of a real increase in sentence severity and fiscal costs. Liberals were encouraged by the adoption of legislation that avoided the inflexibility, severity, and costs of
mandatory minimums and promised an opportunity to structure judicial discretion and thereby reduce disparity. Although the unusual
and temporary coalition permitted the passage of the legislation, this
working agreement postponed confrontation of the difficult questions
of local autonomy and community standards versus a statewide policy, sentencing severity levels, and increased costs.
B.

Formulating the Guideh'nes-PhaseI

Because many important policy questions were not resolved by
the legislature, the PCS was faced with the difficult task of arriving,
without much guidance, at a compromise solution. The PCS created
three sets of guidelines during two distinct phases of development.
During the first phase-from April 1979 to April 1981-the PCS created its initial draft guidelines ("the October 1980 Draft Guidelines") 228 and the first final guidelines ("The January 1981
227. Interview with Ronald Marks, Commissioner of Corrections, supra note
181. Other groups that generally favored the guidelines bill included the following:
the Joint Council, the Harrisburg Area Rape Crisis Center, the Pennsylvania Prison
Society, the Pennsylvania Bar Association and, in general, the academic community.
The police association, in contrast, supported mandatory minimums. See interviews
with Rep. Norman Berson; Judge Richard Conaboy; Rendell Davis, Executive Director of Pennsylvania Prison Society; Professor Donald Dowd; Lynn Marks, Executive Director of Women Organized Against Rape; Sam McClea, Executive Director
of the House Judiciary Committee; and Judge Anthony Scirica, supra note 181.
228. 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4181-96 (Oct. 25, 1980).
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Proposal"). 229 These guidelines were rejected by the legislature in
April 1981.230 In the second phase, with several new members and a
new chairperson, the PCS substantially revised the guidelines ("The
October 1981 Revised Draft Guidelines") 231 and produced the January 1982 guidelines 232 that went into effect in July 1982.233
1.

The Key Elements in Shaping the Gutdeh/es

a.

Membership, Staff, and Internal Dynamics

The PCS first met in April 1979 with eighteen months in which
to create the guidelines. The Commission consisted of eleven members. The four judges who were selected by the Chief Justice were:
Richard Conaboy, from Lackawanna County (Scranton);23 4 John
O'Brien, from the Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) Court of Common
Pleas; and Merna Marshall and Curtis Carson, Jr. from the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. 235 The Commission's four legislative
members were Senator Richard Kelley, a conservative Democrat;
Senator George Gekas, the senior Republican on the Judiciary Committee; 236 and Representatives Anthony Scirica, a Republican, and
Norman Berson, a Democrat. Judge Conaboy was elected as
chairperson.
The three remaining appointments were made by Governor
Schapp in the final days of his administration.2 3 7 The Governor appointed Robert Colville, the District Attorney of Allegheny
229. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 463-76 (proposed Jan. 24, 1981) (rejected, H.R. Res.
24, 165th Reg. Sess. (Pa. Apr. 1, 1981)).
230. H.R. Res. 24, 165th Reg. Sess. (Pa., Apr. 1, 1981).
231. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 3597-3605 (Oct. 17, 1981).
232. 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 431-40 (Jan. 23, 1982).
233. The statute creating the guidelines commission provided that the guidelines would become effective 180 days after final publication unless rejected in their
entirety by a concurrent resolution of the General Assembly within 90 days of publication. See 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2155(c) (Purdon 1981). No such resolution
was passed, and the guidelines became effective on July 22, 1982. See 204 PA. ADMIN.
CODE § 303 (Shepard's 1983).
234. Judge Conaboy was a "natural" choice, since he was president of the Pennsylvania Joint Council, former president of the state trial judges association, and a
close friend of the Chief Justice.
235. Judge Marshall, the original Commission's only woman, had been the primary supporter of the Philadelphia guidelines project. Judge Carson, the Commission's only black, was a civil-rights activist and a critic of the Philadelphia guidelines.
236. Since Republicans gained control of the Senate in 1980, Senator Gekas has
been the chairman of the Judicary Committee.
237. The appointments by Governor Shapp were not discovered until the subsequent administration sought to make its own appointments. Interview with Prof.
Donald Dowd, supra note 181.
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County;238 Michael Minney, an attorney in private practice in Lancaster to represent the defense bar; and Albert Pelaez, a professor specializing in maritime law at Duquesne University to fill the academic
23 9
position.
There were several membership changes during the guideline development period that had a significant impact on the Commission's
composition. Judge Marshall died in December 1979. The subsequent judicial vacancy was filled by Anthony Scirica, who had been
elected common pleas court judge in November 1979. The legislative
vacancy created by Scirica was filled by Terrance McVerry, a Republican second-term representative from Allegheny County. Late in
1979, Judge Conaboy was appointed to the federal bench, but agreed
to remain chairperson of the PCS.
Judge Conaboy's leadership style and view of his role as
chairperson were quite different from those of Minnesota chairperson
Jan Smaby. 240 Conaboy adopted a soft-spoken, gentlemanly manner
and initially failed to take a strong lead within the PCS, contributing
to the Commission's initial lack of clear direction. Conaboy did not
actively represent the PCS and its guidelines to interest groups, the
public and the legislature; instead, he saw his job as leading the Commission in weighing the issues and designing guidelines which the leg24
islature could be expected to adopt. '
The PCS selected John Kramer, an associate professor of sociology at Pennsylvania State University, as its executive director.
Kramer was an experienced criminal justice system researcher with
little previous experience in politics and policy development. His
staff included Robin Lubitz as research director, and John McClosky
as research associate.
The PCS and its staff faced several problems which initially inhibited a productive working relationship. For example, the mem238. Colville was a supporter of the guidelines and one of the few Democratic
district attorneys in the state.
239. Although the academic seat on the Commission was intended to provide
the PCS with technical expertise, Professor Pelaez's speciality is admiralty law. Apparently without any initiative on Pelaez's part, his name was suggested by one of his
former students, who was serving on the governor's staff. When offered the choice of
a position on the Sentencing Commission or on the State Ethics Commission, Pelaez
chose the former. Interview with Albert Pelaez, supra note 181.
240. For a discussion of Smaby's leadership style, see notes 107-08, 176 & 179-80
and accompanying text supra.
241. Judge Conaboy did not present the guidelines to the legislative caucus or
visibly or actively use his contacts to gain legislative support for them. His personal
preference to avoid "huckstering," his view that the legislature tends to be hostile to
the judiciary and his position as a federal judge probably inhibited his activity on the
guidelines' behalf.
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bers' geographic dispersion made short and frequent meetings
unmanageable. Attendance at the meetings by several members was
spotty thereby preventing the continuity necessary to address issues
effectively. Chairperson Conaboy and several other members were
242
reluctant to rely on the staff, and were mistrustful of their statistics.
The PCS did not follow the staffs projected long-term strategy and
workplan, and seemed to pressure the staff to adopt a largely reactive
role.
b.

The Ambiguous and Overly-Ambitious Mandate

Although Judge Scirica believed that the legislation made clear
24
that the guidelines were to be advisory rather than presumptive,
other Commission members sought to create a presumptive sentencing scheme like Minnesota's. 244 The legislation required a judge who
imposed a sentence outside the guidelines to provide a written statement explaining the reason for the deviation, 245 thereby suggesting a
presumptive effect. However, the term "presumptive" had been removed from the final draft of the sentencing bill. Thus, the statute
that gave the PCS its mandate did not settle the issue of the nature of
the guidelines the PCS was to create.
The scope of the guidelines also proved to be a problem. Unlike
Minnesota's mandate, 246 Pennsylvania's legislation called for guide242. Interviews with Judge Richard Conaboy and Albert Pelaez, supra note 181.
243. Letter from Anthony Scirica to Richard P. Conaboy (Dec. 4, 1980) (on file
with the Villanova Law Review). Judge Scirica's letter expressed reservations about the
apparently presumptive nature of the initial draft guidelines: "Act 319 lestablishing
the PCS], I believe, does not mandate presumptive sentences, nor does it grant authority to the Sentencing Commission to impose guidelines in the nature of presumptive sentences." Id at 2. See also Pa. House Leg. J., May 23, 1978, at 1481 (remarks
of Rep. Scirica regarding the advisory nature of the guidelines).
244. The October, 1980 Draft Guidelines used presumptive language. When
they were strongly criticized, the majority of commission members agreed to alter the
language to make the guidelines advisory. A minority argued that the change had
the effect of "pulling the teeth out of the guidelines." See Pelaez & Minney, New
Sentencing Guidelines are More Fluff than Substance, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Jan. 28,
1981, at 9, col. 1.
245. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9721(b) (Purdon 1982). The legislation provides as follows:
The court shall also consider any guidelines for sentencing adopted by the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing . . . . In every case where the
court imposes a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines . . . the court
shall provide a contemporaneous written statement of the reason or reasons
for the deviation from the guidelines.
Id.
246. Minnesota's guidelines cover only felony offenses. For a further discussion
of the scope of Minnesota's guidelines, see notes 89-96 & 161-62 and accompanying
text supra.
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lines covering both felonies and misdemeanors.2 47 The designers of
the guidelines chose to include many crimes that are categorized as
misdemeanors, because they are serious offenses and the source of the
greatest sentencing disparity in Pennsylvania. 24

However, creating

guideline sentences for misdemeanors thrust the PCS into making
policy that would directly affect local correctional facilities. The
Minnesota Commission had staunchly avoided this role, recognizing
the validity of local policies based on different traditions and the conditions in local facilities. 249 The PCS subsequently exacerbated the
public's opposition to the guidelines by designating certain situations
for which an incarcerative sentence was not to be used. Even though
it was common practice not to incarcerate in such cases, it was politically unacceptable to publicly advertise the fact.
c.

The Limits Imposed by the Prison Populations

The prison population issue also created a problem for the PCS.
In contrast with Minnesota,25 0 there was no legislative mandate instructing the Pennsylvania Commission to consider correctional resources. The PCS accordingly faced a dilemma. Members
recognized that many supporters of the bill expected the guidelines to
increase both the severity and the certainty of sentences, a result
which would necessarily increase prison populations. They also knew
that guidelines that greatly increased the number of prisoners and the
length of their sentences would overcrowd prisons and might be impossible to implement.
In May 1980, the PCS discussed and rejected a policy that would
explicitly limit incarceration to fit existing jail and prison cell
space.2 5 1 Several members and the staff insisted that it would be in247. 42 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2154 (Purdon 1981).
248. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code categorizes as misdemeanor I the following
offenses that are treated as felonies in other states, including Minnesota: aggravated
assault, 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2702(a)(2)-(4) (Purdon 1973); terroristic threats,
id § 2706; retail theft of more than $150 as a first or second offense, i. § 3929; theft
of trade secrets, id § 3930(b); and theft of $200-$2000 by deception, id. § 3922; or
extortion, id. § 3923. Offenders convicted for these offenses may get maximum
sentences of up to five years and may be sent to state prison. Id § 1104(1). Additionally, these offenders may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $10,000. Id

§ 1101(1).

Therefore, if the guidelines were limited to felonies only, a prosecutor could
avoid the constraint of the guidelines by dropping felony charges and seeking conviction on a misdemeanor I or II, which still could result in a state prison sentence.
249. For a discussion of the Minnesota Commission's attitude toward the use of
local correctional facilities, see notes 162-63 and accompanying text supra.
250. For a discussion of Minnesota's consideration of correctional resources, see
notes 113-17 and accompanying text supra.
251. Minutes of PCS Meeting, at 8-9 (May 16, 1980). The research methodol-
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appropriate for the PCS in establishing "appropriate sentences" to be
guided by practical considerations of space rather than by principles
ofjustice.25 2 This seemingly-principled stance was also politically expedient: such a limit without legislative mandate was seen as suicidal, making the PCS vulnerable to charges that it was not "tough"
on crime. The two Republican legislators, Gekas and McVerry,
strongly opposed such a limit, arguing that, while it might be a practical consideration guiding the Commission's decisions, it should not
be stated as public policy. Berson reluctantly agreed in the face of an
overcrowded jail in Philadelphia and a politically visible district at253
torney advocating stiffer sentences.
The absence of a clear policy regarding consideration of the
guidelines' impact on prison population left the PCS subject to enormous pressure to increase sentence severity. It succumbed to that
pressure in formulating the January 1981 Proposal. 254 Still, proponents of increased severity were not satisfied that the modified draft
guidelines were tough enough. At the same time, the increase in severity undercut support from liberals and moderates, who attacked
255
the proposals as unfeasible and too expensive to implement.
d.

Research and Research Findings

Research on past practice did not play the significant role in
Pennsylvania that it did in Minnesota, and ultimately proved to be a
two-edged sword that made clear both the extent and nature of disparity and the drastic change required to eliminate it. The PCS
nearly did not conduct a study of past sentencing practice. The
Chairperson and several members did not understand the value of
such a study, and feared that it could result in "making decisions
based on a computer" rather than on the basis of their collective
judgment. 256 A vote committing the PCS to undertake a study of
past sentencing practice in Pennsylvania was deferred while the staff
assertively caucused with several members and pressed successfully
for a vote of approval.
ogy adopted by the PCS provided fairly limited information on prison impact. For a
discussion of the PCS research methodology, see notes 256-66 and accompanying text
z,fra.
252. Minutes of PCS Meeting, at 8 (May 16, 1980); interview with PCS Executive Director John Kramer, supra note 181.
253. Interview with Rep. Norman Berson, supra note 181.
254. For a discussion of the increased severity of the January 1981 Guidelines
Proposal over the first draft guidelines, see notes 315-23 and accompanying text infra.
255. For a discussion of the reaction to the severity of the January 1981 Guidelines Proposal, see notes 334-38 and accompanying text infra.
256. Interview with Judge Richard Conaboy, supra note 181.
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The study of sentencing practices in Pennsylvania that was eventually undertaken provided information on sentence dispositions and
durations based on a sample of 2,907 cases, a 12% sample of all cases
disposed of in 1977.257 No data were gathered on actual time
served. 258 Since eighty percent of state prisoners serve only their minimum sentence, it was less difficult to project the impact of the guidelines on that population than on the jail population, which may be
paroled at any time and for whom data on releasing practices in dif259
ferent counties were not available.
One finding that overshadowed all others-the extent of regional
disparity-made designing acceptable guidelines a nearly impossible
task. Statewide, 38.9% of all the offenders sentenced in 1977 were
incarcerated. 260 Philadelphia and Allegheny counties, which have
the highest crime rates and the highest proportion of violent crimes,
incarcerated 28.5 and 23.8% of their convicted offenders, respectively.
The suburban incarceration rate was 44.1%; in small cities or urban
counties the rate was 47.4%; and in rural areas the rate was 54%.26 1
Philadelphia judges also gave shorter sentences than suburban and
rural judges for the same offenses, particularly for misdemeanors.
The PCS did not develop or adopt Minnesota's sophisticated
projection model because members believed projections could be inaccurate. Such projections also seemed unnecessary because policy
was not to be based on, or limited by, prison capacity. 262 The staff,
however, was able to project the impact of various policies on prison
populations by relying on a number of assumptions. 263 These data
257. Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Report on the Potential Impact
of the Proposed Initial Guidelines on Incarceration Rates and Incarceration Lengths
in Pennsylvania (Nov. 6, 1980) (unpublished report on file with the Villanova Law

Revzew) [hereinafter cited as PCS Impact Report, 1980].
258. See id The PCS collected information on a stratified random sample of
sentences given in 1977 to assure that all counties would have cases represented in the
sample and that the representation would be proportional to the number of sentences
given. Id at 2. Data were collected on approximately 100 variables related to each
case. These items included information relating to the offenses charged, offenses convicted, sentences given, characteristics of the offense, prior record of defendant, and
defendant's socioeconomic background. Id
259. For a discussion of Pennsylvania paroling practices, see notes 36-43 and
accompanying text supra.
260. PCS Impact Report, 1980, supra note 257 (Table 1). For a breakdown by
county of the percentage of offenders incarcerated in 1977, see table at note 297 infia.
261. PCS Impact Report, 1980, supra note 256 (Table 4). For an explanation of
the composition of the "suburban," "small cities/urban," and "rural" groups, see
table at note 298 infra.
262. Interviews with John Kramer, Robin Lubitz, Judge Conaboy, and Albert
Pelaez, supra note 181.
263. See PCS Impact Report, 1980, supra note 257, at 2-4. Research was based
on 1977 sentences. The staff then estimated the impact of the guidelines by applying
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gained from the projections were provided to the PCS at subsequent
meetings. 2 64 Uncertainty about the accuracy of the projections arose
due to the absence of data on actual time served, indications that
there had been changes in sentence length since 1977, the lack of
complete information on the offense severity level of prior convictions, and the less presumptive nature of the guidelines.
A number of policy decisions were made without consideration
of the data on past practice or information projecting the impact of
such a policy on prison population. For example, where the Minnesota Commission opted to eliminate social status factors from consideration by judges after research results indicated that they had made
little difference in previous sentencing decisions, 265 the Pennsylvania
Commission decided to eliminate them before analysis of their impact
266
had been completed.
e.

Public Input and the Lack of Constituency Building

When the question of dealing with the public initially arose, the
PCS members were uncertain that they could produce guidelines,
and had no clear idea of what they would be like or assurance that
they would each personally be able to support them. They were reluctant, therefore, to begin "selling" what they viewed as an unknown
26 7
product.
In keeping with Pennsylvania's individualistic political culture,
members assumed that policymaking should be done less by open discussion with representatives of interested groups than through
backroom bargaining' 268 One legislative member maintained that
the PCS received technical input from specialists, but that the lack of
the guidelines to the 1977 data, and measuring the difference in percentage rate of
incarceration and average sentence lengths. A key assumption was that there had
been no major changes in the Pennsylvania criminal justice system since 1977. Id at
2. The staff commented on the effect of this assumption: "There is some speculation
... that sentences in Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties have increased in severity since 1977. If this is the case then the estimated impact of the guidelines in these
counties will be less than anticipated." Id. at 4.
The staff also assumed 100% judicial compliance with the guidelines. This assumption assured that the impact of the guidelines would not be understated in the
report. Id at 3.
264. Minutes of PCS Meeting, at 4-11 (July 12-13, 1980).
265. For a discussion of the consideration of social status factors in developing
the Minnesota sentencing guidelines, see notes 122-23 and accompanying text supra.
266. For a discussion of the debate within the PCS over consideration of social
status factors in sentencing, see notes 282-86 and accompanying text bfra.
267. Interviews with PCS members Norman Berson, James Kelley, and Alfred
Pelaez, supra note 181.
268. For a discussion of Pennsylvania's individualistic political culture, see note
35 and accompanying text supra.
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input from interest groups during the process of guideline development was appropriate because public hearings or open meetings
269
would only have politicized the Commission's choices.
Although members were expected to represent the views and interests of their constituent groups in the Commission's deliberations,
and to explain the guidelines to these groups once they were designed,
this role was not strongly emphasized. Conaboy left the systematic
effort to educate interest groups and hear their concerns to the staff,
which had little experience with public relations work and initially
limited contacts.
The Commission's defense representative took seriously his role
as liaison with, and spokesman for, the defense bar, and the judges
and legislators informally kept in touch with the local judiciary.
However, the Commission's district attorney failed to fulfill the repre2 70
sentative role.

The press was also largely ignored until the October 1980 date
on which the initial guidelines were presented. While John Kramer,
the executive director, was "available," he did not cultivate relations
with the media. 27 1 The Philadelphia and Pittsburgh papers gave editorial support to the preliminary guidelines; 272 the limited press reac273
tion elsewhere in the state was largely negative.
2.

Constructing the Guidel'nes

The PCS used a matrix format in designing the guidelines. One
dimension of the matrix represented the severity of the offense; the
other represented characteristics of the individual offender. The
"cell" of the matrix which corresponded to the offender and offense
scores indicated both the disposition and duration of the guideline
sentence.
a.

Offense Severity Score

As in Minnesota, Pennsylvania guidelines construction began
with the establishment of a "crime designation" subcommittee which
269. Interview with Sen. James Kelley, supra note 181.
270. Robert Colville, the district attorney representative, missed many commission meetings; did not take characteristically prosecutorial stances; and made little
effort to contact the district attorney's association to explain the guidelines and mobilize the association's support.
271. Interviews with PCS Executive Director John Kramer, Delaware Cty. District Attorney Frank Hezel, Judge John O'Brien, and PCS member Michael Minney,
supra note 181.
272. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Feb. 23, 1981 (editorial); Philadelphia
Inquirer, Jan. 9, 1981, at 18-A (editorial).
273. See, e.g., Harrisburg Patriot, Dec. 14, 1980 (editorial).
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was to rank the severity of offenses. This subcommittee, which initially included O'Brien, Carson, Minney, and Berson, 2 74 ordered offense severity by going through each crime set forth in the Crimes
Code without first establishing ranking principles and placing each
offense listed in one of ten severity levels. 275 Because of dissatisfaction
with the original ranking, 2 76 the staff reordered the severity level of
many offenses. This new ranking was done according to principles
adopted by the PCS at the suggestion of Andrew von Hirsch, an expert consultant to the Commission. 277 Further individual ranking
changes were made at virtually every subsequent meeting.
The final offense severity rank in both the October 1980 Draft
Guidelines and the January 1981 Proposal was to be increased one
point for use of a deadly weapon and one point for crimes involving
serious bodily injury if neither were an element of the offense of conviction.2 78 One point was to be deducted from the offense rank for
2 79
conspiracies and attempted crimes.
b.

Offender Score

The offender score provided the second dimension of the guidelines grid. This score considered the number and severity of prior
convictions, as well as some juvenile adjudications of the defendant.
The PCS was originally divided with respect to consideration of
prior juvenile adjudications. In May 1980, when the rest of the offense history score was constructed, the PCS voted to exclude prior
juvenile adjudications. In August, after Judge Conaboy reported
strong criticism from judges at the Trial Judges' Association meeting,
the issue was reopened. 28 0 It was resolved in October by including
only prior juvenile adjudications for offenses ranked "six" or higher
274. Berson subsequently left the subcommittee and Professor Albert Pelaez attended the subcommittee's meeting. After Berson left, none of the most influential
Commission members were serving on this important subcommittee.
275. Burglary, theft and drug offenses were each broken down into several offense levels.
276. The initial ranking was inconsistent and Judge Scirica strongly objected to
the subcommittee's failure to use the statutory classification in ranking the offense
severity. Minutes of PCS Meeting (Mar. 13, 1980).
277. Andrew von Hirsch served as a consultant to both the Minnesota and
Pennsylvania commissions. At the April 25-26, 1980 PCS meeting, von Hirsch advised against relying exclusively on statutory classifications. Rather, he suggested the
PCS should make its own judgments on the gravity of each crime, using statutory
classification as guidance. Minutes of PCS Meeting (Apr. 25-26, 1980). The reranking was completed by the staff in May 1980.
278. 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4181, 4182 § 303.1(c)-(d) (Oct. 25, 1980).
279. Id at 4182 § 303.1(b).
280. Interview with Judge Conaboy, supra note 181.
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that occurred on or after the defendant's fourteenth birthday and
28
when the current conviction is for a felony. '
The appropriate treatment of social status factors was also a matter of recurrent debate and shifting votes. The Commission's survey
of judicial attitudes indicated that more than eighty percent of the
judges viewed a defendant's education and employment record as appropriate considerations in sentencing. 282 Pelaez and Minney supported the inclusion of social status factors as one of the few ways to
mitigate a sentence. 28 3 Judge Scirica insisted that its exclusion would
be inconsistent with the statutory provision for consideration of "the
28 4
characteristics of the defendant" in the appellate review of cases.
In contrast, Judge Carson adamantly opposed the inclusion, pointing
out the "racist implications" of the inclusion of social status considerations. 28 5 With Berson's reluctant support, Judge Carson's argument
finally prevailed. 286 The PCS resolved the issue by not including social status factors in either the criminal history score or the list of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but made no statement in
the draft guidelines with respect to this exclusion.
c.

Constructing the Matrix

Pennsylvania's minimum/maximum sentencing system complicated the task of creating a single set of guidelines. The minimum
sentence sets the earliest date at which parole can be, and usually is,
granted. The maximum sentence is the length of time the prisoner
may be incarcerated if parole is not granted. This system permits a
judge to appear "tough" by setting a long maximum while setting the
281. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 463, 465 (Jan. 24, 1981).
282. Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Judicial Response to Questionnaire (1980) (unpublished summary on file with Villanova Law Review). Of the responding judges, 89.2% indicated that they considered the defendant's employment
record an appropriate factor in sentencing; 84.1% viewed the defendant's education
as an appropriate factor. Id.
283. Interviews with PCS members Alfred Pelaez and Michael Minney, supra
note 181.
284. Interview with Judge Anthony Scirica, supra note 181 (citing 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1386(d)(1) (Purdon 1983)). The legislation provides that "in reviewing
the record the appellate court shall have regard for the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant." 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1386(d)(1) (Purdon 1983).

285. Interview with Judge Curtis Carson, supra note 181.
286. Berson agreed in principle, and believed that his constituents, black Philadelphians, would strongly oppose guidelines that included status factors. His reluctance stemmed from concern that the provision would provoke opposition to the

guidelines. Interview with Rep. Norman Berson, supra note 181.
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minimum well below half the maximum.2 87 The PCS opted to create
guidelines only for minimum sentences, rather than to establish separate guidelines for minimum and maximum sentences, or to create a
288
matrix for one and make the other a fixed proportion of the first.
Drawing a disposition line that clearly distinguished between
sentences to state prison and those to a local jail was also complicated
by the existing system which permitted judges to send offenders sentenced to a maximum of between two and five years to either a state
or local prison. Those sent to state prison for a maximum of two
years must serve at least one year before being eligible for parole;
those sent to a local jail on the same sentence are eligible for parole by
the judge at any time, and local paroling practices are idiosyncratic.
The PCS did not address the disparity that could result from the
choice of state or local incarceration or suggest criteria for making
that choice.
The PCS drew two disposition lines and established recommended ranges of incarceration during one meeting at which the research findings on past practice were presented. At that meeting,
PCS Executive Director Kramer briefly presented the four philosophical models that the MSGC had considered28 9 and indicated the implications of each in drawing the disposition line. He noted that
historically in Pennsylvania, sentences rested principally on the seriousness of the current offense and only secondarily on prior record,
fitting the "modified just desserts model.''29° The Commission
quickly adopted a modified just desserts approach that would continue prevailing practices.
The Commission's upper disposition line divided longer
sentences, probably resulting in incarceration in a state facility, from
those resulting in shorter incarcerations in local facilities. The lower
line separated presumptive jail sentences from non-incarceration
sentences. 29 1 Judge Scirica suggested eliminating the lower line,
thereby allowing the judge to choose between a non-incarcerative sentence and a jail term for all of these cases. Judge Scirica's suggestion
287. For a general discussion of Pennsylvania sentencing and parole practices
see notes 36-42 and accompanying text supra.
288. The October, 1980 Draft Guidelines simply made no mention of maximum
sentences. See 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4181-96 (Oct. 25, 1980). The January, 1981
Guidelines Proposal specified as follows: "The guidelines make no recommendation
concerning maximum sentences." 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 463, 465 (Jan. 24, 1981).
289. For a discussion of the four philosophical models considered by the MSGC,
see notes 143-47 and accompanying text supra.
290. Minutes of PCS Meeting, at 7-8 (July 12 & 13, 1980).
291. For a copy of the October, 1980 Draft Guideline Sentencing Chart, see 10
Pa. Admin. Bull. 4181, 4185 (Oct. 25, 1980).
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was rejected by the members who wanted narrower ranges of judicial
discretion and strictly non-incarcerative sentences for some minor
offenses.
In drawing the disposition line, the PCS adopted a sixty/forty
rule. Matrix cells in which more than sixty percent of the previous
cases had resulted in imprisonment were to be above the upper (imprisonment) line; cells with less than a forty percent past imprisonment rate were to be below the lower jail line; the remaining cells
were the principal area for dispositional policy choices by the PCS.
In setting sentence lengths, the PCS adopted the principle of
non-overlapping terms, 292 with six-month ranges within the upper
tier cells, and three-month ranges in the middle tier. When an impact estimate indicated the original dispositions and durations might
crowd the jails, the option of non-incarceration was added to a
number of the middle tier cells.
d.

Aggravation, Mitigation and Sentences Outside the Guidelines

The October, 1980 Draft Guidelines set forth exclusive lists of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances which permitted judges to
increase or decrease sentence lengths without being considered
outside the guidelines. 293 In determining a sentence, a judge was to
move one cell to the right of the applicable guideline cell for aggravation and one cell to the left for mitigation, (and, in the rightmost and
leftmost cells, one cell up for aggravation and one cell down for mitigation). This limited the effect of aggravation and mitigation to an
increase or decrease in sentence length of three to six months. These
292. For example, the guidelines set forth separate grid cells for 12 to 18 months,
18 to 24 months, 24 to 30 months, and so forth. Terms in contiguous cells did not
overlap.
293. See January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.4(c)-(d). Section 303.4(c)
provided the following exclusive list of aggravating circumstances: history of violent
conduct (exclusive of juvenile conduct); infliction of severe determined cruelty on the
victim; knowledge of victim's particular vulnerability due to age, infirmity, or reduced mental or physical capacity; leadership of other participants in the crime; involvement of more than one victim in the crime. Id. The above factors warrant an
increase in the offender's sentence. Id
Under the January, 1981 Proposal, the following mitigating circumstances
would warrant a decrease in the offender's sentence: victim provoked the crime;
defendant's conduct did not cause or threaten serious personal or property damage;
defendant lacked substantial capacity for judgment at the time of the offense due to
youth or physical or mental impairment; defendant compensated or made arrangements to compensate the victim; defendant played a minor role in the offense or
participated under duress; defendant cooperated in the apprehension or prosecution
of other offenders; or substantial grounds to excuse or mitigate the defendant's conduct or culpability existed. Id Substantially the same list appeared in the October,
1980 Draft Guidelines. See 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4181, 4186, § 303.4(c)-(d) (Oct. 25,
1980).
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first draft guidelines allowed judges to sentence outside the guidelines
only if they had a "compelling reason" for doing so. This set a high
294
standard intended to sharply restrict such deviations.
The question of how to treat white collar crimes, such as drug
trafficking, organized crime, and offenses involving abuse of trust,
public office, fiduciary obligation, or status, was a source of conflict in
the Commission for many months. Berson and Carson pressed for a
tough stance on white collar crime. 295 Others wanted to address this
issue but resisted making it a reason for going outside the guidelines.
The October, 1980 Draft Guidelines considered as an aggravating circumstance a defendant's use of "his position of trust, public office,
confidence, fiduciary obligation, or status to facilitate the commission
or the offense."' 296 This was not very meaningful since most of these
white collar offenders would still not be incarcerated by the shift of
only one cell. Further, classification as an aggravating circumstance
made deviating from the guidelines for these offenses more difficult
since a compelling reason for deviation would have been required
under the initial draft guidelines. Discontent with this solution led to
the removal of white collar crime from the list of aggravating circumstances in the January, 1981 guidelines and the addition of a statement suggesting that white collar crime could be a reason for
297
deviation.
e.

The Projected Impact of the October, 1980 Draft Guidelines

The PCS made estimates of the impact of the guidelines under
several assumptions. By its own calculations, assuming 100% compli294. Letter from Anthony Scirica to Richard Conaboy (Dec. 4, 1980) (discussing Scirica's reservations about requiring a "compelling reason" to move outside of
the guidelines). This requirement was deleted from later versions of the guidelines.
See note 315 and accompanying text infra.

295. Minutes of PCS Meeting, at 7 (Sept. 13, 1980); id.at 7-9 (Sept. 28-29,
1980).
296. See 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4181, 4186, § 303(c)(6) (Oct. 25, 1980).
297. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 463, 467, § 303.6(b) Uan. 24, 1981). The January,
1981 Guidelines Proposal provided as follows:
The Commission has treated and ranked all crimes, but recognizes the inherent difficulties in setting sentences in certain unusual and atypical cases.
These include major drug trafficking, organized crime, and offenses in

which the defendant used his position of trust, public office, confidence,
fiduciary obligation, or status to facilitate the commission of the offense. In
these instances the judge may sentence outside the guidelines to comport

with the law and facts of the case.
Id Substantially the same language appears in the final guidelines which were accepted by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1982. However, the final guidelines suggest
that "[t]hese crimes may warrant a sentence more severe than otherwise suggested in
this chapter." 204 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 303.1(e) (Shepard's 1983).
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ance with the guidelines, no use of aggravation or mitigation, and the
use of probation in cells with an option of non-incarceration in Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties, the total proportion of offenders
given incarceration sentences was expected to decrease from 38.9% to
36%. However, the proportions to be incarcerated varied widely by
region, increasing the rate at which Philadelphia and Pittsburgh offenders would be incarcerated while decreasing that rate in suburban
areas, small cities, and rural counties. The redistribution of offenders
was particularly striking for offenders sentenced to twelve months or
more. Despite a predicted decrease in the proportion of offenders to
be incarcerated, the PCS estimated an overall increase of 16.3 inmate
months of incarceration due to the lengths of prison terms. This predicted increase also was geographically unevenly distributed. 298
298. The following table estimates changes in the incarceration rates which
would have occurred under the October, 1980 Draft Guidelines by comparing 1977
data with results under the guidelines. The table assumes 100% compliance with
guidelines, and no consideration of aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Percent Incarcerated*
Less than 12 Months
1977
Data
Philadelphia
County

13.5%

Proposed
Guidelines
22.2%

Percent Incarcerated
12 Months or More
1977
Data

Proposed
Guidelines

Total Percent
Incarcerated
1977
Data

15.0%

22.5%

28.5%

Proposed
Guidelines
44.7%

Allegheny
County

10.9

18.6

12.9

11.5

23.8

30.1

Suburbant

29.0

26.8

15.1

8.3

44.1

35.1

Small Cities/
Urbantt

28.6

26.0

18.8

6.6

47.4

32.6

Ruralttt

32.7

24.4

21.3

4.7

54.0

29.1

TOTAL

22.2%

23.8%

16.7%

38.9%

36.0%

12.2%

*

Assumes an alternative to incarceration sentence when the guidelines
sentence allows either incarceration or alternative in Philadelphia and
Allegheny Counties, all others give incarceration.

t

Suburban Counties include Beaver, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery,
Washington and Westmoreland.

tt

Urban Counties and Counties with small cities include Berks, Blair,
Cambria, Cumberland, Dauphin, Erie, Lackawanna, Lancaster, Lehigh,
Luzerne, Northampton and York. These are counties with cities with
populations in excess of 150,000 or counties deemed 60% urban in the 1970
census.
Rural counties are all other counties.

ttt
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f. Public Hearing on the October, 1980 Draft Guidelines and
Final Revisions
The guidelines legislation had been enacted in November,
1978.299 Five months later, the PCS commenced its work on formulating the guidelines. The delayed beginning and the three-month
extension needed to complete the preliminary guidelines resulted in
public hearings in October, 1980 and a ninety-day legislative scrutiny
period from January 24 to April 19, 1981.
Such timing could hardly have been worse. With the presidential election in 1980 and the Republicans' assumption of control of
both chambers of the Pennsylvania General Assembly, a mood of
"get tough on crime" pervaded the state legislature. Further, statewide campaigns for the May 1980 primary elections for seven superior court and two supreme court seats were heating up, as candidates
called for ever stiffer sentences. Attention was also focused nationally
on the problem of violent crime in America. Time and Newsweek both
ran cover stories on violent crime in March 1981. 300 President Reagan was shot in an assassination attempt 30 ' that critics erroneously
stated during debate in the Pennsylvania legislature would have resulted in a sentence of five and one-half to six and one-half years for
the assailant. 30 2 With this growing conservative mood, the chances of
developing guidelines that were sufficiently tough, so as to be politically acceptable, sufficiently prescriptive so as to reduce disparity,
and also feasible to implement given the existing number of prison
and jail cells in the state, grew very slim.
As mandated by law, after publication of the initial draft guidelines in October 1980,303 four public hearings were held around the

state. 30 4 More than seventy-five persons testified at the hearings, representing the police, prosecutors, the defense bar, the judiciary, the
corrections department, probation, parole, and special interest
299. For a discussion of the passage of this law, see notes 182-207 and accompanying text supra.
300. Both Time and Newsweek ran cover stories on the rise of violent crime in
America in their March 23, 1981 issues. The Cause of Violent Crime, TIME, Mar. 23,
1981, at 16; The Plague of Violent Crime, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 1981, at 46.
301. President Ronald Reagan was shot on March 30, 1981 by John Hinkley,

Jr. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
302. See Pa. House Leg. J., Apr. 1, 1981, at 561 (remarks of Rep. Fryer). During
debate in the Senate, however, Senator Gekas correctly pointed out that the proposed guidelines called for a sentence of at least 17 years for Hinkley's offense. Pa.
Senate Leg. J., Apr. 8, 1981, at 402-03.
303. The initial draft guidelines were published at 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4181-96
(Oct. 25, 1980).
304. The public hearings were held in Scranton, Pittsburgh, Harrisburg, and
Philadelphia during December 1980. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 463 (Jan. 24, 1981).
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groups. 30 5 The majority strongly criticized the proposed
30 6
guidelines.
Reflecting on the public reaction at these hearings, one PCS
member noted, "the Commission had its figurative finger in a dike for

two years," but during the public hearings, the dike broke. 30 7 Sentencing liberals such as the Pennsylvania Prison Society, which had
sought to reduce disparity without increasing severity, expressed disappointment that the guidelines would increase prison terms. 30 8 The
representative of the Defender Association of Philadelphia protested
the substantial increases in sentences in his jurisdiction. 30 9 Several
citizen groups expressed concern that a judge had to go outside the
guidelines to incarcerate repeat drunk driving offenders unless they
had a prior felony record. 310 However, the loudest and most visible
opposition came from prosecutors and judges. Prosecutors objected
to the leniency of the proposed guidelines sentences, particularly for

repeat offenders.3 11 Judges' opposition focused on the severe curtailment of their discretion, 31 2 the costs to the court likely to result from

an increased number of trials, and on the problem of crowding in the
31 3
correctional facilities.
305. See Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Synopses of Public Hearing
Testimony Prepared by the Staff (Dec. 1980) (on file with the Villanova Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Synopses of Public Hearing Testimony, Dec., 1980].
306. While the Philadelphia newspapers gave the guidelines editorial support,
and at the hearings the guidelines received praise from academicians, the guidelines
received criticism from virtually everyone else. See notes 272-273 supra.
307. Interview with PCS member George Gekas, supra note 181.
308. See Synopses of Public Hearing Testimony, Dec., 1980, supra note 305, at
13 (testimony of D. McPherson, Pa. Prison Society).
309. Id at 11 (testimony of John Packel).
310. Id at 19. (testimony of P. Pennington of the Governor's Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse; P. Leighton of Alcohol and Mental Health Assoc., Inc.; and S.
Longenecker of the Pa. Driving Under The Influence Ass'n).
311. Id. at 11 (testimony ofJ. Smyth, District Attorney, Montgomery County; J.
Freeman, District Attorney, Chester County).
312. Id at 6, 30 (testimony of Judges Della Porta, Dauer, Tamelia and Rogers).
Judge Rogers noted that the guidelines limit only the judge's discretion and not that
of the prosecutor. Id. at 6 (testimony of Judge Rogers). Criticism of the curtailment
of judicial discretion was also made by John Packel of the Public Defender Ass'n of
Philadelphia; S. Schmukler of the Pa. Trial Lawyers Ass'n.; J. Freeman, Chester
County District Attorney; and L. Zimmerman, Pa. Attorney General. d.
313. Id at 41-42 (testimony of Judges Klein and Bradley). Philadelphia Court
of Common Pleas President Judge Edward J. Bradley testified that implementation
of the guidelines would result in a 10% increase in defendants' requests for jury trials,
thereby costing the state an additional $1,270,000 per year. He further estimated a
6.5% increase in the state prison population resulting from increased sentences of
Philadelphia offenders alone, at an additional cost of $6,400,000 per year. Id. at 41.
As a solution, Judge Bradley suggested expanding the range of sentence lengths to
provide more flexibility. Id at 41-42. This concern over the potentially great increase in costs to the courts and correctional systems was shared by many others
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The nearly universal criticism 3 14 made it clear that without sub-

stantial revision, the legislature was likely to reject the guidelines. Accordingly, the PCS made a number of important changes before
submitting the guidelines to the legislature in January 1981. The
language implying that the guidelines had presumptive force was removed. 3 15 The offender score was altered so that either one or two
misdemeanor convictions would result in one criminal history
point, 31 6 three or more misdemeanor convictions would result in two
criminal history points, 3 7 and each felony up to four yielded one
point, 318 although the maximum of four prior offense points remained. 3 19 Eight of the thirteen formerly non-incarceration cells in
the lower tier were made optional incarceration cells. In the upper
tier both the lower and upper sentences were made more severe as the
within-cell ranges were generally changed from six to twelve months
and an additional six months added to the upper number in each
testifying at the December, 1980 hearing, including J. Packel of the Public Defender
Assn.; J. Freeman, Chester County District Attorney; J. Catalano, Allegheny County
Probation Director; and R. Owens, Phila. Sup't. of Prisons. Id at 42-44.
314. Substantial criticism was also made of the inappropriately low offense rank
assigned to rape, crimes in which children are victims, and, in general, crimes involving actual or threatened serious bodily injury. Id at 15-16 (testimony of Judge
Tamelia; F. Hazel, Delaware County District Attorney; Sen. O'Pake; L. Marks, Women Organized Against Rape; and K. Power, Pa. Coalition Against Rape). Prosecutors criticized the sentences for white collar, political, and drug offenses as grossly
inadequate. Id at 17-18 (testimony of M. Kane, Bucks County District Attorney; J.
Freeman, Chester County District Attorney; F. Hazel, Delaware County District Attorney; E. Rendell, Philadelphia District Attorney; and L. Zimmerman, Pa. Attorney
General).
315. Judge Conaboy indicated in the introduction to the first draft guidelines
that in the normal sentencing situation, the judge "shall sentence the defendant to
the time indicated in the normal guidelines." 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4182 (Oct. 25,
1980) (emphasis added). This language was deleted from the introduction to the
January, 1981 Guidelines Proposal. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 463 (Jan. 24, 1981). The
first draft guidelines also indicated that the normal sentence "must be imposed unless
otherwise provided by this chapter." 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4181, 4183 § 303.3(b) (Oct.
25, 1980) (emphasis added). The January, 1981 Guidelines Proposal merely recommended that a particular sentence be imposed. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 463, 465 § 303.1
(Jan. 24, 1981).
For a discussion of the ambiguity of the mandate given the PCS regarding the
nature of the guidelines, see notes 243-249 and accompanying text supra.
316. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 463, 464 § 303.2(a)(1) Uan. 24, 1981). Previously, two
or three prior misdemeanor convictions would have resulted in one criminal history
point. 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4181, 4182 § 303.2(a)(1) (Oct. 25, 1980).
317. January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.2(a)(2). Previously, two
prior misdemeanor convictions were necessary to get one criminal history point. October, 1980 Draft Guidelines, supra note 228, § 303.2(a)(2).
318. January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.2(b)(3)(a)-(d). Previously, a
maximum of three criminal history points could be added for previous felony convictions. See October, 1980 Draft Guidelines, supra note 228, § 303.2(b) (2) (c).
319. Compare January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.2(c) with October,
1980 Draft Guidelines, supra note 228, § 303.2(c).
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cell. 320 The offense severity ranks for rape and assault were increased.3 2 1 And white collar and organized crime were specifically
excluded from the guidelines. 322 The proposed increases in sentence
severity introduced by various changes in the guidelines meant that
the January, 1981 Guidelines Proposal would have increased the total
number of inmate months 61.1% statewide, as compared to a statewide increase of 16.3% estimated to result from the initial draft
32 3
guidelines.
The guidelines' modifications were intended to mollify criticism
by increasing severity, allowing greater judicial discretion, and permitting greater allowance for community standards. However, the
320. Compare January, 1981 Proposal Sentence Chart, 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 466,
with October, 1980 Draft Guidelines Normal Minimum Guideline Sentence Chart,
10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4185.
321. See January 1981 Proposal Offense Rank List, 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 468-76.
Under these guidelines the rank for rape was increased from 8 to 9. See October,
1980 Draft Guidelines Offense Rank List, 10 Pa. Admin. Bull. 4187-96.
322. Compare January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.6(b). For a discussion of the Commission's consideration of white collar offenses while drafting the
guidelines, see notes 294-96 and accompanying text supra.
323. The following table compares the dramatic difference between the effect
which the October and January Guidelines would have had on sentence length.
Estimated Percentage Changes in Inmate Months, 1977 Compared with October
1980 and January 1981 Guidelines
Percentage Change
Less than 12 Months
October 80 January 81
Guidelines* Guidelines*

Percentage Change
12 Months or More
October 80
Guidelines

January 81
Guidelines

Percentage Change Total
Inmate Months
October 80 January 81
Guidelines
Guidelines

Philadelphia
County

+57.2%

+111.9%

+115.3%

+215.2%

+102.4%

+204.9%

Allegheny
County

+73.1

+158.6

+ 17.1

+ 98.7

+ 29.3

+117.5

Suburban

+17.9

+ 16.6

-

4.9

+ 18.3

+

+ 17.7

Small Cities/
Urban

- 7.6

-

5.0

- 35.6

- 22.5

- 27.1

-

Rural

-26.1

-

8.2

- 54.2

- 44.1

- 46.2

- 33.8

TOTAL
*

**

2.9

17.2

+ 16.3
+ 61.1
+ 17.0
+ 68.8
+ 37.8
+14.4
Assumes Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties comply with minimum of
range, others with maximum, and no aggravating or mitigating circumstances. If minimum guideline sentence is an incarceration range
beginning with zero, then for Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties
incarceration length assigned is 1 month.
When the guidelines authorize either incarceration or an alternative to
incarceration, only those cases which received incarceration sentences in
1977 are assumed to receive incarceration sentences under the guidelines.
In these cases the minimum of the guideline range is assumed to be I
month.
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changes undercut the guidelines' initial conceptual integrity. The
guidelines had originally been designed by the PCS to be presumptive in force and to narrowly limit sentence ranges, thereby greatly
restricting judicial discretion and promoting predictable sentences in
a more flexible and far-reaching manner than mandatory minimum
sentences. By greatly weakening the presumptiveness and narrowness
of the guidelines, the predictability of sentences and the guidelines'
ability to provide a politically satisfactory alternative to mandatory
minimums were undermined. Further, the effort to make punishment proportional to the seriousness of the current offense and offender's prior record was weakened when one prior misdemeanor was
made equal in weight to one prior felony. Finally, by sharply increasing severity, implementation of the January 1981 Guidelines Proposal was likely to produce overcrowded prisons and jails, thereby
necessitating some systematic evasion.
3.

Legislative Rejecti'on and Subsequent Developments

a.

The Legislature's Response

The revised guidelines were published in January, 1981,324 after
which they would become law unless the legislature acted within
ninety days to reject them. 3 25 The PCS had not built a constituency,
had no visible supporters, and as a "legislative strategy" had simply
expected the Commission's legislative members to prevent resolutions
rejecting the guidelines from reaching the floor of both chambers.
However, the supporters of mandatory minimum sentences
reemerged, submitting several bills for consideration with much
32 6
fanfare.
In the House of Representatives, Berson could count on the support of the Democratic leadership, but the Republican PCS member,
McVerry, a junior representative, failed to make an effort to win the
support of the Republican leaders. While personally committed to
the guidelines, he was apparently not anxious to extend himself for
what seemed to be a lost cause.
The coup de grace was delivered by Representative Lois
Hagarty, a Republican former assistant district attorney. Upset at
what she viewed as the guidelines' leniency, she was the first to an324. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 463-76 (Jan. 24, 1981).
325. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2155(c) (Purdon 1981).
326. Interviews with Rep. Norman Berson and Commission members Sen.
George Gekas and Rep. Terrance McVerry, supra note 181. For a discussion of the
mandatory minimum sentencing legislation which eventually was enacted, see notes
361 & 373 and accompanying text itana. See also Franzel, Impliations of Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act, 5 PA. L.J. REP. 3 (1982).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984

69

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 2
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29: p. 21

nounce plans to submit a resolution to reject the guidelines. 327 Scirica, however, was able to convince her to submit a resolution that
merely called for the PCS to revise the guidelines to meet specific
criticisms regarding their leniency, and to resubmit them in six
months. 328 The Hagarty Resolution "urged and directed" the Commission to increase the upper limit of guideline sentences, give judges
greater latitude in sentencing where aggravating and mitigating circumstances were found, eliminate the exclusive list of such circumstances, and increase the severity of sentences for offenses against
32 9
persons.
The House Republican leaders pressed the Hagarty Resolution
through the Rules Committee and onto the calendar for a floor vote
with unusual speed, allowing little opportunity for a PCS counteroffensive. 330 In the Senate, Judiciary Committee Chairman Gekas, although a member of the PCS, was under pressure to hold hearings on
the mandatory sentencing bills. 331 Finding Senate Republican caucus members privately favorable to the guidelines but unwilling to
vote against the Hagarty Resolution, 3 32 Gekas reported out the resolution, which was adopted by a substantial majority in both
333
chambers.
The Hagarty Resolution pleased virtually everybody. Supporters of the guidelines concept, who had opposed the proposed guidelines for divergent reasons, were glad to have salvaged the guidelines
concept and to have another chance to have guidelines adopted.
Supporters of mandatory minimum sentences, who saw that the
guidelines would not provide the certainty of punishment they desired, gained six months in which to preempt the PCS. Everybody
could once again look "tough on crime," because the resolution called
for a revision of sentences upward, while maintaining the status quo
until a politically viable compromise could be found.
327. Interview with Rep. Lois Hagarty, supra note 181.
328. Id; interview with Judge Anthony Scirica, supra note 181.
329. H.R. Res. 24, 165th Reg. Sess., adopted Apr. 1, 1981. See 1 House Leg. J.
566-67 (1981).
330. See 1 House Leg. J. 566-67 (1981); interviews with Reps. Terrance
McVerry and Norman Berson, supra note 181.
331. Interview with Sen. George Gekas, supra note 181.
332. Id. Interview with PCS Executive Director John Kramer, supra note 181.
333. H.R. 24 was passed by the House 157-37 on April 1, 1981, 1 House Leg. J.
566-67 (1981), and by the Senate 34-10 on April 8, 1981, 1 Senate Leg. J. 409 (1981).
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The Role of Interest Groups in the Rejection of the January
1981 Guidelines

No group had been satisfied with the Commission's proposed
guidelines. Although the legislative debate between 1975 and 1978
had revolved primarily around disparity, there had been a second
level of discourse which had focused on severity.3 3 4 In the absence of

any guidelines, it had been easy to oppose disparity in principle.
When the implications of the changes required to reduce disparity
became obvious, however, concern over disparity virtually
disappeared.
The January guidelines brought to light the fact that geographical disparity could be reduced only through two routes, neither of
which was satisfactory. Sentences in Philadelphia and Allegheny
Counties could be increased to match those in the rest of the state,
but this would result in overcrowding the prisons. Alternatively,
sentences outside of Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties could be
reduced while increasing the sentences of urban offenders to a statewide average, thereby filling the state prisons with an even greater
proportion of urban offenders than they already held. 335 A third op-

tion was to maintain the status quo by proclaiming disparity to be a
good thing. This was the least objectionable option to the majority of
the participants in the sentencing debate. Sentencing "uniformity"
became a negative label; critics opposed "uniformity for uniformity's
sake," asserting that each county's own particular problems should be
3 36
addressed on an individual rather than state-wide basis.
The judiciary had opted for the guidelines legislation rather than
mandatory minimums because the former served as a temporizing device and because they saw guidelines as the lesser of two evils. Once
the October 1980 Draft Guidelines were published, it became apparent to the judges that these guidelines would actually restrict their
discretion to a greater degree than would be true under the proposed
mandatory minimums system. Mandatory minimums, if passed,
would only tie the judges' hands in a fraction of the cases; the guide334. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania legislative debate between 1975 and
1978 regarding sentencing guidelines legislation see notes 182-207 and accompanying
text supra.

335. The disparity between sentences in Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties
as compared with those in the rest of the state is illustrated in the table presented at
note 298 supra.
336. Interview with District Attorney Frank Hazel, supra note 181. See also Synopses of Public Hearing Testimony, Dec. 1980, supra note 305, at 8-9 (testimony of S.
Schmuckler, Pa. Trial Lawyers Ass'n; W. Arbuckle, Erie County Public Defender; M.
Kane, Bucks County District Attorney; and F. Hazel, Delaware County District
Attorney).
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lines covered all sentencing decisions, including such crimes as cruelty
to animals and disorderly conduct. 337 In Pennsylvania, judges' wide
discretion to determine both disposition and minimum time to be
served was not something to be given up easily, particularly to an
unusual, apolitical body like a sentencing guidelines commission.
The judiciary was divided on appropriate severity levels but united in
its concern with the retention of judicial discretion and the effects of
the guidelines on case processing. Judges predicted a large increase in
the number of trials and, as a result, rising cost to the court system. 338
The Pennsylvania Trial Judges' Association did not take a position, stating that it was improper to publicly oppose legislation that
its members might have to execute.3 39 It is likely that they were also
concerned that formal opposition to the guidelines would open the
judiciary to the accusation that it sought to preserve its discretion
when abuses of that discretion were the reason for sentencing reform.
Instead of taking a unified stance statewide, judges channeled their
opposition through their counties' legislative delegations. The Montgomery County bench, of which Judge Scirica was and is a member,
sent a unanimous letter calling for support of the Hagarty Resolution
to each legislator in the county. 340 Many rural judges, concerned
with reduced sentence severity, contacted their legislators, who did
not want to be criticized for reducing sentences and who valued the
judge's political support.
Prosecutors' reactions to the guidelines were directly related to
the guidelines' effect on the level of sentencing severity in their jurisdictions. Only in Philadelphia, Allegheny and Delaware Counties,
where the guidelines would have increased both the proportion of offenders to be incarcerated and sentence lengths, were district attorneys favorable to the guidelines. Philadelphia District Attorney
Edward Rendell and the president of the district attorneys association, Frank Hazel of Delaware County, were principally responsible
for preventing the association from taking a position in opposition to
34 1
guidelines, recognizing that the guidelines could be useful to them.
337. The judges' dissatisfaction with the narrow sentence ranges was repeatedly
stressed in their testimony at the public hearings held in December, 1980. Synopses
of Public Hearing Testimony, Dec. 1980, supra note 305, at 6, 27-28 (testimony of
Judge Edward Bradley, President Judge, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas;
Judge Richard B. Klein, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas; and Judge Armand
Della Porta, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas).
338. See note 313 supra.
339. Interview with District Attorney Frank Hazel, supra note 181.
340. Interviews with PCS Executive Director John Kramer and Judge Anthony
Scirica, supra note 181.
341. Rendell's criticisms and suggested change in the guidelines are set forth in
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However, individual district attorneys worked through local networks
342
to oppose the guidelines.
Most district attorneys argued that the guidelines would undermine plea bargaining and increase both the number of jury trials and
the workloads of their offices. 343 These arguments were useful in
arousing county commissioners' concerns about costs. More important to the district attorneys was the proposed decrease in sentence
severity for many offenders, with little "payoff" in terms of increased
344
certainty of imprisonment for the "worst" offenders.
The Commissioner of Corrections, as the governor's appointee,
took a very low visibility position. While the October 1980 Draft
Guidelines had seemed acceptable to the Bureau of Corrections, the
increase in prison population that would have resulted from compliance with the January 1981 Proposal could not have been absorbed
by the Bureau's existing facilities. The Commissioner made no public
statements of protest but "let the governor's staff know the implications of the legislation. '345 Local corrections departments took positions in terms of the impact of the guidelines on their jails.
Other interest groups that might have taken a position on the
guidelines remained silent. No civil rights groups testified at the
hearings or took a position, although most black legislators had voted
against the Hagarty Resolution. The Pennsylvania Prison Society,
having already criticized the severity of the October guidelines, had
little more to say, but was clearly more opposed to the increased severity of the January 1981 Proposal. Within the defense bar, only
the Public Defender Association of Philadelphia opposed the guidelines. Governor Thornburgh, who had not named the commission
members and who had his own criminal justice reform proposals, did
346
not grant the Republican PCS members' request for a briefing.
In the end, even the PCS members disavowed their own product.
Chairperson Conaboy did not lobby for the guidelines, perhaps inhiban unpublished manuscript. Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, Problems with
the Proposed Sentencing Guidelines (1980) (on file with the Villanova Law Review).
Although many of Rendell's suggested changes were adopted, the PCS found his

support elusive.
342. Interviews with Frank Hazel and Edward Rendell, supra note 181.
343. Synopses of Public Hearing Testimony, Dec., 1980, supra note 305, at 3940, 42 (testimony of J. Smyth, Montgomery County District Attorney; M. Kane,
Bucks County District Attorney; J. Freeman, Chester County District Attorney; and
E. Rendell, Philadelphia County District Attorney).
344. Id at 11-12 (testimony of J. Smyth, Montgomery County District Attorney; J. Freeman, Chester County District Attorney; and F. Hazel, Delaware County
District Attorney).
345. Interview with Commissioner Ronald Marks, supra note 181.
346. Interviews with Rep. McVerry and John Kramer, supra note 181.
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ited by personal style, his sense of propriety as a federal judge, and his
doubts about the guidelines. PCS members Minney and Pelaez publicly opposed the guidelines as too harsh. 347 Judge Scirica joined his
bench in signing a letter supporting the Hagarty Resolution. 348 The
legislative members, apparently sensing that the guidelines were going to be rejected, sought to minimize the "loss" by only supporting
the guidelines in a restrained way.
C.
1.

Redesigning the Guidelies-PhaseII

The Mandate and Membership

With the PCS compelled to revise the guidelines, and since all
terms of PCS membership had expired, the Governor exercised his
option of making new appointments. He appointed to the PCS
Frank Hazel, the District Attorney of Delaware County; Charles
Scarlata, a private defense attorney; and Professor David Jones of the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Each was a Republican and
more conservative than his predecessor. All legislative members were
reappointed, and the new Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reappointed three of the judges. 349 He replaced Judge
Conaboy, who had become a federal district judge, with Court of
Common Pleas Judge Lynne Abraham from Philadelphia, a former
prosecutor with a reputation for being tough on crime. Judge Scirica
was elected chairperson.
The internal processes in the second phase were smoother than
those in the earlier phase. Patterns of communication and relations
of trust were already established. The PCS had a clearer legislative
mandate, given its task of modifying the guidelines in light of specific
criticisms rather than reconceptualizing them. The new members
also reduced the friction that in the earlier phase grew from personal
and political differences. The change in chairperson appears to have
made little difference in the day-to-day working of the PCS or the
content of the guidelines. However, Judge Scirica, as a respected former legislator with much political experience, skill, and sensitivity,
took a more active role than his predecessor in building bridges and
maintaining informal contacts with powerful groups and individuals
around the state. In general, PCS members solicited comments and
suggestions from their organizations and kept those organizations in347. See Pelaez & Minney, supra note 244; interviews with John Kramer, Terrance McVerry, and George Gekas, supra note 181.
348. See note 340 and accompanying text supra.
349. Chief Justice Samuel J. Roberts reappointed Judge Anthony Scirica, Judge
Curtis Carson and Judge John W. O'Brien.
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formed of the Commission's activities.3 30 Perhaps as a result, organizations that had previously indicated little interest in the
development of the guidelines were more interested and involved in
this second phase.
2.

The Revision Process

Initially dispirited and stung by the legislative rejection of the
guidelines, the PCS considered several courses of action: disbanding,
resubmitting the January, 1981 guidelines, or revising the guidelines
as directed. 35 1 Pressed by the new members, it opted to revise and
began by considering each suggestion in the resolution. 352 The PCS
also authorized a new study of sentences in Pennsylvania. 353 This research examined 1980 sentences given in twenty-three counties. The
1980 data enabled the Commission to determine the changes in sentencing that had occurred since 1977. It also helped to indicate the
potential impact of PCS decisions, and to inform key legislators of the
potential impact of the revised guidelines on sentences in their counties. 354 While guided by the specific suggestions included in the

Hagarty Resolution, the PCS gradually moved beyond the resolution
in its deliberations and adopted changes designed to increase clarity,
eliminate inconsistencies, and alter the public perception of the
guidelines.
3.

Changes in the Guidelines

The PCS initially modified the format of the guidelines, replac350. For example, newly appointed Commission member Frank Hazel adopted
an active role by acting as a representative of the Commission to the District Attorney's Association.
351. Interviews with John Kramer, Judge Anthony Scirica, and Frank Hazel,
supra note 181.
352. For a list of the directions given to the PCS by the General Assembly, see
note 329 and accompanying text supra.
353. Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, Estimated Impact of Sentencing
Guidelines and Mandatory Sentencing Proposals (Nov. 4, 1981) (on file with the
Vitlanova Law Review) [hereinafter cited as PCS Impact Report, 1981]. The study was
based on sentences for felonies other than drug and theft offenses, and on weapons
misdemeanors and misdemeanors against persons. Id at 33. The actual 1980
sentences were compared to the recommended sentences under the guidelines and the
differences measured. Id The study also estimated the impact of the mandatory sentencing bill alone, and the proposed guidelines and mandatory sentencing together.
It concluded that average statewide minimum sentences would be 42% longer if the
proposed (Oct. 1981) guidelines were enacted; 72% longer if only the mandatory sentencing bill were enacted; and 99% longer if both were put into effect. Id (preface).
354. Id The new data indicated that a striking increase in sentencing severity
had occurred between 1977 and 1980. Consequently, the January 1981 guidelines
would not have led to a 63% increase in months of incarceration, but rather would
have led to a two percent decrease. Interview with John Kramer, supra note 181.
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ing the matrix with a chart to simplify calculation and symbolize its
willingness to make changes. 355 It altered the offense score by replacing the enhancement points for deadly weapon use, firearms discharge, and serious bodily injury with a provision for a fixed twelve to
twenty-four month addition to the sentence for possession of a deadly
weapon. 356 The PCS also reranked a number of crimes. In calculating the prior record score, treatment of misdemeanors reverted to the
October 1980 weights, and scoring of felonies was redesigned to mirror the mandatory minimum bill proposed by the governor. 35 7 Prior
juvenile record consideration was modified to eliminate the requirement that the current offense be a felony. 358

The aggravating and

mitigating circumstances list was eliminated, 359 thereby allowing the
court to consider any factor including the history and character of the
defendant. The ranges where aggravating or mitigating circumstances apply were expanded to twenty-five percent above the upper
term in the normal range and twenty-five percent below the lower
normal term. 360 Both severity and discretion were increased by per-

mitting incarceration for all offenses, increasing the width of the
range for most felony offenses from twelve to twenty-four months, and
increasing the upper limit of the ranges for nearly all offense/offender

36
combinations. '

PCS projections of the impact of the draft revised guidelines on
prison populations, alone and in combination with the proposed
mandatory minimums, 362 indicated that the guidelines were so
"tough" that if strictly followed, the guidelines would increase sentence severity for felony convictions not only in Philadelphia and
355. Compare 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 3604-05 (Oct. 17, 1981) (revised guidelines
chart) with 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 466 Uan. 24, 1981) (original matrix).
356. Compare January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.1(c) with October,
1981 Revised Draft Guidelines, supra note 231, § 303.4.
357. 11 Pa. Admin. Bull. 3597, 3598 § 303.6(a)-(b) (Oct. 17, 1981).
The most serious felonies were assigned three points for a prior conviction; all
others were assigned one or two points, depending on seriousness. The maximum of
six points was retained.
For a discussion of the mandatory minimum sentencing legislation which was
eventually enacted, see notes 362 & 374 and accompanying text 1tfra.
358. Compare January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.2(b)(2) with October, 1981 Revised Draft Guidelines, supra note 231, § 303.6(b) (ii).
359. Compare January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.4(c)-(d) with October, 1981 Revised Draft Guidelines, supra note 231, § 303.3.
360. Compare January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.4(e) (Jan. 24, 1981),
with October, 1981 Revised Draft Guidelines, supra note 231, § 303.8.
361. Compare January, 1981 Proposal, supra note 229, § 303.3(h) (guidelines sentence chart) Uan. 24, 1981) with October, 1981 Revised Draft Guidelines, supra note
231, § 303.8(b) (guidelines sentence chart) (Oct. 17, 1981).
362. These mandatory minimums were subsequently adopted as the Act of
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Pittsburgh, but across the state. 36 3
4.

Pub/ic Hearzngs and Legislatt've Submission

Draft revised guidelines were published in October, 1981.364
The public hearings that followed received little press attention and
brought forth only twenty-four witnesses. 365 The severity of the revised guidelines eliminated virtually all complaints of leniency, while
the added judicial discretion drew off most judicial opposition. BeMarch 8, 1982, no. 1982-54, 1982 Pa. Legis. Serv. 215 (Purdon), amending 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9703, 9712-16 (Purdon 1982).
With the possible 24-month enhancement for the use of a deadly weapon, the
revised guidelines surpassed the mandatory minimum in average sentence length.
363. See PCS Impact Report, 1981, supra note 353. The following table illustrates the projected impact of the October, 1981 Revised Draft Guidelines, with and
without passage of the mandatory sentencing bill.
Projected Percentage Changes in Total Months of Confinement Sentenced, Draft
Revised Guidelines (October 1981) and Proposed Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing Bill Compared to 1980 Sentences
Sentencing
Option

Philadelphia
County*

Allegheny
County-

Others-

Mandatory Bill Only

+ 109%

+ 156%

+ 39%

Guidelines Only
(12 months for deadly weapon)

+

95

+ 102

+ 28

Guidelines Only
(24 months for deadly weapon)

+ 128

+ 155

+ 50

Mandatory plus Guidelines
(12 months for deadly weapon)

+ 169

+ 216

+ 60

Mandatory plus Guidelines
(24 months for deadly weapon)

+ 188

+ 241

+ 73

* All Aggravated Assault (Felony II and Misdemeanor I), Burglary, Murder III,
Rape, Robbery (Felony 1, 11, and III), Voluntary Manslaughter.
** All Aggravated Assault (Felony II and Misdemeanor I), Burglary, Rape, Robbery (Felony I, II, and III), and Firearms (Misdemeanor I).
*** All felonies (except theft and drug offenses), weapon misdemeanors, and Misdemeanor I's against the person. The counties in this sample are: Beaver, Berks,
Blairr, Cambria, Centre, Crawford, Cumberland, Dauphin, Delaware, Indiana,
Lawrence, Lehigh, Luzerne, Lycoming, Montgomery, Northampton, Perry,
Schuylkill, Warren, and Washington.
Id.
The mandatory minimum sentencing bill is now the Act of March 8, 1982, no.
1982-54, 1982 Pa. Legis. Serv. 215 (Purdon), amending 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 9703, 9712-16 (Purdon 1982).
364. The October, 1981 Revised Draft Guidelines are printed at 11 Pa. Admin.
Bull. 3597-3605 (Oct. 17, 1981).
365. Public hearings were held on the following dates: November 16, 1981, in
Harrisburg; November 18, 1981, in Pittsburgh; and November 20, 1981, in Philadelphia. See 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 431 (Jan. 23, 1982). In contrast to the small number of
witnesses testifying at the November, 1981 hearings, 75 individuals testified the previous year. See note 305 and accompanying text supra.
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cause the PCS had adhered to the legislative mandate and the legislature had adopted the governor's proposal to expand the state prison
system by 2,300 cells, 366 increases in prison population caused little
comment or concern. The governor, attorney general, and Commissioner of Corrections offered no testimony. Most of those who did
testify-including judges, police officers, district attorneys, citizens,
and Representative Hagarty-praised the guidelines. 367 Even opponents to the concept of sentencing guidelines acknowledged that the
PCS had responded to the legislative mandate that had reaffirmed
368
support for guidelines.
Following final revisions by the PCS, 36 9 the guidelines were submitted to the legislature on January 23, 1982.370 Having anticipated
3 71
and planned for opposition, the PCS found that there was none.
Chairman Scirica had assurance of support from the chairman of the
366. See An Act Providing for the Capital Budget for the Fiscal Year 1981-82,
no. 1981-166, 1981 Pa. Laws 558, 563-65. This Act provided for up to $127,913,000
for state correctional facilities. Id For a discussion of the inadequacy of this increase
in facilities to meet the influx of inmates that will result from implementation of the
guidelines, see Sentencing Laws Crowd Prisons, Pa. Panel zs Told, Philadelphia Inquirer,

Sept. 2, 1983, at 4B, col. 5.
367. Testimony Abstracts of Harrisburg Hearing (Nov. 16, 1981); Synopsis of
Public Testimony in Pittsburgh (Nov. 18, 1981); Synopsis of Public Testimony in
Philadelphia (Nov. 20, 1981) (unpublished summaries of the main points of testimony based on notes taken at the hearings, on file with the Villanova Law Review).
Rep. Hagarty, who had spearheaded the opposition of the January, 1981 Guidelines
Proposal, testified in full support of the second draft guidelines. Testimony Abstracts
of Harrisburg Hearing, supra, at 1 (Testimony of Rep. Hagarty).
368. See, e.g., Testimony Abstracts of Harrisburg Hearing, supra note 367, at 5
(testimony of Arthur Goldberg). But see Synopsis of Public Testimony in Philadelphia, supra note 367, at 18 (testimony of Stanford Schmukler, Pa. Trial Lawyers
Ass'n) (expressing the belief that the guidelines merely increased severity in all crime
categories and thereby went beyond the legislative mandate).
369. Although the PCS had previously decided to avoid crime-specific matrices
in the January, 1982 Guidelines, it subsequently removed Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substances (DUI) from the general guidelines and set
up a special schedule of punishment with a minimum of 30 days incarceration for the
second DUI offense. 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 431, 432-33 § 303.5 (Jan. 23, 1982) codified
at 204 Pa. Admin. Code § 303.
Other revisions made in the January, 1982 version of the guidelines were increasing sentences for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and for certain weapons
offenses. 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 431 (Jan. 23, 1982) (introduction by Chairperson
Scirica).
370. 12 Pa. Admin. Bull. 431-40 (Jan. 23, 1982).
371. The only legislative discussion of the guidelines occurred in the Senate Judiciary Committee, with the introduction by Senator Gekas of a resolution to reject
the guidelines and the simultaneous announcement that he would oppose the resolution. It appears Gekas was not actually against the guideline. He introduced the
resolution to reject the guidelines so as to assure that the guidelines would be discussed by the legislature and to gain control of the Senate debate. Interviews with
John Kramer, Judge Scirica and Terrance McVerry, supra note 181.
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House Judiciary Committee, 37 2 and, with Representative Hagarty
praising the guidelines and all opponents silent, the ninety-day period
for legislative rejection passed uneventfully and the guidelines be373
came the law of Pennsylvania.
One very important factor in the revised guidelines' acceptance
was the adoption of the mandatory minimum sentencing bill. 37 4 The
statute creating the PCS had been the result of a compromise in
which interim sentencing guidelines were established and the PCS
created to design presumptive guidelines that could serve as an alternative to mandatory sentences.3 7 5 The submission of the January,
1981 Proposal ended the moratorium and reopened the debate between the two factions with respect to alternative strategies for structuring sentencing discretion. Gradually the "choice" between the two
alternatives was redefined. The legislature found complementary
what it had previously seen as mutually exclusive options, and enacted both. The mandatory minimums made a "tough" public policy statement but actually affect only about five percent of all
sentences; the guidelines give advisory guidance to the court in the
rest of the cases.
V.

ANALYSIS

A. Addressing the Problems of Disparity, Severiy, and Authority
The ultimate sentencing reforms that were adopted in Minnesota and Pennsylvania were significantly influenced by the way the
legislatures and guidelines commissions in each state addressed the
questions of disparity, severity, and authority. The handling of these
questions was in turn affected by the existing institutional arrangements and distribution of discretion, the extent and nature of the disparity resulting from the existing system, and the ability of the
372. Interview with Judge Scirica, supra note 181.
373. The guidelines became effective July 22, 1982 and apply to all offenses
committed on or after that date. See 204 Pa. Admin. Code § 303 (Shepard's 1983).
374. Act of March 8, 1982, no. 1982-54, 1982 Pa. Legis. Serv. 215 (Purdon),
amending 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 9703, 9712-16 (Purdon 1982). The bill provided for five-year minimum sentences for offenders found guilty of second or subsequent offenses for murder (third degree), voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault, arson, and kidnapping, for all
first offenders convicted of the above felonies while in possession of a deadly weapon,
and for all persons convicted of these violent crimes committed on local
transportation.
375. For a discussion of the legislative battle over the enactment of mandatory
minimum or guidelines sentencing in Pennsylvania, see notes 182-207 and accompanying text supra.
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interest groups with a stake in the outcome to mobilize members and
exert influence during the development of the sentencing reforms.
In both states the authority to set sentencing policy was delegated by the legislature to a newly created sentencing guidelines commission. However, the reasons for adopting various policies and the
impact of the guidelines on existing institutional arrangements differed substantially between the states. In Minnesota, the judiciary
was responsible for the disposition decision, while the parole board
had authority to decide the duration of prison terms. Although the
parole board had developed parole guidelines, the erosion of confidence in rehabilitation and in the MCB's ability to produce equitable
punishment had estranged its former supporters. Legislatively fixed
sentences came to be seen by many as the only alternative, and would
have been adopted but for the stubborn resistance of strategically important opponents of such a change. The proposed alternative, sentencing guidelines for felony offenses, offered a compromise that all
parties could accept. Although it was agreed that severity would not
increase, law enforcement interests were satisfied with the increased
certainty of incarceration and their greater influence in shaping the
sentencing decision. The judiciary retained "structured discretion"
over sentence lengths. The corrections bureaucracy and defense bar,
which were concerned more with increased severity than with discretionary authority, saw the guidelines as more effective than legislative
term-setting. Local interests, which played little role in the debate,
were subsequently given a financial incentive. Thus, when the guidelines were adopted, everybody had gained something.
In Pennsylvania, the existing institutional arrangements involved a different distribution of discretion and, consequently, a different set of problems. The minimum/maximum sentencing system
gave judges wide discretion over both the disposition and duration
decisions, while the parole board actually had limited effect on the
system. Judges could appease public demands for toughness by setting maximum sentences at or near the statutory maximum while setting relatively short minimums that, in most cases, would be the term
actually served. The legislature could posture about getting tough on
crime but maintain stable prison populations by merely increasing
statutory maximum sentences. The result was both unsystematic disparity within local jurisdictions and patterned regional disparity, as
urban judges were more lenient in sentencing offenders than those in
rural and suburban areas.
Sentencing reformers in Pennsylvania were united in their desire
to limit judicial discretion, but were divided with respect to the other
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goals and the means to bring about reform. Those emphasizing deterrence and incapacitation pushed for mandatory minimums for repeat offenses against persons to assure greater certainty and severity
of punishment. Others, operating from a retributive perspective,
sought principally to reduce disparity by making sentence severity
proportional with offense seriousness through uniform sentencing
standards without increasing severity. Harsh mandatory minimums
at first ran into opposition as too costly to implement and too narrow
and cosmetic a reform. Increasing the authority of the parole board
was not politically feasible. Consequently, the proposed alternative of
a sentencing guidelines commission was adopted. To its advocates it
promised a flexible means of reducing disparity throughout the system; to others it offered an opportunity to vote for a sentencing reform bill that deferred costs but increased severity immediately
through interim guidelines.
In each state the severity question was linked with fiscal issues.
In Minnesota, the legislature opted for fiscal restraint rather than
more severe sentences through an alliance between criminal justice
liberals and budgetary conservatives. Because the severity issue was
resolved, the rhetoric of "getting tough on crime" was not only politically unnecessary but was a threat to the policy. This rhetoric was
largely silenced in the legislative debate and, subsequently, by the
Commission through its interpretation of the legislative mandate as
requiring the guidelines to maintain prison population at the current
level.
In Pennsylvania, political rhetoric about "the crime problem"
and a rise in crime rates led to intense pressure in the legislature for
increased punishment levels. This pressure was countered in part by
concern with the costs associated with incarceration. The 1978 legislation that created a sentencing guidelines commission was passed
without resolving the severity and cost issues. However, when the
Commission's October, 1980 Draft Guidelines embodied policies of
reducing disparity, leveling sentence severity to a statewide mean for
each offense, and maintaining the existing level of prison population,
the whole severity/disparity/authority debate was reopened as certain interests found those policies insufficient or unacceptable. The
debate was finally resolved by opting for token reductions in disparity, vastly greater severity, and increased corrections costs by providing for both mandatory minimums for certain crimes, and sentencing
guidelines to limit judicial discretion across the board. These limitations, however, serve largely symbolic political ends by affirming the
desirability of a statewide sentencing policy and providing a common
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reference point for judges; but due to the wide judicial discretion remaining, they are likely to have little real effect on sentencing
outcomes.
B.

The Legislative Mandate

The Minnesota Commission's mandate was more limited and
specific than that of the Pennsylvania Commission. This difference,
combined with existing institutional arrangements, made the development of sentencing guidelines a less complex task than that in
Pennsylvania. The Minnesota legislative mandate was shaped with
the intent of abolishing the parole board and eliminating the arbitrariness that grew from parole release practices. Only those sentence
durations formerly determined by the MCB were to be set by the
guidelines. The MSGC was formed to determine the circumstances
under which imprisonment is proper and to establish a presumptive
fixed sentence for felony offenders based on reasonable offense and
offender characteristics. The Commission was directed to consider
past practice and correctional resources as the basis for establishing
the guidelines. The MSGC exercised its option of not designing
guidelines for non-imprisonment felony sentences.
In Pennsylvania, where the parole board had much less power
than in Minnesota, the vast discretionary authority of the judiciary
was the target of reform. Supporters of mandatory minimum
sentences proposed to attack the problem by fettering the judges' authority through harsher, mandatory sentences for a small but highly
visible fraction of the offender population. This solution had great
political appeal, but failed to satisfy those wanting broader change.
The legislation creating the Commission gave it responsibility for developing guidelines for both felony and misdemeanor sentences. This
put the Commission in the position of attacking the discretion of the
judiciary over a broad range of its decisions.
As a concession to the judiciary, the term "presumptive" was
eliminated from the Commission's mandate. The legislation authorized the development of "advisory" guidelines, leaving to the PCS
and ultimately to the superior court on appellate review, the determination of how binding the guidelines were to be. Elimination of the
presumptive language created two problems. First, it removed the
certainty that the law enforcement community desired, and second,
without presumptive language, it was very difficult to project the impact of the guidelines.
The legislation did not mention consideration of prison facilities
because the severity issue had not been resolved. Justice-model advo-
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cates did not expect an increase in severity, while supporters of
mandatory minimums expected an increase. Thus a heavy burden
was put on the Pennsylvania Commission to address the dilemmas
that the legislature had been unable to resolve.
C.

Internal Dynamics: Membership, Leadership, and Staff

The interpretation of the legislative mandate and the strategy
that each commission adopted for addressing policy choices, resolving
differences, and dealing with affected interest groups contributed significantly to the viability of the guidelines that each commission produced. The composition of each commission reflected the
distribution of influence and political traditions of each state, and affected the reception of the guidelines.
Exclusion of legislators from the Minnesota Commission might
have been disastrous but for the appointment of several members
with legislative ties and experience. The citizen chairperson proved
to be better able to aggressively promote acceptance of the guidelines
than a Commission member representing a specific interest group.
The inclusion of citizens and exclusion of legislators would not have
been in keeping with Pennsylvania's tradition of limited citizen participation. However, the Pennsylvania legislators tended to devote
limited time to the Commission's work and were unable to prevent
legislative rejection when interest groups actively opposed the
guidelines.
Membership for the Commissioner of Corrections and head of
the parole board in Minnesota was a concession to these agencies
whose activities were to be affected by the guidelines. In Pennsylvania, their counterparts were excluded because their discretionary
authority would be unaffected by the guidelines and because these
agencies had little political influence. Inclusion of the commissioner
in Minnesota had the largely unintended virtue of assuring the presence of a member of the governor's cabinet on the Commission,
thereby providing access to the State House and increasing the governor's stake in the outcome.
The leadership, internal dynamics, and staff affected decisionmaking in each commission and contributed to the content of, and
reaction to, the guidelines. Minnesota Chairperson Jan Smaby's consultative leadership style, political skills, and willingness to make the
guidelines a personal crusade contributed to their acceptance. The
Commission functioned harmoniously for the most part and permitted itself to be guided by its staff. The MSGC staff was able to articulate clearly the complexity of the issues, to focus the Commission's
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attention on the policy choices, to provide a bridge between the language and concepts of social science and law in making the research
findings accessible to Commission members, and to press the Commission to make decisions.
The PCS original chairperson, Judge Richard Conaboy, was less
involved than his Minnesota counterpart in the guideline development process and far more restrained in advocating their acceptance
by interest groups and the legislature. In the second phase, the new
chairman, Judge Scirica, and the Commission members took a more
politically active approach to their work, tasks were more clearly defined, and internal frictions dissipated.
D. Interpreting the Mandate and Designing the Guidehnes

Each commission began by examining the work on descriptive
guidelines developed by the Albany Criminal Justice Research
Center, and each rejected the notion that the task was simply to
model and systematize past practice. Minnesota was the first jurisdiction to break with the descriptive model. The October 1978 staff
Concept Paper articulated the range of policy choices implicit in
moving from data on past practice to guidelines representing future
policy and highlighted the role of values in making these choices.
This set the MSGC on an uncharted course, made members actively
function as decisionmakers, and altered the criteria for the evaluation
of the Commission's work. No longer were the primary questions
technical ones of right or wrong models; rather, they involved agreement with, or dissent from, the value choices made by the Commission. The PCS also collected data on past practice, but developed
largely prescriptive guidelines going a step farther from the descriptive model, since it was not limited by a requirement to consider past
practice or prison populations.

A key to the success of the MSGC in producing feasible guidelines was the interpretation of its mandate to "consider . . . correc-

tional resources" as an absolute limit on future prison populations.
This made the MSGC's task one of allocating scarce prison resources.
It forced a discipline on the Commission which it subsequently imposed on others and permitted it to act in a responsible and "pragmatic" way. In contrast, the Pennsylvania Commission, without a
comparable legislative mandate, but nonetheless concerned about the
political consequences of insisting on imposing an allocation restriction on itself, assumed a "principled" stance in determining sanction
levels, initially designing presumptive guidelines that held prison
population nearly constant. However, when critics of the October,
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1980 Draft Guidelines demanded more severe sentencing schedules
and less presumptiveness, the PCS yielded. It increased sentence severity and eliminated the presumptive nature of the guidelines,
thereby undercutting the integrity of their initial conception. Following legislative rejection, the PCS was given a clear mandate-to further increase severity and widen ranges-to which it responded.
To design a policy that did not overcrowd prisons, it was necessary to project prison populations accurately. To do this the MSGC
collected data on past dispositional and durational practices which it
then used in an innovative way. Rather than merely seeking to mirror the past, the staff devised a prison population projection model
with which to explore the implications of policy options. Policies that
would lead to prison overcrowding were rejected, while those that
were feasible were considered in terms of both past practice and the
values of the Commission members and the concerned interest
groups.
The PCS also collected and analyzed data on past practice to
inform itself of existing practice and the implications of various policy
options. However, without the discipline of the prison population
cap, choices were not based as much on data projection. The Pennsylvania projections rested on many assumptions about judicial decisions, and were therefore less reliable. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania
Commission's data on 1977 sentences undermined support for the initial guidelines because critics maintained (and subsequent research
confirmed) that they understated sentence severity and exaggerated
the impact of the guidelines in comparison with 1981 sentencing
practices. Moreover, the data indicated the extent to which sentence
severity in many counties would be decreased which crystallized opposition to the guidelines.
The MSGC, viewing the construction of the guidelines as a policymaking process, launched a broad campaign to influence groups
and individuals who were interested in the guidelines, while the
Pennsylvania Commission did not conduct such a campaign. The
Minnesota strategy of aggressive constituency-building worked in
that state because it was done effectively and because certain preconditions for success were present. First, Minnesota's opinion leaders
were generally in agreement on the goal of sentencing reform, thereby
permitting discussion to revolve around the means to achieve it. Further, Commission members shared this goal and articulated it to interest group representatives, who sensed that change was coming and
agreed to participate in shaping the guidelines to fit their interests.
Second, the Commission had a chairperson and members willing to
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attend countless meetings and hearings and able to make clear and
convincing presentations. Third, the criminal justice community was
small enough that it could be reached and induced to participate in
the process on a sustained basis.
The Minnesota public relations campaign had several components: 1) initial public hearings to publicize the guidelines; 2) efforts
to build good press relations; 3) involvement of Commission members
in maintaining close contact with the Commission's constituent
groups to ensure both that constituent concerns were presented to the
Commission and that these groups were kept informed of Commission decisions; and 4) "hearings" that were held at the annual meetings of the trial judges, county prosecutors, and public defenders
associations one month before submission of the guidelines to the legislature. Such a process might have highlighted irreconcilable differences if they had existed, but given the MSGC's relatively clear
mandate and the general agreement on the goals of reform, this process led to clarification of the need to compromise in allocating prison
space once the "ground rules" established by the Commission were
clear and resulted in open negotiation among Commission members
representing interest groups.
The preconditions for open debate and constituency building
were absent in Pennsylvania. Legislative leaders, divided and ambivalent about the level of severity and about appropriate limits on judicial discretion, had passed off the problem to the Commission. Since
the Commission members initially lacked a clear sense of the goals of
reform, and the methods to be used to achieve them, public involvement probably would have heightened internal tension and
politicized discussion of the issues within the Commission. This, in
turn, would have increased the dual pressure for greater severity and
more judicial discretion. In addition, the size and geographical dispersion of interest groups which themselves were often divided on issues by regional differences greatly increased the difficulty of
communication and negotiation with those groups. Commission
members, uncertain of the direction and shape of the guidelines, focused on the guidelines' construction and put aside constituency
building.
Although the initial Pennsylvania guidelines were quite similar
to those adopted in Minnesota, the effects-a substantial redistribution of prison and jail population around the state and a reduction of
sentence severity in suburban and rural jurisdictions-threatened
judges, prosecutors, and local corrections officials without offering
them any perceptible benefits. Given Pennsylvania's sentencing sys-
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tem and political climate, it is questionable whether an aggressive effort to build a constituency for guidelines that would bring
substantive rather than symbolic changes would have led to an acceptable compromise. But with limited external input and feedback,
the Commission drafted guidelines that were out of touch with the
political realities and interests in the state and were therefore met
with a barrage of criticism. While all agreed on the principle that the
"worst" offenders should go to prison for long terms, when this meant
overcrowded county jails and shorter terms for offenders in one's own
district, perceived self-interest prevailed. Addressing the crime problem in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia by reducing sentences elsewhere
in the state was unacceptable. During the second phase of the guidelines' development, the Commission was more careful to appease the
interest groups which, by pushing through the Hagarty Resolution,
had already made clear their ability to resist change that was more
than cosmetic.
E.

The Product: A Comparison of Minnesota-sandPennsylvania's
Sentencing Guidelines

Minnesota's and Pennsylvania's guidelines are similar in their
matrix format and underlying retributive emphasis on current offense
rather than prior record. However, they differ significantly with respect to the severity level for felonies, the width of discretionary
ranges, and the scope of the guidelines. The differences in statutory
definitions, offense severity ranking, and criminal history scoring, and
the many possible enhancements of the offender score in Pennsylvania make comparison of sentences for similar crimes difficult.
Nevertheless, Table I suggests the differences between the Pennsylvania January, 1981 Proposal, the Pennsylvania guidelines actually adopted, and the Minnesota guidelines with respect to the
severity and the width of the normal guidelines range for several
crimes.

37 6

The treatment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and
deviations from the guidelines in the two states is quite different. In
Minnesota the guideline sentence is presumptive. A finding of "substantial and compelling" aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
however, permits the judge to deviate from the guidelines and impose
376. This chart illustrates the difference between the Minnesota guidelines and
Pennsylvania's January, 1981 Proposal and the final, adopted guidelines in terms of
severity and width of normal guideline range for several crimes.
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or stay any sentence authorized by law provided that the judge gives
written reasons for the deviation. The emphasis is on limiting the
number of deviations but allowing latitude when compelling circumstances are presented.
Under the Pennsylvania guidelines, the grid sentence is advisory
rather than presumptive. In anticipation of more frequent invocation
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Pennsylvania Commission focused its efforts on limiting the amount of deviation rather
than the frequency. By considering an aggravated or mitigated sentence as being within the guidelines and allowing the judge to move
right or left by one cell, the Commission's January, 1981 Guidelines
Proposal made it easy to alter a sentence by six months but quite
difficult to find additional reasons for going outside the guidelines.
This had the disadvantage of limiting sentencing options in sentencing unusual cases. In the version of the guidelines finally adopted, the
list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances was eliminated,
thereby offering neither guidance nor any effective limitation on
judges' discretion regarding when to aggravate or mitigate within the
guidelines (by the specified amount) and when to deviate from them.
The scope of the guidelines also differs between the two states.
Minnesota's guidelines do not address misdemeanors or the actual
sanction for the eighty percent of the felons whose sentences are
stayed, since the MSGC did not design non-imprisonment guidelines.
The judges, prosecutor, and public defender on the Commission all
agreed that a statewide policy for state prisoners was desirable. A
statewide policy for other sentences was seen as an undesirable infringement on the community corrections approach and might have
created strong opposition to the statewide sentencing guidelines. The
guidelines, in essence, were narrowly and very sharply focused on the
worst felons.
Pennsylvania's January, 1981 Guidelines Proposal provided recommended sentences for both felonies and misdemeanors, provoking
strong protest because they threatened judicial discretion and
prosecutorial practices across the board and ignored local customs.
By telling judges that they should not lock up minor offenders, even
where they tended in existing practice not to do so, rather than focusing on the question of who should go to state prison, the Commission
diffused and thereby undercut its effort to introduce meaningful sentencing reform. Forced to retreat, the Commission produced the final
version of the guidelines which in essence leaves judicial discretion in
sentencing misdemeanants untouched and allows wide discretionary
ranges for handling felons.
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The Role of Interest Groups

Both the Minnesota and Pennsylvania guidelines proposed
changes in existing policies and practices. The MSGC's guidelines
were accepted because the changes they introduced were principled
and limited in scope, because they left important areas of discretion
untouched, and because they gave more than they took from virtually
all affected interest groups. The Commission highlighted the change
in principle underlying imprisonment policy, downplayed the regional redistribution of prisoners, and added a number of sweeteners
that won the support of the primary interest groups.
The county attorneys were pleased with the right of the state to
appeal a sentence, the inclusion of the juvenile record, the elimination
of social status factors from consideration in sentencing, and the
greater certainty of imprisonment for person offenders. The public
defenders viewed as a success their efforts to limit the effects of prior
misdemeanors and juvenile adjudications on criminal history scores.
The judges were divided and thereby neutralized. The guidelines
shifted, rather than diminished, judicial discretion by limiting dispositional authority, while giving judges authority to determine sentence durations. Community Corrections Act counties were given a

financial incentive to support the guidelines. The reaction of corrections personnel was mixed. Probation officers were concerned with
added responsibilities, but leaders in the Department of Corrections
were pleased with increased leverage over prisoners and a predictable
prison population. Indian and Black groups, while suspicious of the
guidelines, felt they had gained by the prohibition of consideration of
social status factors. Feminist groups were pleased with increased sentence severity for sexual offenders. When the guidelines were submitted to the legislature, all organized opposition had been neutralized
and key legislators went along with what otherwise was likely to have
been a controversial policy.

Pennsylvania's October, 1980 Draft Guidelines would have only
modestly increased prison populations, reduced regional disparity by
decreasing the number of offenders from small cities, suburban, and
rural areas to be incarcerated, and limited judges' discretion in sentencing both misdemeanants and felons. Such a proposal, while arguably equitable and ostensibly responsive to the legislative mandate,
was politically unpalatable. The guidelines made mandatory minimum sentences look less inhibiting to judges, more certain to prosecutors, more reasoned to correctional administrators, and less costly to
county government officials. When the regional implications of a policy to reduce disparity became apparent, discussion of disparity was
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replaced by concern that sentencing "uniformity" would fail to meet
each county's unique problems.
Opposition to the January, 1981 Guidelines Proposal led to a
reopening of the legislative debate over sentencing reform. Although
the Commission salvaged the concept of guidelines, they ceased to be
the unique solution and became instead a complementary crimefighting measure as the legislature also passed a mandatory minimum
sentence bill and a revenue measure to increase prison capacity.
The final Pennsylvania guidelines, which further increased sentence severity and broadened the range of judicial discretion, raised
virtually no opposition. Technical ambiguities and confusion about
complexity had been removed; prosecutors could no longer credibly
complain of leniency nor judges of being "fettered." By fulfilling the
clarified legislative mandate and establishing general principles without substantially redistributing authority in practice, the guidelines
became politically acceptable.
G.

Conclusion

Each commission was relatively successful in living up to the expectations of the legislature that created it. In Minnesota there was a
consensus favoring presumptive sentences for felonies, elimination of
the parole board, and reduction of existing disparities without an
overall increase in severity or prison population. The MSGC had a
limited mandate, which it fulfilled by providing guidelines with a
principled and feasible policy. Interest groups which participated in
creating the guidelines gained more than they lost by accepting them.
In Pennsylvania, the Commission failed initially to create politically
acceptable guidelines and yielded in its principled stance on prison
population. However, the PSC may have achieved a latent goal of
the Pennsylvania legislature. The Commission bought time and subsequently heightened awareness of the dilemmas and policy choices
involved in simultaneously seeking to reduce disparity, increase severity, and hold down prison populations and costs. When the choices
became clear, the legislature made a symbolic gesture toward reducing disparity by adopting guidelines with broad ranges and made a
real commitment to increased severity and the associated costs of an
expansion in prison capacity. Rather than choosing between guidelines and mandatory minimums, it adopted both "reforms."
The contrasting outcomes of the development of sentencing
guidelines in the two states caution against generalizing from the experience of a single state. Other jurisdictions considering adopting a
guidelines approach cannot simply attempt to duplicate the Minne-
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sota Commission's experience. Their success in producing politically
acceptable guidelines that introduce a measure of determinacy are
likely to be affected by the following factors: the state's political culture; the magnitude and definition of "the crime problem;" the general political climate; the existing distribution of authority; the level
of consensus in the legislature about the nature of the desired change
and the expression of this consensus in a legislative mandate; the goals
and influence of interest groups in bringing about change; and the
skills of the guidelines commission both in creating a rational, coherent, feasible, and equitable system, and in enlisting the support of the
most powerful interest groups affected by the change.
Finally, adopting a reform measure leaves unanswered questions
about its magnitude, impact, and broader implications. Neither
Pennsylvania's legislative mandate nor the guidelines went very far in
structuring sentencing decisions, reducing disparity, or introducing
"determinacy" into that state, either in theory or in practice. Minnesota, in contrast, seems to have adopted a real change, moving from a
system resting on indeterminate sentences and utilitarian goals to one
in which punishments of determinate length are announced at the
time of sentencing and are based on a just desserts model. Still, several caveats are necessary. First, there are numerous avenues for both
reintroducing utilitarian considerations in sentencing and altering
sentence lengths. Empirical research will have to determine whether
the correctional bureaucracy affects time to be served by denying
good time; how prosecutors' charge and plea negotiation practices,
which are not regulated by the guidelines, affect sentencing outcomes;
and the extent to which "like" offenders actually receive like
sanctions.
Second, determinate systems are unstable and particularly vulnerable to easy alteration under public pressure for increased sentence severity. Minnesota's guidelines face pressures from four
sources that potentially threaten their survival. The legislature may
pass legislation that undermines the balance between prison capacity
and population. The judiciary may react in either of two ways. It
may deviate consistently in the direction of greater severity, increasing population pressure on the prisons. Alternatively, the judges may
sentence at or below the guidelines in cases that lead to public outcry
over "leniency" that threatens the existing system. The governor may
alter the Commission by replacing current members with new members not committed to the current guidelines. Finally, the Commission may alter the guidelines. Thus, whether the coalition of interests
that created Minnesota's determinate sentencing system will continue
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to support the guidelines and whether the guidelines will have the
desired impact on actual sentencing practices and outcomes, remains
to be seen.
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